Crossing Ethnic Borders in Malaysia Measuring the Fluidity of Ethnic Identity and Group Formation

MANSOR MOHD NOOR

ABSTRACT

Scholars studying ethnic and race relations often locate the question of identity and group formation as given and unaltered (Geertz 1963) while Barth (1969), Banton (1983) and Shamsul (1996) have been arguing that no group maintains itself. This article belongs to the latter academic tradition in trying to understand the multi-ethnic Malaysian society not only at the macro but also the micro levels; it analyses both the group and individual alignments, as well as the authority-defined and the everyday defined identities. Data collected from five studies carried out in the Klang Valley and Penang between 1990 and 1998 is utilised to show that universalistic norms of self interest over-ride the concern for ethnic preference. Respondents show that they share some common values and their interactions cross ethnic borders. Pluralism is an accepted social reality in Malaysia and ethnicity is secondary rather than primary.

Key words: identity, group formation, universalistic norms, ethnic preference, ethnicity

ABSTRAK

Para sarjana yang mengkaji hubungan etnik dan ras sering mengatakan persoalan identiti dan pembentukan kumpulan sesuatu yang terberi dan tidak berubah (Geertz 1963) manakala Barth (1969), Banton (1983) dan Shamsul (1996) telah mengutarakan hujah bahawa tiada kumpulan yang boleh kekal. Artikel ini tergolong dalam tradisi akademik yang kedua dalam percubaannya untuk memahami masyarakat Malaysia yang berbilang etnik. Artikel ini meneliti peringkat makro dan juga mikro, peringkat ikatan kumpulan dan juga individu, dan peringkat takrifan penguasa dan juga takrifan harian. Data daripada lima kajian yang dijalankan di Lembah Kelang dan Pulau Pinang dari tahun 1990 hingga 1998 digunakan untuk membuktikan bahawa norma sejagat tentang kepentingan diri lebih diutamakan daripada pilihan etnik. Responden juga menunjukkan mereka berkongsi nilai dan perhubungan mereka melintasi batas etnik masing-masing. Pluralisme telah diterima sebagai satu realiti sosial negara dan identiti etnik adalah sekunder dan bukan primer.

Kata kunci: identiti, pembentukan kumpulan, norma sejagat, pilihan etnik, etnisiti

INTRODUCTION

The task of an ethnic relations scholar is not to defend or deny ethnic identity and group boundary but to recognise the fluidity of these two dimensions within a stratified society as man avails himself, individually or collectively, to the societal resources and social esteem. To understand the dynamism in such social relationships, we need to adopt an approach that combines both the individual and group alignments in our analysis.

Like nationalism, ethnic identity and group consciousness, are sometimes thought to be products of modernisation (Geertz 1963; Milne 1979). They are represented as social forces which gather strength until they achieve maturity in the creation of a nation-state. My studies tend to show the contrary. Economic development can, firstly, promote economic growth, and secondly, lead to a decline in ethnic identity and group consciousness.

By inspiring new wants, economic development leads people to seek new goals. Some of these they can hope to attain by individual actions; others require collective actions (Banton 1997: 47-48). These simple propositions can be used to cast new light on the changes in the parameters of ethnic identity and group boundary among Malays and Chinese in Malaysia.

THE PROBLEMATIC OF ETHNIC IDENTITY AND GROUP BOUNDARY

Badriyah Haji Salleh (1998: 5) raises a question as to whether Malays do know or not that they are a community or a nation. She observes that the British categorised Malays of the Malay Peninsula in the censuses taken since 1871 to 1957 as part of a community of the larger Malay world. At other times, the political boundary of British Malaya was used to distinguish the Malays of the Malay Peninsula from the Javanese, Minangkabau, Bugis, Arabs, Indians and others, but the concept *Malayan* was referred to the larger Malay community in the region. The Federal and the State governments defined the Malays differently. Since 1913, for purposes of alienating Malay Reserve Land by the Federated and the Unfederated Malay States, the parameters of the Malay are descent, Malay language and Islam. However, the definition of the Malay in the 1957 Federal Constitution was more inclusive; a Malay is someone who speaks Malay, is a Muslim and practises Malay custom; descent is omitted.

Shamsul (1996a, 1996b and 1998) and Lian Kwen Fee (1997) trace the changing parameters of Malay identity and group boundary to the present. They argue that the parameters of identity such as culture, religion and descent are

being constantly redefined and altered. The same fluidity is observed with the parameters of the Malay group boundary as a conceptual scheme where as a collective, the Malay group, was employed inter-changeably as a referent, as status, a community and a nation. Kahn and Loh (1992) have described contemporary Malaysian society as a fragmented vision in which ethnic identity and boundary and social classes, especially the middle classes, are inter-connected. The fluidity and dynamism of an individual identity and group boundary are thus social facts.

There are, however, scholars who often paint a portrait of polarisation in Malay-Chinese relations in the society generally, and especially so on university campuses and during an election period. They perceive the *sui generis* of ethnicity as an influence on individual behavioural preference, despite the observed fluidity and the declining concern for ethnic identity and group interest within the larger society (Basham 1983; Agoes Salim 1987; and Jesudason 1989). Their failure to observe the changing social landscape reflects their inability to analyze the fluidity of Malay and Chinese identity and group boundary in an integrative manner. One should avoid reducing any analysis on ethnic identity and group formation to that of individual concern against group concern or vice versa. These two analytical levels – individual and group alignments – must be combined to capture the dynamism of inter-ethnic interactions, to highlight the voices of the powerful as well as the voices of ordinary social actors. In doing so, it helps us grasp the continuous and complex processes of stability and uncertainty of ethnic relations, tensions, their strengthening as well as erosion and rupture.

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY OF RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

Ethnic identity and boundary do not maintain themselves. In some circumstances, like driving a motor vehicle, group membership is irrelevant. In other situations, individual interest motivates group alignment. Sometimes choices have to be made between individual responses and group alignment, or between alignment on the basis of class, or ethnicity, or religion (Banton and Mansor 1992).

Changes in alignment come about as a result of individual choices. The individual has to assess whether he or she can best attain his or her ends by aligning with others (on the basis of ethnicity, class, religion or some other shared value) or by seeking a personal end which may possibly run counter to any expectation that he or she will align with others.

It is assumed that ends are the individuals; that they can sometimes be pursued best by aligning with others with whom ends are shared, but that on occasion their pursuit requires the individual to weigh the benefits of self-interest-based action relative to the costs of deviating from the expectations of the peer group. Such calculations may not be made in any conscious manner.

Social scientists therefore must look to them in order to explain shifts in ethnic identity and alignment, whether towards greater or lesser ethnic identity and group alignment, or whether it changes from one form of ethnic identity and group alignment to another.

Rational choice theory of race and ethnic relations presupposes that individuals act so as to obtain maximum net advantage. Individuals may believe that it is in their interest to align themselves with others who share their interests, or get a psychological reward from aligning with those they believe they are duty-bound to support. It is also possible that individuals may believe that, while they have a general interest in supporting or have an obligation to support fellow ethnic members, the situation about which they are being asked is an exception to this rule (Banton 1983).

Rational choice theory is not limited to the study of any particular kinds of choices. It is a general theory of aggregate behaviour which tries to ascertain the costs and benefits of choices between available alternatives, and presumes that over time people will favour the kinds of choice which produce optimal results.

STUDY AREA AND SAMPLING

The data analysed in this article is collected from five studies carried out between 1990 and 1998 in different areas and among different social strata. The first study entitled 'The Determinants of Malay Ethnic Alignment' (1992) was carried out in 1990 in the residential area of Section 14, Petaling Jaya, Selangor. The socio-economic background of the 330 Malay and Chinese respondents was mainly middle class. The fieldwork for the second study 'National Unity in the Context of Manpower Utilisation in the Labour Market' (1996) was carried out in 1993 in the industrial sector of Penang and the Klang Valley in Selangor. Various levels of the Malay and Chinese industrial workforce, consisting of 300 respondents, were interviewed.

The survey for the third study 'National Unity in the Context of Inter-Ethnic Business Joint-Ventureship' (1997a) was carried out in 1995 in the commercial and industrial sectors of Penang. Malay and Chinese respondents involved in inter-ethnic business joint-ventures were interviewed. The sample size was 108 respondents. The primary data for the fourth study 'Towards Racial Harmony: The Development of Universalistic Norms and its Impacts on Ethnic Relations Between Malay and Chinese Students in the University of Science Malaysia' (1997b) was collected in 1996 among social science students at the Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang. The sample size was 406 respondents. The survey for the fifth study 'Ethnic Trends among Malay and Chinese Students in the University of Science Malaysia' (1998) was carried out in November 1997 to January 1998 also among social science students at the Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang. The sample size for this study was 314 respondents.

The differences in age, status origin and regional peculiarities of respondents have an influence on the findings. Some variations were observed in the findings between the various samples studied. The student population tends to be more influenced by ethnic concerns than residential groupings, industrial workforce or inter-ethnic business elite. The findings show the changing nature of ethnic identity, the parameters of group boundary and the inter-group alignment prevailing in the Malaysian society.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

This study developed an approach by asking how a representative Malay or Chinese will act in situations in which new patterns of behaviour, alternative to ethnic preferences, are appearing and in which values are changing. The procedure adopted was for the researcher to discuss a large number of possible questions about social situations that might or might not evoke ethnic alignment. These hypothetical questions selected were likely to evoke a response from a sample of subjects, Malay and Chinese, male and female.

In the discussion of these expectations, three kinds of potential conflict were identified as worth exploring. These were associated with a norm of ethnic preference on the one hand and individual self-interest of a material kind (such as monetary gain), or of a social kind (such as status gain) or personal obligation on the other. The conflicts can be recognized in the answers given to particular questions posed to the subjects even if the opposed values cannot be made mutually exclusive. It may be in an individual's material or social interest to display ethnic preference in some situations. In others, personal obligation and ethnic preference may point in the same direction. Thus, in the social situations constructed for the interviews there were conflicts to be recognized as such by the respondents.

Three hypothetical questions among those employed in these studies to measure the relative significance of ethnic preference vis-à-vis universalistic norms pertaining to the above arguments are presented below to elucidate the points made.

SELF INTEREST OF THE MATERIAL KIND: SHOPPING CHOICE

Mustapha (a Malay) has been patronising a grocery shop, belonging to Mr. Ah Kow (a Chinese) noted for its cheapness and nearness to his house. Mustapha has been informed that in a week's time, Ahmad (a Malay) will be opening a second grocery shop in his neighbourhood. The hypothetical questions are:

a) Where will Mustapha go?
    [1] Ahmad's shop

[2]   Ah Kow's shop
[3]   Others

b)   Where would his mother wish his son to go?
[1]   Ahmad's shop
[2]   Ah Kow's shop
[3]   Others

SELF INTEREST OF THE STATUS KIND: THE ZOO TRIP

Mustapha is going to bring his children to the zoo this coming Sunday. Mustapha's son has been pestering his father to take along one of his friends on this trip.

a)   Whom will Mustapha suggest to his son to take along on this trip?
[1]   Ah Seng, a doctor's son
[2]   Ali, whose mother works as a housemaid
[3]   Others

b)   Whom would Mustapha's mother wish her son to take along on the trip?
[1]   Ah Seng
[2]   Ali
[3]   Others

PERSONAL OBLIGATION: SUPPORT THE BOSS

Mr. Tay, a Chinese mechanical engineer who graduated from Oxford, has been the head of Mustapha's chemical department for the past three years. A Malay group within his department is trying to replace his boss with a Malay candidate.

a)   Will Mustapha support his boss?
[1]   Yes
[2]   No
[3]   Others

b)   Whom would Mustapha's mother wish his son to support?
[1]   Yes
[2]   No
[3]   Others

The technique of presenting hypothetical social situations in the questionnaire is used to measure the strength of ethnic preference relative to self-interest and personal obligation among Malay and Chinese respondents. The prediction made by the respondents as to how a representative Malay or Chinese would

react in situations of value conflict made possible the measurement of ethnic preference vis-à-vis universalistic norms. In this study, the Malay representative revolves around Mustapha and the Chinese around Lim Lam Seng and this technique of questionnaire design will allow us to understand variations in the pattern of prediction between Malay and Chinese respondents of themselves and of the other ethnic group studied. On this matter, the general observation is that Malay respondents often over-estimate the relative strength of ethnic preference relative to universalistic norms among the Chinese while for Chinese respondents, they often under-estimate the relative strength of Malay ethnic preference.

This technique thus allows us to generate predictions about trends in the strengthening, maintenance or weakening of ethnic identity and group boundary among them. It will enable us to measure the tipping point of ethnic preference vis-à-vis universalistic norms as an influence on Malay and Chinese choices of action.

ANALYSING UNIVERSALISTIC NORMS AND ETHNIC PREFERENCE

The conceptual framework of the questionnaire above, placed each of the respondents interviewed with two options when answering the hypothetical questions posed to him. He could either choose answers that can be categorised as having universalistic norms or ethnic preference. Self-interest choice of action such as of the material kind, status kind or personal obligation is considered universalistic norms while ethnic preference is the behavioural manifestation of the strength of ethnic identity and group boundary.

When the respondent chooses 'others' as the answer to the hypothetical question, it could mean that firstly, he is ambivalent to the social situation concerned and, secondly, the hypothetical social situation question formulated has failed to dichotomise the two variables to be chosen. In the analysis of the tables below, only the findings on the universalistic norms of self interest of the material kind, status kind and personal obligation are analysed. The ethnic preference category can be inferred by subtracting the percentage of the universalistic norms of self interest from a total of 90 per cent. (The 'others' category generally falls within a 10 per cent margin only).

The data in the tables below are employed to highlight two research problems. Firstly, to note the behavioural preference of Malay and Chinese respondents on universalistic norms vis-à-vis ethnic preference and secondly, to observe the emerging pattern of behavioural preference between universalistic norms vis-à-vis ethnic preference within the study period of 1990-98. Due to limitations of space and focus of this article, age, status, religious and gender differences are not discussed. These dimensions and their impact on identity and group formation are presented elsewhere (Mansor 1992, 1996, 1997a, 1997b).

The predictions of Malay and Chinese respondents interviewed about the strength of self-interest of the material and status kinds relative to ethnic preference are presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Self-interest (be it of a material kind or a desire for social recognition by associating with a person of higher status and gaining 'respectability') and the call for ethnic preference, are two influences that sometimes come into conflict with one another. The manner in which an individual resolves such a conflict will depend both on his own sentiment and his belief about how his peers will interpret his behaviour.

SELF INTEREST OF THE MATERIAL KIND

In nearly all of the hypothetical situations posed to the respondents and across the 1990-98 period of study, Malay and Chinese respondents overwhelmingly placed the importance of monetary gains relative to ethnic preference. Both Malay and Chinese respondents in all the hypothetical social situations gave preference to low price for their 'Shopping Choice', collecting rents in 'Renting the House' and 'Renting the Shop-house', obtaining additional income in 'Child Minding', and the calculation of profit when choosing a 'Business Partner' or when giving out a 'Bank Loan'. The only exception to this general pattern of giving priority to self interest of the material kind as opposed to ethnic preference is in the 1990 'Shopping Choice' social situation for Malay respondents.

The percentage distribution favouring self interest of the material kind relative to ethnic preference among the Malays ranges from a low of 53 per cent in 1996 'Shopping Choice' social situation to a high 94 per cent in 1998 'Renting the Shop-house'. As for Chinese respondents, a low of 62 per cent was recorded in 1993 'Bank Loan' and in 1996 'Business Partner' and a high 97 per cent in 1995 and 1996 'Renting the Shop-house' social situations (Table 1).

Table 1 also shows that Malay respondents in the 1990 'Shopping Choice' social situation were swayed by ethnic preference as only 47 per cent chose self interest of the material kind. In this hypothetical social situation, Malay respondents perceived a conflict would prevail, and chose instead to sacrifice the material gains for ethnic preference. This conflictual position arises as the aspiration of the Malays to strengthen their economic position vis-à-vis the Chinese aided by the various politically motivated entreprenuership programmes, licenses and credit facilities have stimulated their concern for group consciousness.

The behavioural preference in giving prior importance to economic consideration rather than ethnic background among the Chinese respondents manifest their exposure to a commercial way of life. Malay respondents also indicate a changing trend towards giving greater priority to material interest relative to ethnic preference in their choice of action.

When analysing Table 1 across the 1990-98 period, two patterns emerge. Firstly, self interest of the material kind is more dominant than ethnic preference. Secondly, the hypothetical social situations in which respondents interpreted

TABLE 1. The strenght of self interest of the material kind relative
to ethnic preferences 1990-98 (percentage)

| Individual Alignment | 1990 | | 1993 | | 1995 | | 1996 | | 1998 | |
Hypothetical Social Situation	M	C	M	C	M	C	M	C	M	C
Self Interest (Material)										
Renting House	64	85	–	–	70	87	71	78	70	83
Child Minding	72	81	63	71	72	68	80	76	73	70
Business Partner	–	–	59	69	59	70	56	62	65	63
Shopping Choice	47	80	61	74	75	78	53	64	61	69
Bank Loan	–	–	61	62	62	87	53	66	65	66
Renting Shop House	–	–	77	95	87	97	88	97	94	92

Source: Primary data for 1990 is from Mansor (1992); 1993 from Mansor (1996); 1995 from Mansor (1997a); 1996 from Mansor (1997b); and 1998 from Mansor (1998).

Note: M (Malay) C (Chinese) Hyphothetical situations revolving around the typical Malay (Musthapa) are in italics.

themselves as being representative of their own group interest relative to self interest of the material kind tend to be less significant. These two observed patterns can be highlighted by comparing the hypothetical social situations of the 'Shopping Choice', choice of 'Business Partner' and 'Bank Loan' which average around 60 per cent while the choices of leaving the 'House Key', 'Renting the House', 'Renting the Shop-house' and 'Child Minding' score between 70 to 90 per cent.

This shows that the way respondents interpret each of the hypothetical social situations posed as having significance to their individual or group alignment will influence the kind of behavioural preference predicted. The forms of alignment, whether individual or group, reflect the intensity of group competition along ethnic lines between Malays and Chinese in availing themselves to material resources and social esteem in the larger society.

Table 1 shows that Malays and Chinese are increasingly influenced by self interest of the material kind relative to ethnic preference. However, analysis over time also indicates that competition over scarce economic resources are fraught with ethnic risk, forcing respondents to give preference to group rather than to individual alignment. The allocation of material resources, either through the market or through political mechanism, needs to be studied in order to understand the reason for such observations.

In sum, we can say that over the 1990-98 study period, a commercial ethos could be observed among Chinese respondents which was also becoming strong among Malay respondents. Chinese respondents, probably, because they are more exposed to commercial culture, give a higher priority to self-interest of the

material kind and they project their own values when predicting responses of Malays. Likewise, Malay and Chinese respondents transpose their economic insecurity vis-à-vis other ethnic groups by being sensitive to ethnic preference when faced with certain social situations interpreted as having greater group significance. Yet such insecurity and fear do not materialise in situations when Malay and Chinese respondents see themselves as individuals in control of such social events. This calculation makes them consider the universalistic norm of self interest of the material kind to be of greater significance than ethnic preference as commercial ethos has increasingly encroached into the life of the respondents studied.

SELF INTEREST OF THE STATUS KIND

In Table 2 the overall pattern of self interest of the status kind alignment during the 1990-98 study period is marked by behavioural ambivalence on the part of Malay and Chinese respondents towards giving significance to the calculation of status gain relative to ethnic preference. Malay and Chinese respondents predicted that the hypothetical Mustapha and Lim Lam Seng would sacrifice status gain for ethnic consideration by bringing along a son of a housemaid instead of a socially privileged son of a doctor on the 'Zoo Trip', and would sacrifice fair-skin complexion of a Chinese child as a status symbol for a dark-skin Malay child in 'Child Adoption'. But in the hypothetical 'Wedding Invitation' and 'Birthday Party' social situations, Malay and Chinese respondents predicted that Mustapha and Lim Lam Seng would instead place status gain rather than ethnic consideration. Thus in 'Wedding Invitation' social situation,

TABLE 2. The strength of self interest of the status kind relative
to ethnic preference 1990-98 (percentage)

Individual Alignment	1990		1993		1995		1996		1998	
Hypothetical Social Situation	M	C	M	C	M	C	M	C	M	C
Self Interest (Status)										
Zoo Trip	13	48	18	14	35	38	30	22	33	24
Child Adoption	26	55	–	–	25	11	38	17	21	18
Wedding Invittation	27	65	93	91	68	62	77	55	47	51
Birthday Party	–	–	–	–	46	57	63	61	78	65

Source: Primary data for 1990 is from Mansor (1992); 1993 from Mansor (1996); 1995 from Mansor (1997a); 1996 from Mansor (1997b); and 1998 from Mansor (1998).

Note: M (Malay) C (Chinese) Hyphothetical situations revolving around the typical Malay (Musthapa) are in italics.

the respondents predicted that the Managing Director's wedding invitation would be given priority over the hawker's invitation; and in the 'Birthday Party' social situation, the celebration of a Tan Sri's birthday party rather his own Chinese clan's meeting would be given preference.

In social events like the 'Zoo Trip' and 'Child Adoption', ethnic alignment is more important to Malay and Chinese respondents than any concern for status gain that could result from association with a higher status family. The data on both these social situations show that universalistic norm of self interest of the status kind was not that crucial in determining their behavioural preference compared to ethnicity. The only exception to this general observation was with the Chinese in 1990 'Child Adoption' social situation where fair-skin complexion as a status gain rather than ethnicity was the preference. The 'Zoo Trip' and the 'Child Adoption' social situations thus tend to evoke a feeling of group competition on the part of Malay and the Chinese respondents studied.

But in 'Birthday Party' and 'Wedding Invitation' social situations, Malay and Chinese respondents predicted that self interest of the status kind rather than ethnic preference would be the basis of their actions. A low 63 per cent favouring self interest of the status kind relative to ethnic preference was recorded for Malays in 1996 'Birthday Party' situation and a high 93 per cent in 1993 'Wedding Invitation' situation. As for the Chinese, a low of 51 per cent was recorded for 'Wedding Invitation' social situation in 1998 and a high of 91 per cent for the same situation in 1993.

Compared to Chinese, Malays tend to interpret 'Wedding Invitation' and 'Birthday Party' social situations as fraught with risks to their own position. Malays would sacrifice status gain for ethnic preference in 'Wedding Invitation' situation in the 1990 and 1998 studies and in 'Birthday Party' situation in the 1995 study. Chinese respondents, on the other hand, did not share the insecurity felt by Malays as in both these social situations they placed status gain ahead of ethnic calculation.

The above general observation in which ethnic preference overrides status calculation, especially among Malays, could be noted too in the comparative analysis across the 1990-98 period of study.

Generally, the studies show the overall pattern that across the 1990-98 period of study, universalistic norm of self interest of the status kind is not a strong social force to bind individuals across ethnic boundary. But a comparison between Chinese and Malay respondents shows that the former did relatively give higher priority to self interest of the status kind vis-à-vis ethnic preference. Malay respondents interpreted self interest of the status kind social situations as fraught with ethnic risks. The data shows that individual insecurity and the need to mobilise group strength tend to be stronger on the part of the Malays than the Chinese. These findings support studies by Stenson (1976 and 1980), Nagata (1975 and 1976), Sanusi Osman (1984) and Jesudason (1989) that in such status-based social situations, 'ethnic consciousness overrides class consciousness'.

SELF-INTEREST WITHIN PERSONAL OBLIGATION

Personal obligation generates social bonds, which reflect the type and intensity of relations between individuals. Self-interest elements exist within personal obligation for those individuals who fear they might suffer if they were known to have neglected their obligation. Some kinds of behaviour bring individuals psychological rewards and satisfaction if they act in the manner expected of them. Sometimes though, actions are regarded as good in themselves.

Furthermore, as people work or come into contact with one another in mutually rewarding relations, they come to feel a sense of indebtedness or obligation to one another; such an obligation, at times, is given a higher priority than ethnic preference. Thus, when personal obligation is placed against ethnic preference, the relative strength of one against the other could be relied upon to weigh the strength of the two inclinations and to note the degree of conflict.

In nearly all of the hypothetical social situations for personal obligation posed to the respondents during the whole period of study, it shows that Malays and Chinese would place priority on personal obligation rather ethnic consideration in their choice of actions (Table 3). Personal bonds were felt to be relatively stronger and could bind individuals across ethnic boundaries. The only exception is that Chinese respondents would give more weight to ethnic preference than Malay respondents when it comes to 'Supporting the Boss' social situation.

Malay and Chinese respondents interpreted that personal bonds would be stronger than ethnic preference in the alignment questions posed such as fulfilling the 'Mother's Wishes'. Social bond and trust are also given priority in the

TABLE 3. The strength of personal obligation relative
to ethnic preference 1990-98 (percentage)

Individual Alignment	1990		1993		1995		1996		1998	
Hypothetical Social Situation	M	C	M	C	M	C	M	C	M	C
Personal Obligation										
Support Boss	61	50	50	50	58	43	63	46	55	52
Mother's Wishes	50	68	–	–	89	87	81	78	78	77
House Key	87	94	–	–	90	87	86	89	81	80
Child Playmate	84	94	–	–	81	89	78	82	88	92
Help a Workmate	–	–	89	91	94	86	95	95	89	91
Paying Condolence	–	–	–	–	74	84	68	74	77	85

Source: Primary data for 1990 is from Mansor (1992); 1993 from Mansor (1996); 1995 from Mansor (1997a); 1996 from Mansor (1997b); and 1998 from Mansor (1998).

Note: M (Malay) C (Chinese). Hyphothetical situations revolving around the typical Malay (Musthapa) are in italics.

case of next-door neighbours as seen in 'Child Playmate' and the 'House Key' social situations. The same applies to assisting a fellow workmate in times of need as shown in 'Helping a Workmate' social situation, and in giving respects to one's office-mate as in 'Paying Condolence' situation. Even in 'Supporting the Boss' situation (i.e., a situation when members of one's ethnic group want to replace the present boss), support to the boss would be given not because of ethnic calculation but due to the personal bond developed between them.

From the studies summarised in Table 3, it can be seen that personal obligation is considered by Malay and Chinese respondents to be relatively more significant than ethnic preference in influencing their behaviour patterns. However, in certain social situations such as 'Support the Boss' in 1995 and 1996, they might reject personal obligation or feel ambivalent about it if they interpret such situations as fraught with risks and which require the mobilisation of group strength.

BEHAVIOURAL PATTERN OF MALAY AND CHINESE RESPONDENTS COMPARED: GREATER SIMILARITIES THAN DIFFERENCES

The above analysis of universalistic norms of self interest of the material kind, status kind and personal obligation as opposed to ethnic preference in moulding behavioural patterns of Malays and Chinese in Malaysia can be observed to prevail and are supported by the behavioural component data of the 1990-98 study period.

Apart from the growing influence of universalistic norms over ethnic preference in the relationship between Malays and Chinese as observed in the discussion on the alignment questions above, the researcher also notes that Malays and Chinese increasingly share values and orientations about their lives in the Malaysian polity and that they are not solely compartmentalised within their own ethnic boundaries.

The works of Sanusi Osman (1981), Mansor (1992) and Kantayya Mariappan (1996) found that Malays and Chinese would choose a good quality leader, but often an ethnic Malay, to lead the country. This shows that the accepted unwritten political norm of a Malaysian leadership culture to govern the nation is biased towards the Malay community. Malay dominance vis-à-vis other ethnic communities in the cultural, political and economic fields have thus been among the accepted conditions of the nation's ideology.

The acceptance of Malay-based symbols such as the Malay language and the King as the basis of the country's national ideology can be seen in Table 4. The table shows that not only Malay but also Chinese respondents would feel disgraced if they were to see individuals who did not give due respect by standing up when the national anthem, *Negaraku*, is being played. Scrutinising the same data by ethnic dimension, it shows that Malays might be more sensitive to

TABLE 4. Multi-Ethnic behavioural patterns: Similarities
and differences 1990-98 (percentage)

Attitiude & Behaviour Patterns	1990		1993		1995		1996		1998	
	M	C	M	C	M	C	M	C	M	C
Frequent cross ethnic interaction	54	89	75	76	69	76	49	51	58	51
Place of contact										
Residental area	44	38	5	12	13	19	20	25	25	22
Workplace	62	66	71	76	64	73	33	25	16	13
Shopping center	18	12	4	2	7	0	2	1	1	2
Ethnic perception										
Good, nationally	47	50	52	38	60	68	35	39	43	34
Five year better, nationally	49	59	41	48	70	70	28	52	28	42
National symbols										
Displeased, anthem	55	44	76	74	77	94	87	76	77	64
We're are Malaysians	76	98	77	88	87	100	53	97	70	81
National issues										
Dissatisfied, migrate	55	44	67	50	70	70	67	38	54	34
Goverment programme syndrome	74	74	71	69	77	77	82	79	76	72

Source: Primary data for 1990 is from Mansor (1992); 1993 from Mansor (1996); 1995 from Mansor (1997a); 1996 from Mansor (1997b); and 1998 from Mansor (1998).

giving respect to the National Anthem relative to Chinese as shown by the higher percentage of Malay respondents agreeing to this statement than the Chinese. However, the data across the period of study also shows that Chinese respondents could show a greater sensitivity to respecting the National Anthem relative to Malays as in the case of the 1995 study.

As to the statement that 'Malaysia does not belong only to the Malays', Table 4 shows that not only the Chinese but also the Malays strongly agreed with this statement. Although historically this region could be regarded as 'the land of the Malays', today, it is different. 'Malaysia as a community of various ethnic groups' is the contemporary understanding agreed upon by all respondents studied, irrespective of their ethnic origin. Chinese relative to Malay respondents tended to agree more with this statement as can be seen in the range of percentages shown in Table 4. But it is worthy to note the willingness

of the Malays to share 'their notion of the Malay land' with other ethnic communities. The percentage is consistently high during the study period. The sharing of the nation among its multi-ethnic citizens is thus an accepted notion of the country's emerging national ideology as observed among Malay and Chinese respondents.

CROSS-CUTTING ETHNIC TIES

The findings on inter-ethnic interaction show that Malay and Chinese respondents interact frequently especially at the workplace. Two observations can be made when analysing the data across the 1990-98 period. First, Chinese respondents had a higher propensity to interact with other ethnic individuals. Second, the intensity of inter-ethnic interaction is linked to whether the individuals interpret the social situations as needing individual or group alignment to avail themselves to societal resource and social esteem. Malay and Chinese respondents in 1996 and 1998 generally indicated a relatively low percentage of inter-ethnic interaction (Table 4). But the data for both studies were based on the student population of a university in Malaysia. Malay and Chinese students interviewed projected their experiences of ethnic competition in the university when predicting the behaviour of the hypothetical Mustapha and Lim Lam Seng. Allocations of student in-take, scholarship and university accommodation based on an ethnic quota influenced the students' thinking, thus giving rise to stronger ethnic identification.

However, other samples, namely those drawn from the residential community, industrial workforce and inter-ethnic economic elites studied, showed marked differences from the student samples of 1996 and 1998. The other samples did not see inter-ethnic interaction as problematic. Only in social situations where ethnicity was interpreted as central to the allocation of societal resources and social esteem, group alignment were be given greater significance over universalistic norms.

THE FLUIDITY OF ETHNIC BOUNDARY IN MALAYSIA

The above analysis shows that ethnic sentiment, identity and preference continue, and can be acute in times of group competition to avail themselves to the societal resources and social esteem, but this study shows that economic growth since the 1970s has restricted their applicability. Malaysians seem not to have recognized the fluidity of the ethnic identity and boundary and how great these societal changes have been. The increasing encroachment of universalistic norms as exemplified by the self interest of the material kind, status kind and personal obligation are counter-balancing the influence of ethnic preference among the people. Even analysis of the multi-ethnic behavioural pattern shows that greater convergence and consensus of values and opinions are to be observed among Malay and Chinese respondents studied. They also demonstrate that cross-

ethnic ties are the dominant norm of behaviour. This study indicates that continuing economic growth, modernisation and technological changes have generated positive social consequences on ethnic relations and harmony in Malaysia.

To avoid being blinded by the changing nature of ethnic relations in contemporary Malaysia, ethnicity should not be regarded as given, ready made, primordial, having a force of its own or *sui generis* (Miles 1982; Geertz 1973). Man's choice of actions would ultimately determine whether ethnicity is *sui generis* or open to further processes of being redefined, reconstructed, reconstituted and altered as the individual relates to other social, religious, political and economic forces within the larger society (Banton 1997; Shamsul 1996).

The cross-cutting ethnic ties that dominate inter-ethnic relations rather than ethnic calculation observed in the period studied inform us of the on-going societal transformation within the society. A portrait of optimism is observable in ethnic relations between Malay and Chinese respondents in these studies. This situation perhaps explains the continuing peaceful Malay-Chinese relationship despite several crises that occurred since 1997.

The 1997-98 financial crisis in Malaysia is already well-known (Jomo 1998, Lee 1998, Morrissey and Nelson 1998). However, in terms of its causes, individual Malays, Chinese, Indians and others blame market forces. Irrespective of their ethnic origin, they found that shops belonging to Malays, Chinese, or Indians were raising prices of goods. The shop owners increased their prices because imported goods such as sugar, flour, potato, meat, and others became more expensive with the devaluation of the Malaysian Ringgit against the US Dollar. In Indonesia, the same economic crisis was interpreted differently. Chinese shops and the Chinese ethnic community were blamed for the economic crisis, growing impoverishment and the rising prices of goods (McLeod 1998). A marked difference is thus observable as to how Malaysians and Indonesians interpreted their own life and national problems.

Of greater significance is to read beyond the above social events as Malays, Chinese and Indians make the social adjustment or feel the social tension as they find their own identity and group boundary being increasingly encroached by universalistic norms as the nation undergoes societal transformation. In the economic crisis above, market forces rather than ethnic differences were blamed for the crisis faced by the nation. Malay, Chinese and Indian individuals did not feel that the economic crisis was ethnically manipulated by another ethnic group against them.

The encroachment of universalistic norms within the Malaysian society has reduced the strength of ethnic preference of Malay, Chinese and Indian individuals at the periphery.

ETHNICITY IS SECONDARY

The findings of the five studies discussed above and the manner in which Malaysians of Malay, Chinese and Indian extractions reacted to the 1997-98 crisis prove that ethnic identity and group strength in Malaysia is a case of secondary ethnicity.

The increasing importance of societal goals that can be pursued by individual action has reduced group consciousness. The consciousness of being Malay, Chinese, or Indian in Malaysia resembles the secondary ethnicity of North America more than the primary ethnicity that has contributed to the tension in the former Yugoslavia (Banton 1997: 37-38). These changes have been made possible by Malaysia's high rate of economic growth which has enabled the Malaysian-Malays to catch up with the Malaysian-Chinese without the latter suffering any decline in their economic circumstances.

If the economic situation were to alter, or if there were to be dramatic shifts in international relations, the trend could be halted or reversed. Competition between Malaysian-Malays and Malaysian-Chinese could turn into conflict. However, this article has advanced reasons for concluding that if the present trend continues as discovered in the five studies, ethnic consciousness in Malaysia will decline further. The onus is on the government to come up with economic and political policies that are conducive to a multi-ethnic society in which not ethnic origins but needs become the new paradigm of governance and development.

CONCLUSION

Scholars need to ask awkward questions whenever ethnic identity and group boundary as theoretical and conceptual tools are presented to them as unalterable. This study disputes Miles' (1982) claims that the sociology of race relations necessarily reifies race. Failure to notice other important influences have blinded many scholars to the way Malays and Chinese respondents are being increasingly absorbed into a non-ethnic universalistic sphere. Sociologists are often more interested in large scale social trends and have failed to heed Barth's (1969) advice to explore the different processes involved in generating and maintaining ethnic groups.

The determinants of ethnic alignment are virtually infinite. The paper indicates that ethnic identities are not primordial characteristics programmed into individuals, but have to be continually established from the actions of people as they choose to align themselves in one way or another, and make use of shared notions about who belongs in what social category. It is not just that some members forsake one ethnic group, or pull it in a different direction, but that members of the other ethnic groups are engaged in changing their group too.

Groups interact. Ethnic alignment interacts with most of the institutions and is influenced by them.

Since Malaysian society itself is changing relatively rapidly because of economic growth and social transformation (Abdul Rahman 1996), the inter-dependencies are extraordinarily complex. Ethnic preference is both a cause and an effect. Therefore, the only satisfactory way of studying ethnic identity and group alignment is on the individual plane, while searching at every point for the influence of collective patterns. Features of one historical period persist only if there are factors which keep them alive. Coppel (1997) has debunked Furnivall's plural society in which he saw each ethnic group as separated and compartmentalised from the others, sharing no value consensus to bind them together, as a failure to understand the dynamic nature of society.

The findings discussed in this paper give reason to conclude that the strength of ethnic preference has been declining, influenced by rapid social change of the last three decades. In studying ethnic relations and identity, scholars should not encourage unrealistic expectations, but should have a more accurate understanding of the prevailing ethnic identity and group boundary formation as well as the determinants of ethnic alignment itself. This calls for a continuous exercise in monitoring the tipping point between ethnic preference vis-à-vis universalistic norms in influencing Malay and Chinese choice of actions.

REFERENCES

Abdul Rahman Embong. 1996. Social transformation, the state and the Malaysian middle classes in post-independence Malaysia. *Southeast Asian Studies* (Kyoto University). 36(3): 56-79.

Agoes Salim. 1983. The role of the *Rukunegara* in nation building: A retrospective view. *Negara* 11(1): 26-30.

Ariffin Omar. 1988. *Bangsa Melayu: Malay concepts of democracy and community 1945-1950.* Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Badriyah Haji Salleh. 1998. Dari komuniti etnik kepada satu bangsa? *Jurnal Ilmu Kemanusiaan* 5: 1-21.

Banton, Michael. 1983. *Racial and ethnic competition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 1991. The race relations problematic. *British Journal of Sociology* 42(1): 115-30.

_____. 1997. *Ethnic and racial consciousness* London: Longman.

Banton, M & Mansor Mohd Noor. 1992. The study of ethnic alignment: A new technique and an application in Malaysia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 15(4): 599-613.

Barth, Fredrik (ed). 1969. *Ethnic boundaries in the social organisation of cultural differences.* London: Allen and Unwin.

Basham, Richard. 1984. National racial policies and university education in Malaysia. In *Culture, ethnicity and identity: Current issues in research,* edited by William C McCreaddy. London: Academic Press.

Chandra Muzaffar. 1987. *Islamic resurgence in Malaysia*. Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti.

Cheu Hock Tong. 1995. National unity in multi-ethnic Malaysia: A Polemic. *Asian Profile* 23 (4): 297-314.

Chin, James. 1997. PBDS and ethnicity in Sarawak politics. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 26(4): 12-26.

Coppel, Charles A. 1997. Revisiting Furnivall's 'plural society': Colonial Java as a mestizo society. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20(3): 563-79.

Esman, J. Milton. 1972. Malaysia: Communal coexistence and mutual deterrence. In *Racial tensions and national identity*, edited by Ernest Q. Campbell. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

Farish A. Noor. 1999. Looking for *reformasi*: The discursive dynamics of the *reformasi* movement and its prospects as a political project. *Indonesia and the Malay World* 27(77): 5-18.

Fatimah Daud. 1984. Some patterns of ethnic relations in Malaysia. *Asian Profile* 13(2): 117-28.

Freedman, Maurice. 1960. The growth of a plural society in Malaysia. *Pacific Affairs* 33(2): 158-68.

Furnivall, J. S. 1948. *Colonial policy and practice: A comparative study of Burma and Netherland India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1963. Integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states. In *Old societies and new states: The quest for modernity in Asia and Africa,* edited by C. Geertz. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Hewstone, Miles and Ward, Colleen. 1985. Ethnocentrism and causal attribution in Southeast Asia. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 48(3): 614-23.

Hirschman, Charles. 1975. *Ethnic and social stratification in Peninsular Malaysia*. Washington: American Sociological Association.

_____. 1989. Development and inequality in Malaysia: From Puthucheary to Mehmet. Review Article. *Pacific Affairs* 62(1): 72-81.

Horowitz, Donald. 1983. *Ethnic groups in conflict: Theories, patterns, policies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

_____. 1989. Cause and consequence in public policy theory: Ethnic policy and system transformation in Malaysia. *Policy Science* 22: 249-287.

Hussin Mutalib. 1989. *Islam and ethnicity in Malay politics*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1992. *Islam in Malaysia. From revivalism to Islamic state?* Singapore: Singapore University Press.

Ibrahim bin Saad. 1983. National culture and social transformation in contemporary Malaysia. In *Ideology in Southeast Asia* edited by Chua, Beng-Huat, *Special Issue of Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 11(2).

Jesudason, James V. 1989. *Ethnicity and the economy: The State, Chinese business, and Multinationals in Malaysia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Jomo, K. S. 1986. *A question of class*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1990. Whither Malaysia's New Economic Policy? *Pacific Affairs*: 63(4): 469-499.

_____. 1994. *U-turn? Malaysian economic development policies after 1990*. Townsville, Queensland: James Cook University of North Queensland.

_____. 1998. *Tigers in trouble: Financial governance, Liberalisation and crises in East Asia.* London: Zed Press.

Kahn, Joel. 1990. Constructing Malaysian ethnicity: A view from Australia. *Ilmu Masyarakat* 14: 6-8.

Kahn, J. & Loh Kok Wah (eds.). 1993. *Fragmented vision: Culture and politics in contemporary Malaysia.* Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Kantayya Mariappan. 1995. Micro and macro ethnicity: Ethnic preference and structures in Malaysia. Ph.D Thesis Bristol: University of Bristol.

Lee, Eddy. 1998. The Asian financial crisis: Origins and financial outlook. *International Labour Review* 137(1): 81-93.

Lee, Raymond (ed). 1985. *Ethnicity and ethnic relations in Malaysia.* Occasional Paper, No. 12. Monograph Series on Southeast Asia. Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University.

_____. 1989. The State, religious nationalism, and ethnic rationalisation in Malaysia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13(4): 482-502.

Lian Kwen Fee. 1997. Between kingdom and nation: The metamorphosis of Malay identity in Malaysia. *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 25(2): 59-78.

Lim Mah Hui 1986. Affirmative action, ethnicity and integration: The case of Malaysia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 8(2): 250-76.

Leong Y Lim. 1997. Cultural attributes of Malays and Malaysian Chinese: Implications for research and practise. *Malaysian Management Review* 33(2):81-88.

McLeod, Ross H. 1997. From crisis to cataclysm? The mismanagement of Indonesia's economic ailments. *The World Economy* 21(7): 913-30.

Mahathir Mohammad. 1970. *The Malay dilemma* Singapore: Donald Moore.

Malaysia. 1991. *The Second Outline Perspective Plan 1991-2000.* Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department.

_____ 1996. *Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996-2000.* Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department.

Mansor Mohd Noor. 1992. The determinants of Malays ethnic alignment. Ph.D Thesis University of Bristol.

_____. 1997. *National unity in the context of manpower utilisation in the labour market.* Kuala Lumpur: Department of National Unity.

_____. 1997a. *National unity in the context of inter-ethnic business joint-ventureship.* Kuala Lumpur: Department of National Unity.

_____. 1997b. Towards racial harmony: The development of universalistic norms and its impacts on ethnic relations between Malay and Chinese students in the University of Science Malaysia. A paper presented at the 3rd Asean Inter-University Seminar Pekan Baru Universiti Riau.

_____. Ethnic trends among Malay and Chinese students in the University of Science Malaysia. Penang: Center For Policy Research, Universiti Sains Malaysia.

Means, Gordon P. 1991. *Malaysian politics: The second generation.* Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Miles, Robert. 1982. *Racism and migrant labour.* London: Routledge.

Milne, R.S. 1979. *Politics in ethnically bipolar states: Guyana, Malaysia and Fiji.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Milner, Anthony. 1982. *Kerajaan: Malay political culture on the eve of colonial rule.* Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press published for the Association for Asian Studies, USA.

_____. 1994a. Episodes in the history of Malayness. A paper for the Conference on Minority-Majority Discourse, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii.

_____. 1994b. *The invention of politics in colonial Malaya.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mohd Nor Nawawi. 1991. Ethnic politics in Malaysia: Emerging trends. *Plural Societies* 20: 56-68.

Morrissey, Oliver and Doug Nelson. 1999. East Asian economic performance: Miracle or just a pleasant surprise? *The World Economy* 21(7): 855-79.

Nagata, Judith. 1981. In defense of ethnic boundaries: The changing myths and charters of Malay identity. In *Ethnic change,* edited by Charles F. Keyes. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

_____. 1979. *Malaysian mosaic: Perspective from a poly-ethnic society.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

_____. 1976. The status of ethnicity and ethnicity of status: Ethnic and class identity in Malaysia and Latin America. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 17(3-4): 242-260.

_____. 1975. Perceptions of social inequality in Malaysia. In *Pluralism in Malaysia: Myth and reality,* edited by Judith Nagata, Special Issue of Contributions to Asian Studies 7: 113-36.

Ong Puay Liu. 1987. Malaysian students studying in Britain: A study of identity relations and preferential policies in their home country. M. Phil. Thesis, University of Bristol.

Regan, Daniel. 1977. Secular city? The religious orientations of intellectuals in Malaysia. In *Cultural pluralism in Malaysia: Polity, military, mass media, education, religion and social class,* edited by John A Lent. Northern Illinois University, Special Report, No. 14. The Center for Southeast Asian Studies.

Sanusi Osman. 1981. The national unity policy and ethnic relations in Malaysia with special reference to Malacca town. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Bristol.

_____. 1984. Ikatan etnik dan kelas. In *Ethnicity, class and development in Malaysia,* edited by Syed Husin Ali. Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia.

Saw Swee Hock. 1988. *The population of Peninsular Malaysia.* Singapore: Singapore University Press.

Shamsul A.B. 1996a. Debating about identity in Malaysia: A discourse analysis. *Southeast Asian Studies* (Kyoto University) 34(3): 476-99.

_____. 1996b. The construction and transformation of a social identity: Malayness and Bumiputraness re-examined. *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 52: 16-33.

_____. 1999. Ethnicity, class, culture or identity? Competing paradigms in Malaysian studies. *Akademika* 53: 61-76.

Shamsulbahriah Ku Ahmad. 1998. What are we trying to measure?: Conceptualising ethnic and gender inequality in Malaysia. A paper for The Fourth International Conference on Development and Future Studies, Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

Sivalingam, G. 1985. The New Economic Policy and the differential economic perfor-
    mance of the races in West Malaysia 1970-1985. In *Economic performance in
    Malaysia: The insiders view,* edited by Manning Nash. New York: Professors World
    Peace Academy.

Snider, Nancy L. 1977. Malaysian noncommunal political parties. In *Cultural pluralism
    in Malaysia: Polity, military, mass media, education, religion and social class,* edited
    by John A Lent. The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois Univer-
    sity. Special Report, No. 14.

Stenson, M. 1980. *Class, race and colonialism in West Malaysia*: The Indian case. St.
    Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

_____. 1976. Class and race in West Malaysia. *Bulletin of Concerned Asian
    Scholars* April-June: 45-54.

Syed Husin Ali. 1984. *Ethnicity, class and development in Malaysia.* Kuala Lumpur:
    Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia.

Tan Chee Beng. 1984. Acculturation, assimilation and integration: The case of the Chi-
    nese. In *Ethnicity, class and development in Malaysia,* edited by Syed Husin Ali.
    Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia.

_____. 1999. Chinese identities in Malaysia. *Southeast Asian Journal of
    Social Science* 25(2): 103-116.

Thomas, R. Murray. 1982. Malaysia: Co-operation versus competition or national unity
    versus favoured access to education. In *Politics and education: Cases from eleven
    nations,* edited by R. Murray Thomas. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Ting Chew-Peh. 1982. Chinese immigration and the growth of a plural society in Penin-
    sular Malaysia. *Research in Race and Ethnic Relations* 3: 103-123.

Vorys, Karl. 1975. *Democracy without consensus: Communalism and political stability
    in Malaysia.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ward, Colleen and Hewstone, Miles. 1985. Ethnicity, language and intergroup relations
    in Malaysia and Singapore: A social psychological analysis. *Journal of Multilingual
    and Multicultural Development* 6(3/4): 271-96.

Yew Yeok Kim. 1983. The impact of interaction and mass media on national unity: A
    socio-psychological approach. Part I *Negara* 7(2); 20-25 and Part II *Negara* 1984:
    8(1): 24-30.

Yumin Lee. 1992. Cultivating authentic sons of the soil: Development discourse and
    praxis in management of indigeneity in Malaysia. In *Asian and Pacific inscriptions:
    Identities, ethnicities and nationalities,* edited by Suvendrini Parera. Bundoora. Vic:
    Australia: Meridian Book.

Mansor Mohd Nor
Centre for Policy Research
Universiti Sains Malaysia
11800 Minden, Pulau Pinang
Malaysia