Telling the Untellable: Dialectic of Silence in Jewish-American and Arab-American Holocaust Discourse

MUNIR AHMED AL-AGHBERI
University of Al-Bayda
Yemen
maghberi@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

The present paper attempts to cast light on an important aspect of Holocaust literature. Basically, it is an investigation into two ideological responses to the Shoah that, though characterised by the dominant element of silence, both are marked by essential discrepancies. One sort of responses finds in silence a trope for the incommunicability of the trauma; the counter response professes silence as a fragile way of protest and resistance. This paradoxical dialectic of silence is traced in both Jewish-American and Arab-American literary discourses as emblematic contexts of the discrepancy in the Holocaust representation. Silence, as examined herein, is found to typify a meta-narrative arising from the tension between sacred memory and subversive amnesia. It effectively re-enacts the conflicting histories of loss and trauma where the deliberate absence of voice is believed to convey what words mostly fall short of and thus it could enhance one’s status of victimhood.

Keywords: silence; dialectic; Jewish-American; Arab-American; Holocaust discourse.

INTRODUCTION

A distinct feature about Holocaust literature is that it relies for impressiveness on the paradox of telling the untellable and imagining the unimaginable. It tries in the process to bridge the gap between the world a reader is able to fathom and the one never seen, even in nightmares. To achieve that, Holocaust discourse goes beyond the structural limits of language to the communicable meta-discourse of silence. Several ambiguous circumstances wrap the rupture in speaking to the tragedy in its aftermath hiding beneath variable if not antithetic motives and manifestations. The question posed herein, therefore, emerges as an investigation into two ideological responses to the Shoah that, though characterised by the dominant element of silence, both are marked by essential discrepancies. One sort of response finds in silence a trope for the incommunicability of the trauma; the counter response professes silence as a fragile way of protest and resistance. This paradoxical dialectic of silence is traced in both Jewish-American and Arab-American discourse as a typical context of the discrepancy in the Holocaust representation. Silence in both is a long shadow cast by violence and loss.

Basing the main argument on the implications of silence as tackled by Wajnryb (2001), LaCapra (1996), Cathy Caruth (1995), etc., the present study examines and compares selected texts from the Arab-American and Jewish-American literary and critical discourse over the Holocaust. It analyses recurrent fictional incidents and images and place them within the context of the writers’ collective consciousness. The broader theoretical framework will be an adaptation of criticism of consciousness where certain motifs become indicative of the ideology that a group of writers consciously or unconsciously adhere to.

In principle, to depict how language falls short to represent the Holocaust necessitates exploring the absence of speech as an efficient alternative and an evocative method to convey the message that is otherwise transformed in a distorted way. For, the disruption of language does not necessarily mean messages are no longer sent. It, by contrast, implies that communication assumes free play. This leads to the core of the present study which proposes that in the Holocaust context silence is not identical with simple muteness, but as Dominick
LaCapra puts it, “the way language breaks down is itself a significant and even telling process” (1996, p.47). The distinction between ‘telling silence’ and ‘mute silence’ is therefore instrumental in understanding the plurality of voices inhabiting the subtext through listening to the silences and reading between the lines. “Through their very breakdown,” observes Shoshana Felman, “the sounds testify, henceforth, precisely to knowledge they do not possess, by unleashing, and by drifting into, their own buried depth of silence” (1995, p.43). The silence about the Holocaust in this context is defined by what is felt and thought but for one reason or the other remains indescribable and inexpressible. In his essay *Unspeakable*, Thomas Trezise, in the course of originating the unspeakability of the Holocaust in its historical setting, comes up with three explanations paralleling the three dictionary definitions of the term. Accordingly, *Unspeakable* could mean that “the historical event simply exceeds any and all means of verbal representations at our disposal”. It may mean “bad or objectionable” conveying “a judgment of taste, whether aesthetic or social (that is, having to do with what is socially inappropriate)”. The third explanation matches the unspeakable event up with “a ‘sacred’ object, that is, an object that either cannot be spoken because it lies outside the profane world and its language, or may not be spoken, because speaking it would be a profanation” (Trezise 2011, p.39).

Coming now to the point, silence as intended by this study is synonymous with what Ruth Wajnryb refers to as the ‘Unspoken Text’ that he defines as: messages conveyed in the absence of text. He classifies it into three types—exclusions, iconic messages and omissions. ‘Exclusions,’ according to him, are forced absences that amount to the taboo topics actively excluded from standard discourse, whereas ‘iconic messages’ refer to the meanings associated with certain tangible objects, certain recurrent behaviours and attitudes, and certain remembered occasions that invoke Holocaustal significance. He names chimneys, dogs and trains as examples of tangible objects. The third type, ‘Omissions,’ is closest to pure silence, “Here the silences are so absent, the reference to the past so muted. . . .” This last one includes silence as conspiracy, silence as denial and silence as cultural genocide. (Wajnryb, 2011, p. 248-76).

Inspired by Wajnryb’s classification, the dialectic of silence, herein, contrasts the Jewish-American cult of keeping the aura of the sacred intact with the Arab-American deliberate negligence of the topic adhering to the outcome of Arab-Israeli conflict. The former resurrects from about two decades of complete lack of speech to a shy and covert portrayal of the survivors’ trauma by disrupting language and letting the picture speak. The latter highlights the Nakba discourse in order to defeat Zionism in the game of victimhood.

**JEWISH-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE**

To begin with, writing about the Shoah in the Jewish-American context entails a radical alteration in the means of communication that opts for the existential and psychological halo engulfing the event. While language, falling short of its task, heaps massive difficulties in the way of successful communication, silence entrusts the chief part of communication to the listener who is required to calibrate the text against its context. The ‘linguistic lack’ denotes a further systematic one where both language and the individual are rendered outstripped of linguistic ability. Elie Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor best known for his memoir-novel *Night*, sums up the paradoxical equation of the need to tell the ineffable in the statement, “I know we must speak. I do not know how. Since this crime is absolute all language is imperfect” (1990, p.86). Like Wiesel, survivors do not have the language to speak out their anguish as they suffer from ‘survivor syndrome,’ i.e., symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder including anxiety, exaggerated fears, failure to grieve, nightmares, etc.
That syndrome is best portrayed by Edward Lewis Wallant’s novel *The Pawnbroker* (1961). To intensify the representation of the Holocaust, Wallant uses a double method: depicting the existential dilemma of the survivor unable to get rid of the hangovers in the aftermath of the tragedy, on the one hand, and employing a collage of elements from recurring nightmares to construct Nazerman’s experience in the concentration camps of Dachau and Bergen-Belsen. While Nazerman has no conscious memories to share about his experience leaving the task of conjuring up the past to the unconscious fragmented dreams, nowhere in the novel is the Holocaust overtly stated. The collage of dreams through which the Holocaust experience is retrieved in the novel, however, is paralleled by the technique of flash cuts some of which do not last a second in Lumet’s film adaptation that makes some expressionist cinematic modification to fit into the visual presentation. Lumet’s film could further address the paradox of telling a story that must be told and foregrounding the inadequacy of conveying the horror of it in Rod Steiger’s (the actor playing Sol’s part in the film) ‘mute scream’ that articulates the inexpressibility of the grief.

Taking into consideration that the Holocaust has two victims (those who died and those who survived), telling about trauma for survivors becomes a kind of reliving the event; they, therefore, die twice. Reclining to unspeakability provides an escape though it fails to hide the tension between two impulses: the impulse to tell and let the world know and the counter impulse to suppress telling and forget in order to live normally. At this juncture emerges the importance of silence as a probe to access the shadow of the experience. In the essay entitled ‘From Speechlessness to Narrative,’ Dori Laub notes, “Not only what survivors could say but what they could not say about their traumatic experiences constitute most valuable sources of information” (2011, p.256). He believes that the post-survival silence is the outcome of ‘inner speechlessness’ where no tellable story exists after the event except an ‘absent experience’ and a “frozen image recorded in a different part of the brain”. Laub goes on to call ‘erasure’ the process through which “parts of the survivor’s story, and thus a piece of human history, are lost to silence” (2011, p.257). Both of Laub’s ‘frozen image’ and lost history are best represented in Saul Bellow’s novel *Mr. Sammler’s Planet*.

A significant feature of Mr. Sammler is that he is one-eyed; a trait that has its own evocative implications. Although he has surrealistic visits whenever scenes from the past are recollected, seeing the world through only one eye means that half of the protagonist is absent somewhere. For, having “only one good eye” suggests that the now-and-here world contains only half of the truth whereas the other half lies far away in time and space. True, “the good eye was dark bright, full of observation,” (2007, p.2) but Mr. Sammler needs the blind eye equally. If the right eye helps him indulge into the minutest details of the present, the left flawed eye, distinguishing ‘only light and shade’ represents a channel connecting Mr. Sammler with a world of the past where no distinctive colors make their objects traceable. Movement between the two worlds, then, takes place throughout the novel by alternately and symbolically switching from one eye to another. In his encounter with the black pickpocket, Mr. Sammler’s fear, giving way to nervous stress that he feels sickening his skull, muscles and blood, allows switching to take place. The vision is directed via the damaged nerve of the blind eye to a scene of the past:

He felt a constriction, a clutch of sickness at the base of the skull where the nerves, muscles, blood vessels were tightly interlaced. The breath of wartime Poland passing over the damaging tissue—that nerve-spaghetti, as he thought of it. (2011, p.2-3)

In fact, such an epileptic-like reaction by Sammler evokes the sense of a disabled memory.

Silence, therefore, is not merely void but a history submerged by the absence of narrative. That lack of ability to tell applies not only to survivors who remain unwilling to speak, but also to those who encounter a complexity of social stigma and traumatic enigma
that prevent them to articulate a permanently fractured self besieged by belonging to a silenced group. In this respect, both Rosa in Ozick’s short story ‘Rosa’ and Nazerman in The Pawnbroker are suggestively illustrative. Both are Holocaust survivors and both shun people who come to their shops creating and maintaining a necessary gap of communication because, no matter how those people tend to show understanding, they actually know nothing about the horrible past hidden deep in their memories. In an attempt to widen that gap more, Rosa, unable to stand them any longer, smashes up her store self-justifying: “whoever came, they were like deaf people. Whatever you explained to them, they didn’t understand.” (Ozick, 1990, p.27).

That casts light on the anguished memory as the state in which language falls short to express the trauma. Silence in the case of trauma tells about the mental and emotional failure to shape memory into something literally communicable although it becomes itself a vivid witness to the intensive suffering and a vehicle that, to use Wan Roselezam’s terms, conveys “inner consciousness” (2003, p.5). In the essay Is Forgetting Reprehensible, Björn Krondorfer comments:

> When the totality of memory continues to intrude into the present life of survivors, their silence may be the most authentic act of remembering—because such wordlessness, rooted in continuously felt pain and despair, testifies to a visceral memory that remains incommunicable and unrecognizable even to the survivors themselves. (2008, p.244-5)

True, the absence of talk on a topic of trauma is ultimately destructive as it keeps the individual enclosed behind the barriers of suppressed reality. But the fears that the shattered lives of survivors would yield only fragmented tale imposes silence as a bitter alternative on those who come through and live on. When LaCapra states that there is “a sense in which silence may indeed be the only way to confront a traumatic past” (1996, p.122) he denounces any potential structure as inequivalent and reductionist. Silence is the only acceptable response to the Holocaust. The real fear, then, is that the tellable artistic version might be imperfect and distorted which, in turn, does no more than trivialise a sacred memory.

In an interview with Elaine Kauvar, Cynthia Ozick accused the Holocaust fiction of reducing the historical facts to mere ‘imaginings’ (Kauvar, 1993, p.391) and of distancing the reader from the agony of the first-hand experience. In her short story ‘The Shawl,’ Rosa a mother losing her infant Magda in the electrified fence, “took Magda’s shawl and filled her own mouth with it” (1990, p.9). The shawl-stuffed mouth creates a repressed scream of agony and anguish a desperate woman can produce in immediate reaction to the loss of a child. The act symbolises a pragmatic self-imposed silence that conveys the above-mentioned message preached by Ozick not to violate the sacred shrine (the Holocaust). Commenting on this image David Brauner writes that “the story does not finish in a note of triumphant, liberated expression, but rather with another image of (self-) enforced silence” (1990, p.120).

In fact, Ozick, in both ‘The Shawl’ and its sequel story ‘Rosa,’ deliberately makes Rosa speak the silent language of the Holocaust trauma, which, besides maintaining the sacred rituals of unspeakable suffering, would be able to “tell everybody –not only [her] story but other stories as well” (1990, p.66). Polish, her ‘own language,’ embodies that silent language as it has been effective only when writing to her dead daughter Magda and through which the reader gets exposed to a segment of Rosa’s past. English is a superficial language to communicate with a superficial world. This leads to a duality in expressing the self, perplexity, and thus unreliability in reporting the past events. Writing, therefore, can becomes a fictional re-enactment of the primary trauma from which the individual cannot break free: “she was writing inside a blazing flying current, a terrible beak of light bleeding out a kind of cuneiform on the underside of her brain. The drudgery of reminiscence brought fatigue, she felt glazed, lethargic” (1990, p.69). Psychologically speaking, the moment of conjuring up
the trauma is reinforced by words that articulate an unconscious expression of the repressed trauma itself. Yet, what is more frustrating is the condition when words fail to describe the horror of the Holocaust in the act of retrieving scenes from a wounded psyche. They all can be just other ways of repressing, projecting, and acting out trauma. This gives clue to narrative’s tension between the desire to speak—to break the silence—and the compulsion to preserve intact the unspeakable world of trauma.

Obviously, a great deal of the postwar reticence about directly representing the Holocaust is due to the worries of misrepresentation; to profane the sacred, to counterfeit the original and to pry open the shell of silence. For, to represent a massively experienced trauma of ultimate incommunicability in a trivialised fashion is to subject the unutterable to the commodifying process of reproduction that, according to Jean Baudrillard, always imply “an anguish, a disquieting foreignness: the uneasiness before the photograph, considered like a witch’s trick” (1998, p.356). Simulation, therefore, is one way by which the Holocaust sacred status is reduced to the vulgarity of oversimplifying complex events. Moreover, the memory of an absent object expressed in a story tested by experience enables the simulacrum to grow at the expense of memory. Judith E. Doneson observes, “The perpetual telling of the tale at the expense of raw memory, nevertheless, is the price paid to sustain a lasting vision in the minds of those who can never approach the reality of the Holocaust” (1996, p.74-5). Hence, the distance that memory naturally ensues from the original events and objects is further doubled by the tale encasing memory within an aesthetic framework.

ARAB-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Apart from silence that places the Holocaust over and beyond the human imagination and language, the opposite side of the coin reveals a counter silence that occurs out of a deliberate desire to keep the entire issue intact. It is what Ruth Wajnryb calls the ‘conspiracy of silence’ that begets an absence of public talk about the Holocaust in the first two decades following the war. This type, however, comprises a number of motives that ranges from the passive detachment of bystanders (individuals or institutions) to the one contextualised within the broader realm of ideologies and politics. An example of the latter is the German intellectuals that Derrida tackles in ‘Heidegger’s Silence’ and Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Central to the postwar indifferent response to the Holocaust is the silence of Arabs who have been badly affected by the establishment of the State of Israel causing them to lose so many things. This last attitude either prefers to absent the Holocaust from its discourse or react negatively to it in fear that the event, exploited by certain agendas, would scapegoat the people to pay the debts that Europe owes to Jews.

The response to the Holocaust by Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular, however, can never be dealt with in isolation from the politics of struggle with Zionism as well as their own tragedy and sense of victimhood. Their reaction ranges from negligence of the topic while highlighting the discourse of Nakba and Deir Yassin to shaking the very ground about its authenticity and even denial. Casting doubts about the Holocaust aims in the first place to demolish the moral and historical basis of Zionism and the State of Israel. Being victims of Zionism, Palestinians could not accept the victimhood of what they view as their perpetrators as it gives them some moral justification. This attitude, however, wavers in accordance with the nature of political relations between the two people. When the peace negotiations achieve some progress in 1998, the ex-president of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat was willing to accept the initiative of visiting the Holocaust Museum in Washington. But the visit did not take place since the museum’s board of directors refused to extend him an official VIP invitation. This attitude on the part of the highest Palestinian
authority reflects the political essence of the Palestinian response to the Holocaust. They find it difficult to accept the other’s tragedy as it, yoked with the ongoing conflict, entails contributing to the moral justification of their own displacement.

In an interview with Karl Pfeiker, Esther Webman, a research scholar at the Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, and the author of *From Empathy to Denial: Arab Response to the Holocaust* (co-authored by Meir Litvak) traces the different phases of the Arab views toward the Holocaust. According to the study, the immediate postwar Arab sympathy for the Jews victimised by Nazis soon vanished after they realised that “the issue of the displaced persons is going to be settled in Palestine.” They find themselves torn between the humanitarian impulse to help a displaced persecuted people and the fear of losing their own land. But when they find themselves next in the list of displacement, a crucial alteration takes place. In Webman’s words:

> This conflict didn’t exist later on because they really pushed aside this knowledge and they did not only push aside this kind of knowledge but they also prohibited knowledge from coming in to Arab countries, not only knowledge but also films, books, anything that concerns the Holocaust. (2010, n. p.)

This marks the origin of Arab silence that compares talking about the Holocaust to taboos of betraying the cause of one’s own nation.

Among Arab intellectuals silence, less oriented by politics, develops gradually into a reluctant acceptance that voices protest against oppressions and dispossessions regardless of whether the victims are Jews or Palestinians. Edward Said who in “An Ideology of Difference” denounces the logic of the present as “a logic of either unacceptable stagnating or annihilation” (1985, p.57) is a paradigmatic case in point. Said states that Arabs should “accept the Jewish experience in all that entails of horror and fear . . . This act of comprehension guarantees one’s humanity and resolve that such a catastrophe should never be forgotten and never again recur” (qtd. in Litvak, 2003, p.133). Said, however, stipulates for breaking the silence about the Holocaust an acceptance of the relationship between what happened to the Jews in World War II and the catastrophe of the Palestinian people as the foundation for any peaceful coexistence.

Absolutely aware of the Arabs’ deliberate reluctance to the Holocaust and the Jewish past grievances, Said once made a plea for Arabs and Palestinians to revise and come to terms with the Holocaust and its intensive impact on the Jewish people. In his lecture on the history and hangovers of the Balfour Declaration in Washington, DC, Said focused on the Palestinian tragedy as a point of departure for his real message, a message that rose above the dualistic discourses underlying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For him, the problem goes beyond the political or intellectual righteousness to an utmost moral necessity. It is not a matter of choice that one could evade or postpone, because of the inseparable interconnections between Palestinian Arabs and Jews:

> It is simply remarkable that, in the entire Arab world, you cannot find a single institute devoted to the study of Israel, Judaism, the Holocaust, or even American Studies. This lack of knowledge and interest partly explains the lack of Arab success in dealing with US and Israeli strategies in the region. (Qtd in King, 1998, n. p.)

In his view, it is impossible for his people to convey their message to the humanitarian world as long as they turn a deaf ear to the other’s voice. “We must make clear,” he emphasised, “the link between the Shoah (the European Jewish Holocaust) and the Nakba (the Palestinian catastrophe of 1948). Neither experience is equal to the other, and neither should be minimized.” (Qtd in King, 1998). Said’s aforementioned message that the cult of silence adds no credit to one’s moral account is to be understood by Arabs and Jews alike.
Other Arab-American writers who happened to engage themselves in that complicated joint of history never tired of pointing out that since Germans and the West in general and not Arab were responsible not only for the Holocaust but also for the centuries of anti-Jewish persecution that led up to it, Arab should not have to atone for the crimes of others by giving up Palestine. Dr. Safi, a character in Ibrahim Fawal’s novel *On the Hills of God* (2006) declares that equation of injustice: “The West seems set on paying old debts to the Jews. Nothing we could’ve done would’ve mattered” (2006, p.83). Fawal is part of a collective Arab American voice that speaks to the Palestinian problem placing the entire historical tangle within the Zionist-West conspiracy against the region. In the above-mentioned novel Ustaz Saadeh says that this “piece of theatre has been written over the last half century. Who gets what is preordained on papers. Now they must put it on the ground. No matter what it takes” (2006, p.378). He certainly knows that whatever they do can never change the map because the “real battles have been fought and won in foreign capitals” (2006, p.379). Hence, within the context of the Arab-American writing what is visible is not the Holocaust but its consequences, namely the Nakba. The Holocaust for them is a moral standard against which Jews’ actions after the establishment of Israel are weighed. This is perceptible in the words of Poppy, a character in Noami Shihab Nye’s novel *Habibi* (1997) that says, “wouldn’t you think Jews, because of the tragedies they went through in Europe themselves, would have remembered this? Some did. But they weren’t always the powerful ones” (1997, p.31). From the Arab perspective, the Nazi final solution kills Jews en masse and Zionists send survivors to uproot another people. Their silence, therefore, is a complexity of seeing only the part of the tragedy which afflicts them.

Ibtisam Barakat’s memoir *Tasting the Sky* (2007) is a vivid case in point. Ibtisam’s mind is too preoccupied with her own ordeal to have a space for others’. The displaced Palestinian-American writer’s memory of home is charged with a series of traumas beginning with a child’s tears shed over the loss of her shoe and ending with the most serious loss of family and home. That memory, however, becomes unspeakable when her pals’ penetrating questions try to exorcise the dark past. Ibtisam finds herself unable to answer the questions about her childhood, but her silence, according to Noraini Md. Yusof et al., “is revealing” (2012, p.100). Ibtisam is but one of many Palestinian-Americans who learn from diaspora experience that in order to live they have, for the time being, to forget.

Unconsciously, Arab American writers, if not Arab writers in general, resorted to the meta-narrative of silence because of the lack of alternatives. They are devoted to the imperatives of their current national cause being displaced and victimised by Israelis—always mistaken for Jews. They had to struggle to convince the world that they are victims and their perpetrators are Jews. For them, admitting their enemy’s status of victimhood would undermine and deny their argument against them as oppressors. It is as if the world is not willing to accept Jews as both victims and persecutors at one and the same time as far as they intentionally remind the world of their past suffering in order to blindfold it to their current crimes. Apparently, the stage of the world’s sympathy, therefore, cannot accommodate Jews and Palestinians.

The meta-narrative of silence, however, cannot be dealt with in isolation from the political realities. Comparing the Jewish and Palestinian narratives—especially the ones communicated through silence, can, by no means, overshadow the big difference between the powers possessed by both parties to convey their implied voice to the world. While there is an almost monopoly of the American mass media by Jewish lobby organizations that could self-dramatise, justify, and interpret the Jewish silence, the Arab’s silence addresses only a limited category of audience and is, thus, misunderstood and misinterpreted due to the lack of self-justification. Furthermore, Israel, whose voice is louder, uses its indomitable power over the powerless Palestinians to determine the way history should be read. It goes to a point that
the Holocaust historiography is taught to the Palestinian school children whereas their history of displacement and diaspora is deliberately absented; a situation that might lead to a crisis of identity and even cultural schizophrenia. The Palestinian younger generation is driven into both introjection and internalization. Probably, a day might come when they identify with the history of their oppressor as they internalise the historical status assigned to them by him. This is the most chronic type of silence where an entire people’s historiography is deleted from their collective memory only to be replaced by cultural amnesia.

At the time the final touches of this paper have been done, another Israeli genocide was taking place against the people of Gaza Strip, the biggest concentration camp in the modern world. Again, silence is imposed as an extension of the Holocaust prototype. The Western media, intelligentsia, politicians, etc. prefer to keep silent than to protest against such a genocide less they might be charged of anti-Semitism, the contemporary version of the Salem’s witch-hunt and McCarthyism. They dare not speak reclining to an anxious silence which must tell much about the world’s injustice where the self-proclaimed victim—Israel—can unquestionably kill and destroy in the name of self-defense. Silence, in this case, is similar to that of the Holocaust bypassers and along with other types of silence constitutes a meta-narrative reviving one history afresh in memory while pushing another history into amnesia. This is a moment when silence, replacing telling the truth, becomes a lie. For those who know, breaking silence which implies avoiding lies becomes an imperative: “Breaking the lie of silence is not an esoteric abstraction but an urgent responsibility that falls to those with the privilege of a platform” (Pilger, 2009, p. 2).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the zero in mathematics is of course emptiness that has an instrumental function in raising and multiplying the value of the neighbouring figures. Likewise, the absence of narrative talking directly about the Holocaust becomes more evocatively representational than any direct representation. Hence, between two silences the holocaust discourse travels with no audible language to tell the story. One sort of silence talks about a traumatic history recoiling even from itself and getting encased into a sacred shrine where any attempt to pry it open means profanation. The other type discovers in silencing the enemy’s voice a way to utter out its own grievances against the victimization meted out by yesterday’s victims. Ultimately, both are silent but both are heard and understood. No wonder then if the present paper deciphering that dialectic unwillingly incorporates within its boundaries certain junctures at which some untellable ideas have to be passed over in silence.

REFERENCES


