Akademika 55 (Julai) 1999: 99 - 132

Forests, Protest Movements and the Struggle Over Meaning and Identity in Sarawak

FADZILAH MAJID COOKE

ABSTRACT

Widespread rural protest against forestry activities in Sarawak during the mid 1980s and early 1990s invited retaliatory measures from the state in the form of tighter surveillance and criminalisation of protest. Thus, the protest movement could easily be dismissed as having failed to influence policy. However, in the long history of Dayak protest against forestry activities what may be new is the widespread and sustained nature of the action. But how was strategic mobilisation possible, given the limited political space for critique, the lack of political cohesion and the heterogeneity of Dayak experience of the state and 'development'? Viewing Dayak protests as part of an ongoing larger social movement concerned with a more just state and environmental health, the paper highlights the way in which rural protest assists in the production of 'Dayakised' knowledge about development, environment and identity. In this larger movement, the work of academic researchers, environmental and indigenous activists are linked. The paper argues that the implications of the protests for rural Dayak understanding and experience of the state, citizenship and identity is far reaching but, as yet, little understood, suggesting a need for analysis of the state and civil society to move beyond party politics and the NGO movement. What the movement has done is expand the discourse and practice of conservation to include a wider range of concerns than have been possible in the past, given the tendency to privilege biological and economistic factors in resource management policy.

Key words: forests, native rights, protest movement, identity

ABSTRAK

Bantahan meluas masyarakat luar bandar yang berlaku di Sarawak terhadap kegiatan pembalakan, pada pertengahan tahun-tahun 1980an dan awal 1990an telah mengundang langkah tindak balas daripada pihak pemerintah yang meningkatkan pengawasan dan mengisytiharkan kegiatan bantahan itu sendiri sebagai kesalahan jenayah. Dengan itu, pergerakan bantahan itu boleh dianggap sebagai telah gagal mempengaruhi dasar. Walau bagaimanapun, apa yang baru dalam sepanjang sejarah bantahan yang dilakukan oleh kaum Dayak terhadap kegiatan pembalakan itu ialah sifatnya yang

*meluas dan berterusan (*sustained*). Namun bagaimanakah mungkin berlakunya pengembelingan secara strategik memandangkan terbatasnya ruang politik untuk kiritikan, kurangnya kesepaduan politik dan keseragaman pengalaman kaum Dayak mengenai pemerintah dan 'pembangunan'? Dengan melihat bantahan kaum Dayak itu sebagai sebahagian daripada pergerakan sosial yang lebih besar lagi berterusan, untuk mewujudkan sebuah negara yang lebih adil dan persekitaran yang lebih sihat, makalah ini memaparkan cara bagaimana bantahan rakyat desar membantu meningkatkan pengetahuan kaum Dayak mengenai pembangunan, alam sekitar dan identiti. Dalam pergerakan yang luas ini, hasil kerja penyelidik akademik, dan aktivis alam sekitar dan aktivis masyarakat peribumi. Makalah ini menghujah bahawa implikasi bantahan itu kepada pemahaman dan pengalaman kaum Dayak di desa mengenai pemerintah, kerakyatan dan identiti adalah menjangkau jauh tetapi kurang difahami. Hal ini menunjukkan perlunya analisis mengenai pemerintah dan masyarakat sivil melampaui sempadan parti politik dan pergerakan organisasi bukan kerajaan (NGO). Pergerakan NGO ini telah memperluaskan wacana dan amalan pemuliharaan untuk meliputi isu-isu yang lebih luas berbanding dengan yang pernah dilakukan. Perluasan ini dilakukan memandangkan terdapatnya kecenderungan oleh pihak pembuat dasar untuk mengutamakan faktor-faktor biologi dan ekonomi dalam polisi pengurusan sumber.*

Kata kunci: hutan, hak pribumi, pengerakan bantahan, identiti

INTRODUCTION

This paper examines rural protest in Sarawak in the 1980s and early 1990s which reached its height with the Penan blockades of logging roads. The protest was not confined to the Penan, although it may be useful nationally and internationally to present it as such (Tsing 1993; Majid Cooke 1997).[1] It deals with generalised rural protest and explores the way it feeds into or finds resonance in the wider movement for change expressed in environmental politics. We pay attention to environmental activism, particularly to the way in which rural communities (not only the Penan) link up with non-government organisations (NGOs) as well as environmentalists and field researchers (who may or may not be linked to NGOs. In this wider movement for change we draw attention to larger changes in discourses and practices about the 'sustainability' of forest resource use.[2] We argue that in terms of meaning and identity Dayak protest have benefited from these linkages.

Due to frustration with the slow pace of change emanating from 'below', and because surveillance has in fact tightened in the late 1980s and 1990s, Dayak protest of the period can easily be dismissed as having little or insignifi-

cant impact on regional and national politics or as having made much substantial inroads in the policy arena for advocates of local rights. The 1987 amendment (90B) to the Sarawak Forest Ordinance made blockading of logging roads illegal and entitled the state to use police power against such activity. A further amendment in 1993 presumed guilty anyone found or arrested in the area where barricades have been set up, even if he/she does not actively participate in them or engage in putting them up (Sahabat Alam Malaysia, Sarawak Update, 10 January 1994). Given these developments, it would be foolish to claim that substantial inroads have been made by advocates of local rights in the policy arena.This could be one reason why the complexity of Dayak protest and its significance in the every-day defined context of identity discourse has not been well theorised in the past. Neither have the issues discussed in this paper been taken up by others in this volume.

This paper argues that where political space for critique may be limited, "even strategies that fail to have any impact on policy making, although they were intended to do so, can turn out to be a success of consensus mobilization" (Klandermans 1988: 184 citing Morris, 1984). After all, it is now clear that even at the height of protest in 1989,[3] Dayak unity was not (as it has not been in the past) a certainty (Bevis 1995; Harding 1996). In the heart of logging country, long houses were divided. There were pro and anti-logging factions within the same long house (Harding 1996: 242). A few long houses who earlier supported logging, later changed their minds (Breunig 1993). Even among protesters there were those who might have worked or planned to work for the timber industry in order to survive, for adventure or for other reasons (fieldnotes 1991,1998; Bevis 1995: 20). Although most Penan groups oppose logging, many did not want to take part in resistance action; in fact, a few Western Penan groups cooperate with timber companies (Brosius 1997: 477). Interestingly, anti-logging activism unitedd some NGOs with individuals in political parties in government (Bevis 1995: 214). Partly, this complexity can be traced to the historical process of identity formation (to be dealt with in the next section).

Given the range of experiences and responses of Dayak groups, a more useful question to ask and one that has implications for predicting future participation is, how, given the heterogeneity, consensus was mobilised inspiring action. A second, related, and equally useful question is how, despite limited political space, local claims were heard nationally and internationally. The last question we ask in this paper is, how heterogeneous groups, caught up in the demands of everyday life, acquired a sufficient degree of co-ordination and awareness to mount strategically effective protest. To answer these questions we need to examine the role of the state and civil society and to focus on Dayak activism in a way that takes account of the rich theorising surrounding the characteristic and potential of the ecological movement (see Peet and Watts 1996).

Much of the theorising surrounding social movements emphasise the role of non-state actors (especially NGOs), the use of science and technology to

support knowledge claims about the environment, the importance of symbols or issue frames in achieving consensus or inspiring action (Klandermans, Kriesi & Tarrow 1988; Tarrow 1989; Princen & Finger 1994). With regard to mobilising action, Klandermans (1988: 179) maintains that it is best to start with structural factors (for example strain deprivation, marginalisation or decreased legitimacy of regimes). However, since structural factors only explain where grievances come from, it is also important to examine how grievances are interpreted. To induce people to act on their grievances there must be 'cognitive liberation' (Klandermans 1988: 180 citing McAdams 1982). This means that those who normally accept authority must be persuaded to re-evaluate the legitimacy of institutions (that they are wrong); those who are fatalistic must be persuaded to start demanding change; and those who generally feel powerless must be persuaded that they are capable of changing the system. And so, we must turn to the work of NGOs as critics. In Malaysia, however, the impact of NGOs in the political sphere is considered disappointing (Jesudason 1996; Eccleston & Potter 1996). According to Eldridge (1996: 17) such a disappointment stems from an exaggerated expectation of NGOs as potential agents for political change in the conventional sense of party politics. NGOs, after all, do not comprise the whole of civil society.

In this paper, the role of native peoples is considered crucial. Drawing from secondary sources and conversations with state and non-state actors we examine the way in which Dayak communities draw attention to issues of land rights and problematise normative arguments that provided justification for their initial exclusion from the process of state building. In Sarawak as elsewhere (see Wilmer 1993: 26) changing the official language and normative arguments that equated being Dayak with ignorance and backwardness (*katak bawah tempurung*) (Lian 1987), was considered an important task. Changing the language meant challenging the significance that has been given to those descriptions by the powerful and which had become institutionalised. Nowhere is this active engagement more concentrated than during the state-approved Inquiry held by the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) into Sarawak forestry in 1989/90. Hearings at the Inquiry became a venue for contesting dominant discourses of 'development' and 'sustainability',[4] and identity in the authority-defined context (Shamsul 1996, 1996a).

More generally, and beyond ITTO, in debates about sustainable forest management, knowledge claims of scientific forestry (sustained yield) are being contested. In this paper, we examine the institutionalisation of scientific forestry's claims against shifting cultivation and how this was being contested within science and among 'specific intellectuals', in the policy arena and at the level of discourse.[5] Contestation at this level is rarely considered 'politics' in the conventional sense, but impinges on the political arena in the long term through paradigm shifts in policy approaches.

Dayak protest against forest activities has a long history. Guided by the notion that "communities and groups of people cannot be separated from the history of their localities; their environmental actions are the product of local history, just as their actions transform the history of their environments" (Friedman & Rangan 1993: 13), this paper begins by framing present day Dayak/state interaction in its historical context. But first, we wish to point out the fluidity of Dayak identity.

WHO ARE THE DAYAK?

Dayak is the umbrella name used to describe the various non-Muslim indigenous groups in Sarawak composed of the Iban, Bidayuh (composing a number of sub-groups) and the Orang Ulu (among whom are the Bisaya, Kedayan, Kayan, Kenyah, Kelabit and Penan/Punan). The term, however, is externally introduced and of relatively recent development. The Iban, whose oral history suggests that their movement into Sarawak from Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan) dated around a thousand years ago, were often feared by other groups. Among some of the latter were those well equipped to withstand Iban raids and headhunting missions, but who nonetheless were occasionally outmanoeuvred. Among the Iban themselves, there is said to have been a hierarchy of military prowess, with those down river often used by the Brooke regimes to subjugate more recalcitrant ones upriver (Pringle 1970). The Malaysian Constitution applies the term Dayak only to the Iban (mistakenly referred to by James Brooke as the Sea Dayak) and the Bidayuh (who were known as the Land Dayak). Iban people themselves prefer to use the label Dayak, the term Iban being a relatively new introduction (late 19th century) (Uchibori 1984: 218). In the 1980s, at least at its initial formation – the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) was thought of by the Orang Ulu as a mainly Dayak party (Lian 1987: 21). Dayakism is now a significant mobilising force, uniting the different groups, although temporarily unable to acquire state power following losses experienced by PBDS in the 1991 state elections (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 October 1991: 19). In this paper we do not wish to essentialise ethnic identity, the distinctiveness of each group is well recognised in many ways. However, in some parts of the paper the term Dayak is used as a practical measure, but no assumptions are made about unity in diversity.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS: A BRIEF HISTORY

In the area of forest resource use, two kinds of conflicts are clear (Knight 1996: 713-14). The first is an opposition between forests as a source of livelihood for local peoples versus forests as a form of wilderness to be protected. 'Conservation' often assumes an exclusion of local peoples, although exclusionary prac-

tices vary according to the enforcement regimes or licensing systems introduced. The second kind of conflict is evident in the way in which local livelihood forests are turned into forests meant for a national (productive) resource. Although apparently different, both forms of conflict involve a clash between extra local and local claims to the environment.

In the case of Sarawak, an important aspect of local and extra-local conflict is Dayak/state interactions over forest resources. The trend in this relationship is marked by state attempts to exercise control over material and cultural aspects of economic and political development. State power is evident in forest management regimes, but exercising state power does not necessarily ensure effective control.

The clash between extra-local and local claims over forests in Sarawak has not been as well analysed as the wars of 'pacification' of the Brooke state (Pringle 1970).The conversion of 'open access' forests to forest reserves by the Forest Department during the Brooke period was viewed by many Brooke administrators as a largely technical procedure. Creating forest reserves were regarded an essential first step in the management of forests along the lines of scientific forestry.[6] In reality, Dayak groups who feared that their customary access to land would be infringed upon, continually resisted the creation of forest reserves (to be discussed shortly).

The conventional view among scholars is that the Brookes were averse to opening up Sarawak to foreign investment in order to maintain the state in the tradition of British idealism (Reece 1993). The other view is that, because the Brookes experienced the exacting demands of maintaining the regimes' economic viability without enjoying the advantages of Colonial support had Sarawak been a Crown colony, they had little choice but to look on the forests as a means of generating revenue (Kaur 1998). By declaring all land as state land, the 19th and early 20th century Brooke Land Codes enabled the state to grant lands to a few individuals and foreign companies for purposes of establishing rubber plantations, logging and mining. (Admittedly, in terms of total area, the amount of land awarded to business concerns was small compared to those opened for plantation and mining in neigbouring colonial Malaya).

In forest management, forestry rules and regulations reinforced the process triggered by the Land Code. Following the Forest Reservation Order of 1920 and the passing of the 1924 Forest Ordinance, the work of exploring, demarcation and constitution of forest reserves began. In these reserves "Ibans were not allowed to farm, hunt and collect jungle produce" (Reece 1993: 56), without licence. Forests were to be managed not only for harnessing timber for commercial potential but also for generating more revenue from the so-called 'minor forest products' such as jungle rubber, rattan, camphor, *damar (*a resin used in varnish), sealing wax and other similar products (Dunn 1975) and especially *jelutong* (Dyera costulata) used in the manufacture of chewing gum. During 1923, 3,500 tons were exported from Sarawak (Mead 1925: 97), and revenue from

it was substantial enough for the Forest Department to attempt to introduce a more rigorous revenue collection system. The other aim of jelutong management was to introduce tapping or extraction methods that were less damaging to the trees. But management attempts generally failed. (For a more detailed analysis of the trade in the so-called 'minor forest products' generally in the early part of 20th century Sarawak and Malaya see Majid Cooke 1999; Mead 1938; Annual Report Forest Department Sarawak 1939; Smythies 1963).

Up until the introduction of these new restrictions, the Iban were the main suppliers of jungle products and were regarded as pioneers, encouraged to travel to the Brooke regime's newly acquired districts of Baram and Trusan. Between 1876 and 1910, these jungle products formed one-third of Sarawak's total exports (Pringle 1970: 266).

As a result, Dayak groups continually resisted forest boundaries and rules. In the 1920s, Sarawak Forest Department's Annual Reports contained many accounts of 'friction with the native population'. Facing continued antagonism (from foot dragging and avoidance of forestry rules), an administrative directive to stop the creation of further reserves was issued in 1932 (Smythies 1963: 233). Following resistance from Dayak groups including a protest led by the Iban leader Asun which lasted several years beginning the early 1930s, a provision was passed for the establishment of "protected forests".[7] The intention of the 1934 legislation was "to protect a forest with the least inconvenience to the local inhabitants" (Annual Report, Sarawak Forest Department, 1934). In "protected forests", although shifting cultivation was prohibited, the taking of small quantities of forest produce for domestic use was allowed. Nevertheless, from a local perspective, "protected forests" signified additional restrictions which could appear to local users as forests protected from themselves (for purposes other than their own needs). Foresters trained in the traditions of colonial forestry did not take kindly to the 1934 legislation since it was seen as making too many concessions to shifting cultivators.[8]

Despite new restrictions, because of inadequate budget, enforcement staff and proper equipment for drawing up detailed forest inventory and the mapping of forest boundaries, the creation of forest reserves was a slow process. Neither was enforcement strictly rigorous. Consequently, the power to dominate could not have been altogether effective. The Department would also have had to live with the effects of a general ambivalence of the Brooke regime in the area of native welfare. Needing native (especially Iban) support to uphold the very basis of its legitimacy (in the early years of the regime, most up-river Iban were opposed to the Brookes (Pringle 1970), successive Brooke individuals were said to have excercised a form of paternalism in the area of native affairs, so that foresters' management practices that were seen as exclusionary were sometimes overruled.

After Second World War, with Sarawak officially declared a Crown Colony, the Colonial government looked towards timber as a source of revenue for

financing other sectors of the economy such as transport (Kaur 1998). The Forest Law (Forest Ordinance 1953), which came into effect in 1954 had four objectives; one concerned with protection and conservation; the other three with raising revenue from forests as efficiently as possible including through trade. To implement state development plans, surveillance and mapping intensified, as monopoly concessions and greater capital investment in the economy, especially in the timber sector, was encouraged.[9]

At this juncture in Sarawak's history, once again the arguments centering on the 'primitiveness' of shifting cultivation proved useful. The Sarawak Conservator of Forests, upon moving the second reading of the 1954 Forest Bill pointed to the importance of the Forest Ordinance for controlling forest degradation. He observed that although forests were being degraded by many causes including 'primitive' logging methods, their destruction resulting from shifting cultivation was a bigger worry because Sarawak's most valuable kind of timber *belian* was being destroyed (Browne 1954: 32-5). This proved to be a useful argument for gaining access to more state resources, for, in the 1950s when plans were drawn up for opening up Sarawak's forests on a larger scale than has been done during the Brooke era, the Forest Department gained more staff to survey, categorise and constitute permanent forests as well as prepare and enforce working plans (Kaur 1988: 132). The Sarawak Forest Ordinance was passed in 1953, and has remained the basic foundation on which scientific forestry is practised today.

'POSTCOLONIAL' FOREST MANAGEMENT, SHIFTING CULTIVATION AND DAYAK IDENTITY

Malaysia was formed in 1963 incorporating Peninsula Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak. For many Sarawak elites the merger carried with it a sense of insecurity because of the fear that the state would be swamped by the Peninsula's perceived more economically aggressive and politically experienced masses. Such fears were behind the negotiations of the Malaysia Agreement of 1962 (Roff 1974; Milne & Ratnam 1974). Since 1963, social and political mobilisation in Sarawak has continued to emphasise the concern of 'catching up' (King 1990: 116-20: Milne & Mauzy 1978: 111-14). One effect of the Agreement was the placing of Sarawak's forests and, by extension, the fate of the people in them under state jurisdiction.

In the 'postcolonial' era ammendments to the Forest Ordinance tightened surveillance in order to promote and safeguard the timber industry in the era of 'development'. At the same time, the campaign against shifting cultivation intensified as it became the symbol of underdevelopment at best, or at worse, of anti-developmentalism.

Beginning the 1970s the demand for Sarawak logs from Japan and the newly industrialising countries of Korea and Taiwan appeared insatiable (Dauvergne 1997). In the 1990s, timber revenue forms an average of 32 percent of Sarawak's export income (Tsuruoka 1994: 70 cited in Eccleston 1996: 135), and from the later 1980s contributed to nearly one-half of state government revenue (Wee Chong 1995: 22 cited in Eccleston, 1996: 135). The extra-local view is that the economic benefits from timber production 'trickles down'. The current Chief Minister of Sarawak holds this view and is quoted as saying (in Ritchie 1994: 145):

> Logging helps employ more than 50,000 people (excluding another 60,000 indirectly involved) benefiting more people with spin-off effects. With the opening of factories we will create jobs. Despite Sarawak's substantial contribution to the national economy it still remains as one of the least developed States in the Federation of Malaysia. Since independence, the government has managed to reduce poverty which stood at 57 percent in 1976 to about 20 percent today. A great deal of this progress is because of the government's logging policy.

During this era of development, the critique against shifting cultivation gained new ground. In 1978, a government workshop concluded that "shifting cultivation represents probably the greatest single threat to the integrity of Sarawak's natural resources" (King 1988: 271). In 1991, the perceived destruction was described thus:

> The destruction removes the delicate biomass-soil nutrient cycle which contributes in the maintenance of the forest cover in the natural undisturbed state. It also exposes the surface soil to agents of erosion. The net result is soil fertility depletion. (Sarawak Forest Department 1991: 26)

The claims against shifting cultivation have nothing to do with bad or good science (i.e. whether or not they are based reliable evidence). It merely suggests that, under the umbrella of proper or 'rational' use of forest resources, and using science, 'post-colonial' forestry recuperates the stand against shifting cultivation established during the colonial period.[10]

Precisely because such knowledge claims are based on science, they can be contested by other scientific knowledge claims. A contrasting and more complex view about the viability of shifting cultivation has emerged as a result of field studies in various regions of Sarawak undertaken by non-foresters (see, for example, Cramb 1978; Padoch 1982; Chin 1987; Lian 1987). This point will be discussed later.

The Forest Department's view does not contradict, but in fact reinforces, the perception held by other state actors. At the 6th Malaysian forestry conference in 1976, the then Chief Minister of Sarawak, Abdul Rahman Yaacob commented: "the encroachment of shifting cultivators into the Permanent Forest Estate represents a most distasteful, wasteful form of land exploitation while the illegal felling of timber represents a significant loss of revenue to the state. Such a blatant disregard for the laws of the state cannot be allowed to continue..."

In the 1990s, the critique of shifting cultivation expanded to include judgement about value systems and institutions, especially about Dayak land tenure arrangements. According to Dr.Mahathir Mohamad (1998:114), Dayak 'communal landholdings' with its emphasis on achieving consensus when making decisions about landuse, prevent improvements from being made to the land, because the full agreement of all stakeholders is seldom achieved. As a result, native land is often unimproved, yields low economic value and is deemed 'wasted' . This presumed waste is compounded in view of the material benefits and management experience foregone had they been logged, mined or opened up for commercial agriculture (Mahathir Mohamad 1998: 114).[11] Dayak value systems and social institutions are seen as obstacles to development.[12] Changing them would enable Dayak peoples to become more like "us". This sentiment may be gleaned from a statement about the Penan.

> If you look at their plight, you will understand what will happen to the Penan if they are kept in the forests ... to eat monkeys and maggots and caterpillars .... We believe that the Penan are humans like everyone else .... So what's wrong with us ... feeding them with the kind of culture that will make them like any of us.(The Prime Minister of Malaysia quoted in the *New Straits Times*, October 8, 1991)

It is clear from the above that, in official discourse, Dayak identity is defined in relation to a norm derived from somewhere else, and according to this norm, Dayak cultural elements are found wanting. In response, using cultural traits to argue their case, native groups engage in overturning what has been interpreted as 'a lack' to 'a need' (to be discussed later). Needs from their perspective are not problems. In any case, "In the Baram, we don't need very much". (a Kenyah, fieldnotes, February 1998).

Nevertheless, modernity visits Dayak lives through employment in timber camps, agricultural extension services, schools, improved health and communication systems. In Southeast Asia, there is considerable dispute as to the causes of degradation and deforestation, with policy-making networks emphasising the extent of forest clearance by shifting cultivators, and NGOs and native groups pointing the finger at large scale mechanised logging (Eccleston 1996; Colchester 1995). Despite the best of government intentions, the consensus is that, under the current policy context, the material base for the means of subsistence for the majority of rural Dayak in Sarawak is being systematically degraded (King 1996; Parnwell and Taylor 1996; Brosius 1996). Despite the New Economic Policy and its declared aim of focussing on enhancing the economic rights of Bumiputera communities, Dayak peoples as Bumiputera, still constitute the largest single group of the poor in Sarawak. Their representation at national and state government levels is considered ineffectual, partly because they are said to lack cohesion (King 1986; Jayum Jawan 1994). Moreover, despite the importance of the timber industry in the 1980s as a source of wage employment in the Tinjar, that employment is irregular, terminates when companies move on to newer localities

and is subject to market conditions. In the Tinjar, employment in the timber industry was an important interim route to follow for those who were preparing to marry or to separate from the stem household (Lian 1987: 168). In other words, it is an option only for the young or able bodied.

Consequently, Dayak resistance persists. In February 1998, the Baram district was alive with news passed from long house to long house of Iban farmers who, many weeks earlier were shot by law enforcers, for resisting large scale, land development (oil palm plantations) scheme in the area (fieldnotes, February 1998). Resistance however does not exhaust the story of Dayak/state relations which, in reality, is largely about accommodating the state (to be discussed in the next section).

Moreover, identity formation is not the sole perogative of the powerful, although their views are usually recorded either in printed form or in audio-visual electronic form, and often become the parameters within which debates about identity take place. This is identity discourse that is 'authority-defined' and is based on observation and interpretation (Shamsul 1996: 477-78).

Contesting this discourse is the 'every-day defined' context of identity formation, based on the lived experience of *Dayak* peoples themselves. This discourse is often personalised and unrecorded, but even when occasionally recorded by the odd anthropologists or historians, it has, until recently, been frequently rejected as being "unscientific" (in favour of "scientific statistics") or simply ignored in public debates (Shamsul 1996: 479). Precisely because resistance persists, engaging with the state (as Dayak people have done with Christianity), may mean a complex process of accommodation and recuperation which amount to holding on to (not abandoning) core identities, thereby confounding interpretations about Dayak identity in the authority-defined context. Dayakism after all, became a significant mobilising force in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this period Dayak identity in the every-day defined context took on an additional dimension through individual involvement in the ecological movement, but in so doing Dayak activists found the movement's agenda somewhat restrictive.

ENGAGING WITH THE STATE

At every encounter with government officials, with field researchers and NGOs, Dayak claims point to environmental destruction that has acute consequences for their means of livelihood as rivers become polluted, soil eroded and their *menoa* (forests left on rotational fallow) destroyed from road construction and bulldozing. They want large scale logging stopped, but far from wanting to withdraw from the 'modern' sector, they want logging licences to enable them to log the forests themselves. The last request reflects an attempt to keep the benefits of timber extraction local. Moreover, conservation to Dayak peoples as

it is to many forest dependent groups is not separate from livelihood issues (Friedman & Rangan 1993). It explains Dayak demands for compensation for diminishing livelihood resulting from degraded forest surrounds, for example by the creation of communal forests or through direct cash payment. These anxieties and claims are voiced time and again in their dealings with agents of the state, and are expressed via statements made to non-government organisations, anthropologists and other visiting scholars (World Rainforest Movement/ Sahabat Alam Malaysia 1990; ITTO 1990; Manser 1996; Brosius 1996, 1997).

In all these demands there is not a sense of wanting to circumvent or subvert the state, but rather the concern is for a better state. In fact, most groups look to the state for assistance, as seen in the numerous requests for help in their dealings with logging companies. Even when the state clamped down on some of them as in 1987, by imprisoning native activists, and again in 1989 by making the largest number of arrests of Dayak at logging blockades over an eight year period, disenfranchised groups continued to engage with the state.[13] Given the distances and the difficulties of travel from the *Ulu* (hinterland), they attend court hearings about their cases, often repeatedly (because of constant court adjournment) at great personal expense which are only occasionally reimbursed by the state (fieldnotes 1991; Bevis 1995).

Mostly the appeals for establishing communal forests fail. In some instances forests have been converted into reserves, and therefore cannot be reversed to community forests, especially if they have been licensed out for logging (interviews, Marudi 1991; World Rainforest Movement/Sahabat Alam Malaysia 1990). Since according to the Land Code, (with few exceptions) all land unless titled, are considered state owned, Dayak disputes with logging companies are regarded as a private matter (World Rainforest Movement/SAM 1990; Ritchie 1994). Whatever concessions rural groups are able to extricate would depend exclusively on their negotiating skills and the goodwill of companies. The frustrations are well documented (see World Rainforest Movement/SAM 1990; Bevis 1995; Brosius 1997).

Given limited political space where critique of government policy is considered subversive (Rousseau 1996: footnote 7; Majid Cooke 1997), and in a situation where local needs, economic practices and cultural values are considered 'primitive', secondary to national or extra-local imperatives, ecology provided one avenue for critic.

CONTESTING SUSTAINABILITY AT ITTO: THE STRUGGLE OVER MEANING AND IDENTITY

The ITTO Inquiry into Sarawak Forestry held in 1989 has been criticised by many for both its ecological and social shortcomings (Colchester 1990; Chin 1992). In ecological terms it was deemed as having provided a conservative

estimate of growth data and regeneration potential which, at best, has contradicted the very generous production estimates produced by the Sarawak Forest Department (Chin 1992). In social terms, it was a disappointment for local rights advocates for its ignoring of the native rights issue (Colchester 1990). The broader question of native access rights was reduced to the "native peoples question" and an "awkward difficulty", to be resolved from within Sarawak's political and legal systems (ITTO 1990: 8). ITTO was in a difficult position. Invited to evaluate the state of Sarawak forestry by Malaysian and Sarawak state governments, it also had to guard its own interests. The Sarawak Inquiry had to be seen to be replicable to ensure future work with other governments or producers of tropical timber (field interviews, January 1991). Criticisms of ITTO's work in Sarawak reflect larger changes taking place in the discourse and practice of environmentalism, in particular of 'sustainability' (to be discussed in the next section).

Our analysis of exchanges between native representatives and ITTO Mission members at the hearings (reported verbatim and attached as Appendix II of the ITTO Report (ITTO 1990), suggests that they were the site for a much larger project than has been allowed for by its critics. At the hearings, the acts by native Bumiputera groups of questioning convention and of redefining the 'problem' (to be discussed shortly), were highly political. A close examination of specific exchanges suggest that scientific forestry's assumptions were being questioned and practices criticised. Moreover, these exchanges were not merely confrontations lost or won in the terrain of meanings and values. They were in fact grounded in complex sociological processes, much of which have been touched upon elsewhere (see Majid Cooke 1999).

Proceedings from the ITTO hearings provide a rich and unique source for analysis of the political communication of native Bumiputras. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the majority of native speakers at the hearings came from Iban and Orang Ulu villages or longhouses that had experienced chronic social change through timbering in the Sarawak hinterland. They describe their experiences orally, mostly through interpreters. Regardless of the presence of government officials at the hearings, which often signals the necessity for restraint among the rural poor (Turton 1984), speakers were inspired to express their views. We focus on three messages the speakers wanted to impart, namely that (1) they were legitimate citizens with rights and in view of these rights wanted active participation in the state's economic development as community entrepreneurs (for example, through timber licences held by the community); (2) Dayak peoples as possessing their own complex cultural styles and are autonomous subjects, not the objects of exploitation despite the fact that their 'sovereignty' was being challenged; and (3) they are not one of many groups of contenders to a dispute but are moral inheritors of specific 'rights' to the land. Strategies used amounted to persuading members of the Inquiry to see new problems or to think about old problems in a different way. Our analysis of the hearings, follows a qualitative approach focusing on the themes of the text.

By the time the public hearings began, the terms of reference for the ITTO Mission had been drawn up. In public policy terms this could have meant that problems had been identified and solutions were what needed to be formulated. Mission members were interested in native opinions only in so far as they provided possible alternative solutions to the 'problem'. In general, native claims based on customary rights were considered part of the problem (ITTO 1990: 8-9). In assessing the 'sustainability' of Sarawak forestry, the ITTO mission considered native claims relevant but outside the 'sustainability' paradigm. Sustainability of forest resources, in these terms began with ecology and economics:

... such reservations would total about 0.5 million hectares ... this simple expedient would therefore be unlikely to have serious consequences for sustainable timber utilisation ... on the other hand, it would greatly enhance the prospects for sustainability of certain social values and for those non-timber ecological values ... after all, both the constitution and the forest policy guarantees traditional rights ... the main focus of the work of the Mission was, then, on the "sustainability" of the forest resource in Sarawak. This was taken to mean the attainment and maintenance of a forest estate yielding a continuing and non-declining flow of benefits and products at levels of each considered best by the people of Sarawak and at levels which can be supported in the future. (ITTO 1990: 9)

From the above paragraph, we are persuaded to think of social values and non-timber ecological values (under which native rights claims have been slotted), as having an effect on sustainable timber utilisation. In so doing, the assumption is that these values are not an integral part of the equation for 'sustainability of forest resource'. The problem, then, is not that sustainability was an exclusionary construct, but that native claims are a stumbling block to a 'continuing and non-declining flow of benefits' and, therefore, had to be 'dealt with'. In the ITTO report, ascription to an earlier form of native customary land use was considered a problem, albeit one which needed to be accommodated in forestry practices:

The Mission therefore concludes that many of the present complaints and claims of right by local communities are not based on Sarawak law as established by the Land Code, but a continued application of older, traditional native custom. During dialogues, it was not apparent that this distinction is appreciated by the communities concerned, or indeed by others (such as SAM) pressing the case ... almost all of these problems would be alleviated if the Forest Department was to improve consultative procedures with local communities, if concession holders were personally committed and required to ensure closer and more sympathetic communication between contractors and local communities ... (ITTO 1990: 37-38)

By contrast, native peoples were not convinced that their claims were a problem. Their oral narratives suggest that 'needs' are not 'problems'. From their perspective, the 'problem' did not arise from a contradiction between the 'is' and the 'ought' but from a constellation of events, situations and processes that constituted reality. For this reason, they felt compelled to construct their world before the Inquiry, and in doing so, placed themselves at the centre. It

became important for them that panel members recognised their experiences, what life was before and what life is like now. How could the visitors identify the cause of the problem if they did not have the contextual knowledge of what life was like in Sarawak? To illustrate, the story told by Jarom, is excerpted below:

Pemanca Jarom said he has the longest longhouse in the district with 70 doors and a total population of 589. It is the most upriver at the head of the Limbang close to the Mulu National Park. Previously there was a six mile gap to the boundary of the forest reserve but the park has taken some of the forest which he considered part of his land bank and this has left too little forest for his community's agricultural needs. He said he did not quarrel with licences to log ... but he would like to be given notice first. Otherwise the contractors employ his people without consultation and he loses control of them. He proposed that, to solve the problems, the licences should be given to the longhouse, so that he would be the principal controlling the contractor. He asked also for communal forest, not just for Iban people, but for all the communities living in the up river areas and he specified that they were short of wood for making coffins and boats. (ITTO 1990:169)

Jarom is actively engaged in redefining the 'problem'. His needs (for a communal forest) are not considered a problem; the problem rather is the havoc created by logging and by the withdrawal of a 'right' (of access to forest land within his group's Native Customary Rights boundary). The 'need' for the establishment of a communal forest for his village comes at the end of a narrative. The sequencing is important and is a noticeable pattern in most narratives at the hearing. It indicates the intersection of past events and current effects suggesting that a 'wrong' has been done. After all, the message goes, they are not a people without history, but are citizens with viable social and cultural systems who have a right to be consulted. The moral 'right' of citizenship is based on the argument that forest land claimed under Native Customary Rights are 'theirs' by rights of prior occupation and inheritance, and is captured below:

The first speaker said that most of their land has been destroyed by the activities of logging which leaves timber criss-crossing farmland and fish dying because of water pollution. The animals run away because most of the fruit trees have been knocked down and rattans that are used for buildings have also been destroyed, and there is difficulty in looking for food. During the rule of the British, he said they were quite happy as there were no such difficulties .... He asked how many hundred years they have been living in the area and yet the Malaysian government has now told them what to do with their land and not to cut forest for farms. If we cut the forest they will arrest us. The speaker said that he personally has been taken to court four times; he said, never before have Penan and Kelabit been jailed in the last one thousand years. He said they are not against government but want them to administer the people properly ... . The government does not believe them, so they make blockades and then they get arrested. (ITTO 1990: 165)

One Penan presented such rights as 'natural', that is, derived from God:

The second speaker was a Penan. He said it was a great opportunity to meet with the Mission. He said that the Penan are like sick people about to die, because our area has almost been finished and if it is finished we are going to die. He said the Penan get

everything from the jungle including the fish and animals, rattan, sago palm and poison for darts, and their only money comes from selling jungle products. He said it is their hope that the Mission will inform the companies to stop and that if it takes time for them to stop, the Penan will die ... . The timber companies never listen and instead they bulldoze our graveyards. If they have sympathy for us we will never say they are not good. He said when we were created by God, before there was anything, there was water and earth and this water subsided and there is an island where God made us and there is where we are now. They say they want to take this land away and that is why the Penan are trying to defend the land of their ancestors. Please stop the companies as soon as possible. (ITTO 1990: 166)

The duty accompanying that right is to look after their 'land' for the next generation. It does not, however, indicate that forest resources ought to be left totally untouched:

Lawai Usat ... said that ... there are eleven timber companies operating within the boundaries of his land. His longhouse has 70 doors. Before the timber companies came in 1970 when there were plenty of fish, animals and rattans (sic). After 1970 the timber companies invaded the area and they were told that there would be development opportunities to improve their so-called primitive living. They promised employment and a share in the profits. The NCR land was given away without our permission ... . A total of 1000 acres of fertile NCR land was bulldozed and flattened to make way for the logging operations. He said they want to preserve the land for their children. (ITTO 1990: 176)

The desire for continued customary access to forest resources, using them but ensuring that the benefits of forest exploitation accrue primarily to local populations and future generations is an observation that has been made elsewhere by students of environmental politics (see for example Utting, 1993; Redford & Stearman 1993; Bebbington 1996). Native speakers above identify the state (the 'Malaysian government') in the form of an intervention, yet in their multiplicity and heterogeneity, present themselves as people with desire, wanting to survive and wanting development for which they look to the government for assistance:

Joshua Lawai Lawing thanked the ITTO group for visiting Baram and thanked the Chief Minister for allowing them to come ... . He said that these people have been on the land since the time of James Brooke and they understand that this land is government property but do not understand why the government gives it to people from outside and not to them ... . He questioned what the difference was between them and people in Miri, because the local people also want *the (timber) licences. He said* they also want cars and good buildings and to live well, like the town people ... . He said the people need money for their children to study and many people cannot continue to study because they have no money. (ITTO 1990:177)

In asking for development and in wanting to share the benefits of forest exploitation, they used the same euphemisms for exploitative production practices employed by agents of the state. At the hearings, development was also inscribed with prescriptions for legitimacy. The Sarawak and Federal govern-

ments rationalise their legitimacy by emphasising 'development' benefits provided to the *rakyat* (the people). Given the realities of their oppression and the knowledge of probable repression, wanting development is an officially acceptable if not the only viable way for the speakers to press their claims. They used liberally the values of the dominant social order, including those concerning governmental responsibility and democratic participation (ITTO 1990: 165,175), the right to 'develop' through education, employment and health (ITTO 1990: 169, 170, 173, 177), including the right to being awarded their own timber licences (ITTO 1990: 169, 176). These are modest appeals to a 'moral economy' (Scott 1985). Guided by knowledge of the real possibility of repression, Dayak groups at the Inquiry as others do elsewhere (in their contact with academic researchers and environmentalists – to be discussed in the next section) held the state to its promises of citizenship, rights and privileges upon which it propagates itself in the first place. It does not mean that imaginings of a social order along a different line is not possible.

At the ITTO hearings, a critique of social order was emerging. It was directed at scientific forestry. The following exchange between a forestry professional and a natural scientist belonging to the ITTO Mission, and a native speaker captured these assumptions. Also apparent was the different perspectives about conservation between the three speakers.

> Dr. Poore asked if it would be possible for the village people to go through the forest systematically before the concessionaire carried out the logging to harvest the rattan block by block before the trees are felled. However Stephen Ayot said this would not be possible because the people might not be free from work on the farm and also the market prices are variable. Lord Cranbrook suggested that the rattan might be harvested and then kept for when the price improves, but Stephen Ayot said that the real problem is that the aim is to conserve the rattan plants. Only those which are ready to harvest are taken and the rest are left. (ITTO 1990: 149)

The differences in ideas about conservation are clearly indicated in this exchange. Firstly, timber is accorded unquestioned value over rattan by Poore and Cranbrook.[14] This assumption about the importance of timber originated in concerns of a different time and place – of the less complex, temperate forests of Europe and North America and in the 19th century (Behan 1990; Moran et al. 1991; Whitmore 1991). It has remained relatively unquestioned in tropical forestry (Guha 1991; Westoby 1987).[15] Rattan, as a non-timber forest product, is given secondary value. Secondly, from the perspective of Poore and Cranbrook, conservation is about 'rational' or 'wise' use. Since timber has been accorded primacy, the value of rattan could be 'sacrificed'. However, utilitarian thinking which is implicit in the rational use model, also suggests that not to harvest rattan prior to logging is not 'wise use', especially if it were subject to possible destruction during harvesting (Allison 1991).

By contrast, conservation in subsistence terms is about ensuring subsistence security. Rattan is one of the essential means of existence; necessary for

mats, basket making and other needs, including handicraft production for the market. Consequently, to eliminate rattan in one grand swoop is to eliminate one of the means of existence. Conservation from this perspective means preventing large-scale destruction, such as the cutting and burning of forest for cattle ranches, building dams that displace local inhabitants, altering landscapes in ways that make traditional subsistence impossible, oil exploration or gold mining that destroy forests through the influx of outsiders and new diseases (Redford & Stearman 1993: 253). According to Redford and Stearman (1993: 251-53):

> Many, but not all, indigenous peoples are acutely aware of their close cultural ties to the tropical forests and the necessity of conserving this resource for their continued well-being ... other indigenous groups may not show such awareness or concern for the natural environment ... to indigenous people, conserving biodiversity may not preclude slash-and-burn farming for the market ... selective logging from which they gain a profit, subsistence or even commercial hunting, or other forms of extractive activities that leave large areas of the forest or other natural habitat altered but still standing.

These contrasting perspectives are clearly grounded in differences in historical and material conditions. Scientific forestry emerged out of the complexities of industrial society, so that the system of regulation, surveillance and preservation of forest is caught in the network of assumptions regarding the needs of an industrialised state. In Sarawak, as in other countries embedded in subsistence traditions, regulation and forest preservation enters new ground, requiring new rules based on different material conditions and social practices. Instead, what has happened is the adoption of a sociotechnical system ill-equipped to meet the forces of agrarianism.

In Sarawak, as seen from the analysis of the ITTO hearings, a critique of 'mainstream' sustainability politics has emerged in conjunction with native rights advocacy. (The next section traces its origin in the ecology movement). Advocates emphasised the importance of changing the language used to describe what it meant to be Dayak. According to Wilmer (1993: 36), "false stereotypes reinforce the perception of indigenous peoples' moral inferiority and oral incompetency ... . Much of the political activism of indigenous peoples is directed toward the rhetorical issues that underlie their political marginalization".

But identity formation is not a one way street. Identity interpretation in the authority-defined context needs validating at the level of everyday experience. At ITTO, interpretation in the authority-defined context has not been validated by Dayak's personal experiences. Because the interpretation of identity in the authority-defined context lacked validity, we witnessed at ITTO, an attempt to amend discordant language. Since the interpretation lacks validity, the process of rejection and validation is not dead, as will be seen in the next section.

ENGAGING NON-STATE ACTORS

The ecological movement has been criticised for its limited understanding of power relations surrounding problems of control and access to natural resources (Guha 1989, Sachs 1992). On the other hand, conservation to Dayak peoples as it is to many forest dependent groups is not separate from cultural, identity and livelihood issues, the movement has been able to sustain the interest of indigenous activists. For Dayak peoples affected by logging the challenge is to find a way of expanding issues of biological welfare or ecosystems health to include 'native welfare'. However, the ecological movement is at once a scientific discipline and a protest movement (Taylor & Buttel 1992). It draws into its fold environmentalists, academics and academic activists. Lessons from Asia, South America and Africa have pushed movement boundaries so that conservation and development issues are now seen as inseparable (Friedman & Rangan 1993; Peet & Watts 1996), although this has not been easily achieved (Taylor & Buttel 1992). Nevertheless, in Malaysia, ecology appears to continue to be a viable avenue for bringing up issues of cultural survival as evident in the way 'environmental' issues became prominent in the opposition against the construction of the Bakun Dam towards the end of the 1990s. Objections raised against the Bakun Dam regarding its environmental and economic feasibility also included issues of displacement of native peoples, their protest against their impending relocation and lack of proper consultation by planners (INSAN 1996).

For activists the first task is to present Dayak groups as sound managers of their forests, and that their managment system as 'scientific' (based on observation and experience), as that of scientific forestry. The second task involves presenting Dayak cultures as dynamic, their communities adaptable and wanting development, contrary to official accounts that tend to portray them as resisting development. This section will deal with how Dayak activism feeds into different projects of the larger movement for change labelled environmentalism.

As a movement, ecology's theorems such as the 'balance of nature' or the 'priority of the whole over its parts', have been found useful (Sachs 1992: 30). Ecology's emphasis on looking at forests in terms of ecosystems health provides the movement with the platform from which to contest scientific forestry's knowledge claims, which until recently, have been based largely on observations of forest patches (Majid Cooke 1995). This is seen in the debates over the accuracy of sustained yield estimates in scientific management practices and in differences over the nature of tropical forests themselves.[16]

The movement draws from a range of disciplines and study areas. In political economy, ecology's influence is seen in new ways of looking at the relationship between the state, society and nature, as well as between ecological knowledge and power (Peet & Watts 1996). Such efforts in turn pave the way for asking new questions about access to and control of natural resources. Thus, academic interest in 'indigenous management systems' have tended to emphasise

the systems' general viability and flexibility, particularly in the way indigenous agriculture, such as shifting cultivation, in fact, takes heed of the links between soil fertility, water and productivity. This approach provides a 'scientific' dimension to indigenous claims that they are valid managers (not destroyers).

Research on 'indigenous' forest management systems are carried out in a range disciplines including geography, agronomy, botany and anthropology. In sum, native shifting cultivation, slash and burn agriculture or swiddening is presented as an agricultural system that is contingent on a whole range of management practices aimed at ensuring soil fertility (Padoch 1982; Chin 1985; Lian 1987; Cramb 1988; Langub 1996). Far from being static, this system of forest management is presented as constantly evolving, a notion that is not captured by the term 'indigenous' (Utting 1993: 162). More importantly, such representation has the effect of placing at centre stage alternative knowledge forms in forest management, which have traditionally remained in the periphery for being 'unscientific' at best, or, at worse, destructive, as noted. Theorising on 'Dayakised' knowledge and the role of 'specific intellectuals' should enrich current debates on national identity construction and 'nations-of-intent' (Shamsul 1996).

Research on indigenous management systems further present a more complex view of Dayak subsistence economy. Existing at the subsistence level does not exclude engagement in the cash economy, the range of activities included involvement in the jungle products trade and cash crop production which in some instances entailed an engagement with the state. Degrees of involvement in the cash economy, however, varies across groups and historical periods.

For example, in the 1970s, the Kenyah were active suppliers of *garu* or *gaharu* (Chin 1985), which are used in world markets as incense, in cosmetics or as fragrance in perfumes. Depending on market conditions and changes in their level of need for goods and services, the Kenyah may even exploit their environment. In the mid to late 1970s the depletion of *garu* in the Tinjar district was attributable to the high price it fetched from urban markets at the time (Chin 1985: 125). Kenyah also engage in a range of economic activities over time and during different market and other conditions (Lian 1987: 165-96). Some Kenyah communities grew rubber as a cash crop through government cash subsidy. In fact, the government rubber subsidy was termed 'prais' (for the English word price) which provided them with the opportunity to expand their area of economic activity. Perceiving forest degradation to be inevitable, some work in logging camps concluding that they might as well participate 'while the iron was hot'.

Such findings are potent reminders that Dayak societies are not averse to change, strengthening indigenous advocates' claims that they are for development (not against it) and that their vision of 'self-development' is not subversive, as is often regarded by state officials on occasion (Majid Cooke 1997).

Dayak activists find in NGOs a sympathetic ear, although this link is not without its problems.[17] In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the NGO, Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM) became useful to native activists as a mediating agency. SAM

was able to organise several hundred community or long house associations impressing the message that security of tenure is the most crucial consideration in any development activity (Keck & Sekkink 1998: 159). SAM's lawyers in Pulau Pinang provided legal assistance to native groups in their claim for customary land. Long houses sought and obtained SAM's representation in their claims against the state regarding customary rights land. The Jok Jau Evong case where the Uma Bawang longhouse claimed that the logging licence on their customary rights land was illegally issued, although unsuccessful because of a technicality (Harding 1996: 342), nevertheless provided an example that the state could be wrong, and that making demands proactive is both crucial and possible. Since in social movement theory, the role of charismatic leaders is important for mobilising consensus, the leadership of Harrison Ngau and others in legitimising action means and goals is important. Ngau can be personally persuasive while SAM at Marudi became the processing centre for a deluge of claims as well as a venue for networking among activists (Bevis 1995: 35).

The opportunity for 'cognitive liberation' presented itself through many avenues including: (1) events leading to the 1987 state elections; (2) the leadership struggle in UMNO in 1987; and (3) the formation of the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS). In 1987, elite rivalry prompted full public revelation of how patronage worked in Sarawak's timber politics. The links between timber magnates and political elites became clear, an issue that was previously known but often not spoken of freely, for fear of reprisal (Majid Cooke 1997). The revelation strengthened activists' claim against distorted development. "A lot of money is being made from the trees and the Dayaks are not getting anything and they are losing their way of life. The government says this is development. If this is development, the Dayaks do not want it" (Harrison Ngau cited in Colchester 1993: 82).

The frame is one of 'rights', that is the right to decide on how to develop and to have a greater share in the fruits of development. This frame has resonance because among Dayak the issue of being left behind despite the New Economic Policy is a widely held sentiment (Jayum Jawan 1994: 204-31). As well, Dayak experience of environmental disturbance is a direct experience but which had been treated as an individual problem by the state. Framing environmental degradation as a development problem, puts the effects of logging in a different light. It elevates environmental degradation from the realm of individual suffering to a public issue. Issue framing is important. According to Klandermans (1988: 179), framing existing issues in new ways and working out persuasive frames go a long way towards motivating people to re-evaluate the legitimacy of institutions, and to realise that they have the capacity to act, as well as demand change. In this way the interests of those affected by logging became aligned with the interests of those working towards sustainable development. Moreover, the frame carried fear appeal, namely, a collective good (development and environmental health) is being threatened. The fear appeal could have been

fanned as well by the arrest of Harrison Ngau under the Internal Security Act in 1987. Upon his release, Ngau briefly entered party politics as a federal parliamentarian.

The probability that fear appeals mobilise people is linked to the presence or absence of effective means of coping. If no effective means were communicated, people may easily engage in defensive avoidance (Klandermans 1988: 188). Dayak groups did not engage in defensive avoidance because of two developments in the larger political process. Dayak groups may have been convinced that the political crisis at the national level during 1987/88 provided them with an opportunity window for making proactive demands. The leadership struggle in Kuala Lumpur[18] could have stimulated protest. According to Tarrow (1989: 45), relative openness or closure of opportunities over time, affect the incidence of protest. Moreover, the formation of PBDS, although initially identified by Orang Ulu as an Iban party, may have the effect of suggesting to Dayak communities that their participation is above threshold level (that there are more than the ordinary number of groups involved). The fact that PBDS when in opposition in those early years expressed concern with Dayak, especially, language and land rights issues, could have inspired action.

CONCLUSION

Social movement theorists remind us that modern form of politics is as much about cultural struggles over material conditions and needs as it is over meaning (Klandermans, Kriesi & Tarrow 1988; Morris & Mueller 1992; Van Cott 1994; Peet & Watts 1996; Keck & Sikkink 1998). The Penan blockades have been interpreted as a struggle over meaning (Tsing, 1993; Brosius, 1996), and ought to be seen as but one aspect of a broader struggle within the Dayak community. Faced with all pervasive state intervention with local processes of production and reproduction, according to students of social movements, rural groups use identity as the basis for resisting state predation, claiming autonomous spaces for themselves from within the state but at the same time making claims on the state as citizens (Bebbington 1996: 94). Conservation provides a viable, albeit limited, avenue.

The exchanges at ITTO suggest that identity discourse in the authority-defined context may set the parameters for debate but the actual process of identity formation relies for its validity on the discourse of personalised experience. In the authority-defined context, Dayak identity discourse centres on a 'lack' (for example, of appropriate or progressive land tenure systems; of finesse because they "eat maggots or caterpillars"), but for that interpretation to make a meaningful imprint, it has to be validated by personalised experience. At ITTO, both validation and rejection were occurring. Dayak were rejecting the discourse of 'lack' while validating that of 'rights'. What was being validated was Dayak

identity as citizens who have been wronged, who saw the state (the Malaysian government) as having the power to put it right. Dayak activism at ITTO as their activities elsewhere show, is about demanding for a just state, not for circumventing it. At every opportunity, in their dealings with the state or its appointed representatives (as at ITTO), Dayak communities presented their own interpretation of their 'problems' and 'needs' and that those needs were not problems. The objective for doing so was to change the language of marginalisation and of portraying themselves as citizens with complex social systems, having the right to be consulted.

The protest movement may have been brief and easily squashed as it has been by coercive measures but the process is far from over. Interestingly, NGOs are again at the forefront, this time in alliance with opposition parties, academicians, workers groups and trade unions in the cry for *reformasi*.[19] When monitoring further development within the *reformasi* movement, it would be worthwhile to note that NGOs do not exhaust the whole of civil society, neither does the strengthening of the NGO movement necessarily reinforces civil society (Feldman 1997).

In judging the effectiveness (or lack of it) of the Dayak protest movement, it is important to frame the movement against this larger picture, so that native critique of development and sustainability may be seen as part of an ongoing process of expanding the discourse and practice of conservation to include a wider range of concerns than have been possible, given the past and lingering tendency to privilege biological and economistic factors in natural resource policy. As a result, the issue of sustainable forest management has been expanded beyond the arena of economics and biology to include concerns over native rights and local access to forest resources, although when translated into policy such concerns have been captured in an ad hoc fashion (for example through the creation of the Sarawak government's Penan Committee, despite the adverse conditions affecting all Dayak groups). What the protests mean in terms of identity formation (as Dayak) and experience of citizenship, is an area of research that has only just begun but even at this early stage the implications appear to be far reaching (see Brosius, 1996; 1997).

This paper has suggested the need for social and political analysis to move beyond organised party politics to include environmental action (resistance and civic movements) and to view such action as broader than theorising around the middle class and/or the NGO movement.[20] A fuller understanding of the political space occupied by civil society in Sarawak in particular, and Malaysia in general, will have to include an examination of local long house institutions (especially systems of land tenure), the role of external agents including religious groups (the Borneo Evangelical Church) as well as university researchers and their production of 'Dayakised' knowledge.

NOTES

1. In the 1970s and 1980s Iban groups had sporadically blockaded logging roads to protest against inadequate (or non existent) compensation for damage to their land. But the Penan barricades which began in March 1987 spread throughout the region to include other Dayak groups such as the Kenyah, Kayan, Kelabit and Lun Bawang, stopping activities in at least 16 logging camps (World Rainforest Movement/Sahabat Alam Malaysia, 1990). Despite the introduction of stricter surveillance through amendments made in the Forest Ordinance, blockades continued well into the 1990s, at different levels of intensity in different parts of the Sarawak interior. When blockades were erected in one part of the state, groups from other parts flocked to the site to lend support (Brosius 1997: 476).
2. 'Sustainability' is a contested terrain. The concept of sustainable development, although originating in the early 1970s as seen in the writings of Paul Ehrlich and E.F. Schumacher, became more contentious because of its ambiguous and contradictory definition as development that would ensure meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). However, precisely because the term is ambiguous, it appears non-threatening, and has received growing acceptance among policymakers and planners especially those engaged in the international business of development such as those in aid agencies and multilateral development banks. For those critical of economic development priorities or who are sceptical that development (as measured in economic growth) could go hand in hand with maintaining a sustainable environment, sustainable development provides a way of bringing ecological concerns into the debate. For those concerned with social justice, sustainable development provides an avenue for consideration of 'rights'. However, because of differences in history and material conditions among countries and in the power relations that link them, ecological concerns are not only a result of environmental changes taking place 'out there', but a function as well of domination and control, accommodation and recuperation. This means that the kind of environmental problems that get into the public (or international arena) or how they are dealt with (the solutions) are partly a function of power. It is no wonder that in the area of forest resource policy (as is the case for environmental politics in general) there is no consensus as to what it is that ought to be sustained, what the main agents of forest degradation or destruction might be, or the ways by which damage could be avoided.
3. From 1987 to 1994, a total of 478 individuals from various Dayak groups were arrested or imprisoned, 229 of them in 1989 (Manser 1996: 266).
4. The ITTO Report has been criticised by many in terms of its 'objective' findings, namely in terms of the reliability or otherwise of its ecological and administrative assumptions and conclusions (see, for example, Colchester 1990; Chin 1992). My analysis of ITTO as an arena for contesting dominant discourses about 'development' and 'sustainability', is therefore a departure from past trends.

   'Development' in the manner it is equated with unbridled progress and commonly measured in terms of economic growth has been recognised as ideology. Critics maintain that the incidence of enhanced (not reduced) social inequality, gender, ethnic and racial divides in many developed countries and in those that are

heading towards developed status, are indicators of a lack of progress. Recognising the ideological nature of 'development', alternative forms and measures are being attempted and debated. (For a brief discussion of the issues, see Stiglitz & Squire 1998). More extreme critics such as Escobar (1995) advocate looking for alternatives to development. In this paper, these ongoing concerns are acknowledged, so that 'development' is used as ideology.

5. Discourse in this paper is used in combination with the term practice (Keeley 1990; Sivamarakhrishnan 1995). In this perspective, discourses are not merely theoretical constructs, but are forms of 'ordering' with implicit sets of norms and prescriptions. Using Foucault's concept of biopower which draws attention to power at micro-sites (such as that which resides in scientific disciplines among 'specific' intellectuals), an analysis of scientific forestry, its institutionalisation and the way it renders invalid other forms of forest management systems (such as 'indigenous' ones), simultaneously draws attention to uncertainties in many of its knowledge claims. I attempted to do this in Majid Cooke (1995) and in more detail in my book (1999). On the other hand, environmental activism has benefited from a paradigm shift in ecology from one resting on simple notions of stability, harmony, and resilience to one that proceeds from the idea of chaotic fluctuations, disequilibria and instability (Majid Cooke 1995; Peet and Watts 1996: 9-13). Tropical forests are now seen in terms of their uniqueness and ecosystems as fragile, in need of protection.
6. Colonial forestry built its foundations on the 19th century experience of 'scientific' forest management in Europe, especially France and Germany, gained ascendance in Burma and India, subsequently spreading to Southeast Asia (Guha 1989; Peluso 1992; Bryant 1997). The central aim of 19th century scientific (European) forestry was timber production for revenue generation. The Sarawak Forest Department was formed in 1919 and shared similar traditions from colonial forestry as the Malayan Forest Department established eighteen years earlier. J.P. Mead, the First Conservator of Forests for Sarawak had served in Malaya (Flint & Richards 1992: 96) and returned to serve in Malaya upon completion of his years in Sarawak (Smythies 1963: 238). Procedures for reserving forests in Sarawak were based on those of Malaya (Troup 1940: 393).
7. The Asun 'rebellion' was also interpreted as a generalised reaction to restriction on social life which included the tightening up of tax and fee collection (such as door tax and gun registration fees); as well as a curb on upriver migration (for shifting cultivation or flight from war or disease) (Reece 1993: 56).
8. The 1934 legislation caused such great consternation among foresters that the editorial page of the Empire Forestry Journal in 1935 (v.14:100) exclaimed that "This (1934) legislation seems superfluous, as privileges to take forest produce for domestic use could be conceded in a reserved forest under the previously existing forest law. The unlimited privileges granted under the new law would seem rather dangerous and in any case, it is the agitation of shifting cultivators against any form of forest protection that is to be feared ..."
9. The first few politicians to emerge in Sarawak especially Temenggong Jugah (an Iban leader) and James Wong (an ethnic Chinese and currently, Minister of Environment and Tourism), acquired timber wealth in colonial times (Milne and Ratnam 1974: 318).

10. It is not the power of individual foresters that is at issue here, but rather that, 'expert' opinions (of 'specific intellectuals') (Foucault 1972;1980) is accumulated because of the extension of techno-scientific structures into the economic and strategic domain. It is a power that is embedded in a system of relations that link knowledge and power in discourse. Clearly the forester' s view is a national view, and a developmentalist one, with implicit understandings about: (1) industrial development and progress, and (2) the state, its prerogatives and rights. Indeed, the persistent claim of industrial forestry in Sarawak (as it is in the Peninsula) is its contribution to national income goals (Sarawak Forest Department 1991: 3; Thang & Masran 1991: 1). Together with intensified demonising of shifting cultivation in Sarawak, 'postcolonial' forestry appears to be a misnomer since being 'postcolonial' implies having graduated past colonial attitudes and practices which current management practices have not proved to have done.
11. This is a similar view to that of colonial administration in the 19th century. In 1891, a Governor of the Straits Settlements wrote: "The great objective of government should be to get land taken up on almost any terms, for agriculture alone will bring about a settled thriving population" (Governor Cecil Clementi Smith 1891 quoted in Lim Teck Ghee 1976: ix). The specific conditions in 1891 differed from 1998, but the perception that land is unproductive unless 'developed' appears consistent across colonial and post-colonial regimes.
12. This is not the only time that value systems have been used to argue for economic growth. This was explicit in Dr. Mahathir's book *The Malay Dilemma*, in Japanese cultural images presented in the 'Look East Policy', and in initiatives towards promoting an Islamic work ethic through the establishment of a think tank, the Malaysian Institute for Islamic Understanding (IKIM) in 1993 (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 20 May 1993: 32).
13. During 1987 because of insecurities and factionalisation within the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), and as part of an overall crackdown on dissent, Dayak activists, along with other critics of government policy were arrested in a crackdown called Operation Lallang, but they were subsequently released (Eccleston & Potter 1996: 58).
14. Mission members were mainly forestry professionals (especially foresters, zoologists and forest economists) (Colchester 1990). Duncan Poore was a member of the ITTO Mission, while Lord Cranbrook was the leader of the Mission.
15. A qualifier is needed here. Forestry practices in postcolonial conditions have incorporated 'basic needs' and ecological imperatives. These imperatives have been translated in such practices as social forestry and ecosystems health management. However, social forestry has not been incorporated into mainstream industrial forestry practices, and instead, operates alongside it (Westoby 1989). In instances where social forestry has taken the issue of local needs more seriously, as in the Philippines, management practices (extraction and production aims) remain grounded in assumptions of industrial forestry (Van den Top 1998). On the other hand, ecosystems health management is in a very early stage of development. In industrial forestry the main preoccupation is still with timber.
16. Citing various NGO claims, Eccleston (1996: 126) notes that estimates of residual damage from mechanised logging in increasingly remote, inaccessible and species diverse forests range from one tree damaged for every two cut to five damaged for

every one removed. The latter estimate comes from Sarawak due to the conditions specific to its hill forests. Residual damage when coupled with that derived from road construction (such as soil compaction) contributes to soil erosion and river pollution, although in the absence of longitudinal data, the long term and cumulative effects remains unclear (see contributions to Gomez-Pompa, Whitmore & Hadley 1991). Many claim that such damage has not been factored into sustained yield calculations in Sarawak (Chin 1992; Colchester 1990).

17. I have written about the double-edged nature of international networking among NGOs (Majid Cooke 1997; Eccleston 1996a). In brief, conservation 'interests' emanating from the first world concept of wilderness preservation reduces native peoples to the status of 'ecologically noble savage' and overlooks the possibility that native cultures are dynamic and constantly evolving. In practical terms, it could lead to misdirected campaign strategies with coercive measures imposed on local communities by governments retaliating to so-called 'foreign NGO' interference in the country's internal affairs (Eccleston 1996).
18. The leadership challenge mounted by what was known as team B within the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in 1987 and the subsequent formation of Semangat 46 as an opposition political party with a significant support base in the Peninsula, created problems of legitimacy for the UMNO faction in power. Sensing that UMNO (under team A) might need to mobilise as much support as it could get from non UMNO sources, Dayak activists took a calculated risk in presenting their case in Kuala Lumpur, thereby drawing the latter's attention to the customary rights issue in Sarawak. [For an account of the leadership struggle in Kuala Lumpur, see Shamsul (1987); and Singh (1991).
19. During the 1998 protests, the allegations of corruption, cronyism and collusion' may be politically inspired and directed at political elite (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 July 1998; *Time*, 14 September 1998), but what the movement stands for in terms of its meaning to those who participate in it may, in the end, be far different from what even the so-called Anwar supporters could predict. However, this is not the first time, that the Mahathir leadership has been challenged (Case 1997). So, the significance of the protest movement that has crystallised in conjunction with the sacking by Prime Minister Mahathir makes the Anwar protests different from earlier contests among elites within UMNO (as signalled by the formation of Semangat '46 and the Musa/Mahathir rivalry in the 1980s). Given the tendency to dismiss Malaysian voters' interest in 'rights' (see Jesudason 1996: 145-50; Case 1997: 83), the Anwar protests suggest that there is a need to look beyond party politics. (For a different view, see Saravanamuthu 1992: 44-54). Given the 'hegemonic project' of the Mahathir administration, it also suggests a need to examine a different form of power than the power to dominate, that is the power to 'speak' – to resist. Nowhere is this process clearer than in the indigenous rights movement in Sarawak, the subject matter of this paper.
20. If our analysis were confined to formal party politics, it would appear that the Mahathir administration has been engaged in a 'hegemonic project'. Elaboration regarding the 'hegemonic project' of the Mahathir administration can be gleaned from related works regarding the process of ideology formation surrounding national identity, citizenship and the rights associated with it. Nowhere is the process of ideology formation better discussed than in debates concerning the relationship

between economic development and Bumiputeraism. In these discussions, the New Economic Policy, the 'Look East' Policy, Vision 2020, and the development of popular and official Islam become important elements of debate (Khoo Boo Teik 1995; Jomo 1995; Khoo Kay Jin 1992; Saravanamuttu 1989; 1996; Shamsul 1996a). These discussions point to the possibility that the political and administrative elites are engaged in the project of national identity building called for amending and rearranging existing discourses on the Bumiputera identity, the Sultanate, and notions of democracy, justice and the Court system to conform to a narrow conception of national identity, political participation, governmentality and economic and political leadership (Barraclough 1984; Shamsul 1987; Fatimah Halim 1990; Jomo 1990). Power can therefore be identified in the regime's ability to rework existing discourses about certain symbolic elements in Malaysian life. The effort has been considered successful. One indicator is that UMNO is considered a party that 'everyone' who is interested in accessing the country's wealth wants to be affiliated with (Shamsul 1997: 18).

However, a different perspective suggests that states may embark on 'hegemonic projects', but whether or not they succeed is a separate issue (Stoler 1997). In Malaysia, national identity is far from being a closed issue. Despite the use of Bumiputera as an ethnic symbol to create a kind of joint nationhood by the present Malay (UMNO) dominated Malaysian state, many divergent versions of 'nations-of-intent' have emerged (Shamsul 1996; 1996a). Among Malays there is the alternative version of nationhood offered by Parti Islam based on the idea of an 'Islamic nation'. Broadly, this implies a nation of Muslims and non-Muslims organised around the principles of the Quran and Islamic laws. In Malaysia, contesting the dominant version of Bumiputeraism and nationhood is that of regionalism as expressed in Sabah's 'Kadazan nationalism' and in Sarawak's 'Iban nationalism'. Even after 1990, with the strengthening of UMNO in Sabah, the Kadazan 'fire' of nationalism has not been extinguished (Shamsul 1996).

REFERENCES

Allison, L. 1991. *Ecology and utility*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Annual Reports, Forest Department Sarawak, 1934, 1939.

Ashforth. 1990. Reckoning schemes of legitimation: On commissions of inquiry as power/knowledge forms. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 3(1): 1-22.

Ave, J. and King, V. 1986. *Borneo: The people of the weeping forest*. Leiden: National Museum of Ethnology.

Barraclough, S. 1984. Political participation and its regulation in Malaysia: Opposition to the Societies (Amendment) Act 1981. *Pacific Affairs* 57(3): 450-461.

Bebbington, A. 1996. Indigenous organizations and agrarian strategies in Ecuador. In, *Liberation ecologies: Environment, development, social movements*, edited by Peet, R. and Watts, M. London and New York: Routledge.

Behan, R.W. 1990. Multiresource forest management: A paradigmatic challenge to professional forestry. *Journal of Forestry* 88(4): 12-18.

Bevis, W.W. 1995. *Borneo log: The struggle for Sarawak's forests*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.

Brosius, P. 1996. Between development and deforestation: Negotiating citizenship in a commodified landscape. In *Penans and their surroundings,* edited by Hood Salleh. Bangi, Malaysia: Institute for the Environment and Development (LESTARI), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Round Table Diologues No. 2.

Brosius, P. 1997. Prior transcripts, divergent paths: Resistance and acquiescence to logging in Sarawak, East Malaysia. *Comparative studies in society and history* 39(3): 468-510.

Browne, F.G. 1954. Regional notes. *Malayan Forester* 17(1): 32-5.

Bryant, R.L. 1997. *The political ecology of forestry in Burma 1826-1993.* London: Hurst and Company.

Case, W. 1997. Malaysia: Still the semi-democratic paradigm. *Asian Studies Review* 21 (2-3): 79-90.

Chala, T. 1993. Development and change in Sarawak: An analysis of conflict. Master of Arts Thesis, University of Melbourne, Geography Department, Melbourne, Australia.

Chin, S.C. 1987. Do shifting cultivators deforest? In *proceedings of conference on forest resources crisis in the third world,* 6-8 September 1986. Pulau Pinang: Sahabat Alam Malaysia.

Chin, S.C. 1992. Curiouser and curiouser: Forestry in Sarawak. *Wallaceana* 63: 2-5.

Chin, S.C. 1985. Agriculture and resource utilization in a lowland rainforest Kenyah Community. *The Sarawak Museum Journal* 25(56) New Series, December. Special Monograph No. 4, Kuching, Sarawak.

Colchester, M. 1990. The International Tropical Timber Organisation: Kill or cure for the rainforests? *Ecologist* 20(5): 166-73.

Colchester, M. 1995. Forest peoples and sustainability. In *The struggle for land and the fate of the forests.* edited by Colchester and Lohmann, L. Pulau Pinang, Malaysia: World Rainforest Movement/Ecologist/Med Books.

Cramb, R. 1978. The transition from shifting cultivation to commercial agriculture: A case study from the Layar River. Paper presented at the Workshop on Shifting Cultivation in Sarawak, 7-8 December 1978, Sarawak Department of Agriculture, Kuching.

Dauvergne, P. 1997. *Shadows in the forest: Japan and the politics of timber in Southeast Asia.* Cambridge, Massachusets & London: MIT Press.

Dunn, F.L. 1975. Rainforest collectors and traders: A study of resource utilization in modernand ancient Malaya. *Monographs of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,* No. 5.

Eccleston, B. and Potter, D. 1996. Environmental NGOs and different political contexts in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. In *Environmental change in Southeast Asia,* edited by Parnwell, M.J.G. and Bryant, R.L. London: Routledge.

Eccleston, B. 1996. NGOs and competing representations of deforestation as an environmental issue in Malaysia. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 34(1): 116-41.

Eccleston, B. 1996a. Does North-South collaboration enhance NGO influence on deforestation policies in Malaysia and Indonesia? *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 34(1): 66-89.

Eldridge 1996. Development, democracy and non-government organizations in Indonesia. *Asian Journal of Political Science* 4(1): 17-35.

Escobar, A. 1995. *Encountering development*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Fatimah Halim 1990. The transformation of the Malaysian state. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 20(1): 64-88.

Feldman, S. 1997. NGOs and civil society: (Un) Stated contradictions. *Annals, The Journal of American Academy of Political Science* 554 (November): 46-65.

Flint, R.P. and Richards, J.F. 1992. Contrasting patterns of shorea exploitation in India and Malaysia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In *Changing Pacific forests: Historical perspectives on the forest economy of the Pacific Basin*, edited by Dargavel, J. and Tucker, R. Durham, N.C.: Forest History Society.

Foucault, M. 1972. *The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, M. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Friedman, J. and Rangan, H. (eds.). 1993. *In defense of livelihood*. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press.

Fuss, D. 1989. *Essentially speaking*. New York: Routledge.

Gomez-Pompa, A., Whitmore, T.C. and Hadley, M. (eds.). 1991. *Rainforest regeneration and management*. Man and the Biosphere Series, V.6, United Nations Economic and Social Commission. New Jersey: Parthenon Publishing.

Guha, R. 1989. Radical American environmentalism and wilderness preservation: A Third World critique. *Environmental Ethics* 11(1): 71-83.

Guha, R. 1991. *The unquiet woods*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Harding, A. 1996. Practical human rights, NGOs and the environment in Malaysia. In *Human rights approaches to environmental protection*, edited by Boyle, A & Anderson, M. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hong, E. 1987. Natives of Sarawak: Survival in Borneo's vanishing forests. Pulau Pinang, Malaysia: Institut Masyarakat.

Institute of Social Analysis – INSAN. 1996. *Power play: Why the Bakun hydroelectric project is damned*. Kuala Lumpur, second edition.

International Tropical Timber Organization. 1990. *The promotion of sustainable forest management: A case study in Sarawak, Malaysia*. Report submitted to the International Tropical Timber Council, Eighth Session, 16-23 May, Bali, Indonesia.

Jayum A. Jawan. 1993. *The Iban factor in Sarawak politics*. Serdang, Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Pertanian Malaysia.

Jesudason, J.J. 1996. The syncretic state and the structuring of oppositional politics in Malaysia. In *Political oppositions in industrialising Asia*, edited by G. Rodan. London & New York: Routledge.

Jomo, K.S. 1990. Whither Malaysia's economic policy? *Pacific Affairs* 63(4): 469-99.

Kaur, A. 1995. The babbling Brookes: Economic change in Sarawak 1841-1941. *Modern Asian Studies* 29(1): 65-109.

Kaur, A. 1998. A history of forestry in Sarawak. *Modern Asian Studies* 32(1): 117-47.

Keck, M. and K. Sekkink. 1998. *Activists beyond borders*. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.

Khoo Boo Teik. 1995. *Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An intellectual biography of Mahathir Mohamad*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Khoo Kay Jin. 1992. The grand vision: Mahathir and modernisation. In *Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia*, edited by Kahn, J. and Low, F. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

King, V. 1988. Models and realities: Malaysian national planning and East Malaysian development problems. *Modern Asian Studies* 22(2): 263-98.

King, V. 1990. Why is Sarawak peripheral? In *Margins and minorities: The peripheral areas and peoples of East Asia,* edited by King, V.T. & J.G. Parnwell. Hull: Hull University Press.

King, V. 1996. Environmental change in Malaysian Borneo: Fire, drought and rain. In *Environmental Change in Southeast Asia*, edited by Parnwell, M. & R.L. Bryant. London: Routledge.

Klandermans, B. 1988. The formation and mobilisation of consensus, In *From structure to action: Comparing movement participation across cultures*, edited by Klandermans, B., Kriesi, H. & Tarrow, S. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Klandermans, B. Kriesi, H., and Tarrow, S. 1988. *From structure to action: Comparing movement participation across cultures*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Knight, J. 1997. A tale of two forests: Reforestation discourse in Japan and Beyond. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 3(4): 711-30.

Korsmo, F. 1990. Problem definition and the Alaska natives: Ethnic identity and policy formation. *Policy Studies Review* 9(2): 294-306.

Langub, J. 1996. Penan and their surroundings. In *Penans and their surroundings*, edited by Hood Salleh. Bangi, Malaysia: Institute for the Environment and Development (LESTARI), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Round Table Diologues No. 2.

Lian, F.J. 1987. Farmers' perception and economic change. PhD Thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.

Lim Teck Ghee. 1976. *Origins of a colonial economy: Land and agriculture in Perak 1874-1897*. Pulau Pinang, Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia.

Lim Teck Ghee 1996. Nongovernmental organizations in Malaysia and regional net working. In *Emerging civil society in the Asia Pacific community,* edited by T. Yamamoto. Tokyo: Institutute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Mahathir Mohamad. 1998. *The way forward.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Majid Cooke, F. 1995. The politics of sustained yield forest management in Malaysia: Constructing the boundaries of time, control and consent. *Geoforum* 26(4): 445-58.

_____. 1997. The politics of 'sustainability' in Sarawak. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 27(2): 217-41.

_____. 1999. *The challenge of sustainable forests, The policy of forest resource use in Malaysia, 1970 - 1995.* Sydney: Allen & Unwin and Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Manser, B. 1996. *Voices from the rainforest.* Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Social Analysis.

Mead, J.P. 1925. Forestry in Sarawak. *Empire Forestry Journal* 4(1): 91-9.

Mead, J.P. 1938. Sarawak. Annual Report of the Forest Department 1937. Commentary. *Empire Forestry Journal* 17: 322-4.

Milne, R. and Mauzy, D. 1978. *Politics and government in Malaysia.* Singapore: Times Books.

Milne, R., and Ratnam, K. 1974. *Malaysia, new states in a new nation.* London: Frank Cass.

Moran, A., Chisholm, A. and Porter, M. 1991. Wood, wildlife and wilderness, managing Australia's native timber forests. In *Markets resources and the environment*, edited by Moran, A. et al. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Morris, A.D. and Mueller, C.M. (eds.). 1992. *Frontiers in social movement theory.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Padoch, C. 1982. Land use in new and old areas of Iban settlement. *Borneo Research Bulletin* 14(1): 3-14.

Parnwell, M.J.G. and Taylor, D.M. 1996. Environmental degradation, non-timber forest products and Iban communities in Sarawak. In *Environmental change in Southeast Asia,* edited by Parnewll, M. & Bryant, R.L. London: Routledge.

Peet, R. and Watts, M. (eds.). 1996. *Liberation ecologies: Environment, development, social movements.* London & New York: Routledge.

Peluso, N. 1992. *Rich forests, poor people: Resource control and resistance in Java.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Princen, T. and Finger, M. 1994. *Environmental NGOS in world politics.* London & New York: Routledge.

Pringle, J. 1970. *Rajahs and rebels: The Ibans of Sarawak under Brooke Rule, 1841-1941.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Rangan, H. 1993. Romancing the environment: Popular environmental activism in the Garhwal Himalayas. In *In defense of livelihood*, edited by Friedman, J. & Rangan, H. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press.

Redford, K. and Stearman, A. 1993. Forest dwelling native Amazonians and the conservation of biodiversity: Interests in common or in collision? *Conservation Biology* 7(2): 248-55.

Reece, R.H. 1993. *The name of Brooke: The end of White Rajah rule in Sarawak.* Kuching, Malaysia: Persatuan Kesusasteraan Sarawak (2nd edition).

Ritchie, J. 1994. *Bruno Manser, the inside story.* Singapore: Summer Times.

Roff, M. 1974. *The politics of belonging.* Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Rousseau, J. 1996. The Bakun hydroelectric project and resettlement: A failure of planning. In *Power play: Why the Bakun hydroelectric project is damned*, edited by Institute of Social Analysis. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Social Analysis (second edition).

Sachs, W. 1992. Environment. In *The development dictionary,* edited by W. Sachs. London and New Jersey: Zed Books.

Saravanamuttu, J. 1989. Look East Policy: In *The real lessons: Mahathir's economic policies*, edited by Jomo, K.S. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Social Analysis.

_____. 1992. The state, ethnicity and the middle class factor: Addressing non-violent democratic change in Malaysia. In *Internal conflict and governance*, edited by Rupesinghe, K. Basingstoke, England: St.Martin's Press.

_____. 1996. Malaysia's foreign policy in the Mahathir period, 1981-1995: An iconoclast come to rule. *Asian Journal of Political Science* 4(1): 1-16.

Sarawak Forest Department. 1991. *Forestry in Sarawak, Malaysia.* Kuching, Malaysia.

Scott, J.C. 1985. Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Shafruddin, B.H. 1987. *The federal factor in the government and politics of Peninsular Malaysia.* Singapore: Oxford University Press.

Shamsul, A.B. 1987. The battle royal: The UMNO elections of 1987. In *Southeast Asian Affairs 1988*, edited by Ayoob, M. and Ng Chee Yuen. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Shamsul, A.B. 1996. Debating about identity in Malaysia: A discourse analysis. *Southeast Asian Studies* 34(3): 476-99.

_____. 1996a. Identity construction, nation formation and Islamic revivalist movement in Malaysia. In *Islam in the era of nation-states: Politics and religious renewal in Southeast Asia*, edited by Hefner, R. and Horvatich, P. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.

_____. 1997. The economic dimension of Malay nationalism: The socio-historical roots of the New Economic Policy and its contemporary implications. *The Developing Economies* 35: 3240-61.

Smythies, B.E. 1963. History of forestry in Sarawak. *Malayan Forester* 26(4): 232-50.

Stiglitz, J. and Squire, L. 1998. International development: Is it possible? *Foreign Policy*, Spring: 138-51.

Stoler, A.L. 1997. *Tensions of empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tarrow, S. 1989. *Struggle, politics and reform: Collective action, social movements, and cycles of protest*. New York: Cornell University.

Taylor, P.J. and Buttel, F. 1992. How do we know we have a global environmental problem? Science and globalisation of environmental discourse. *Geoforum* 23(3): 404-16.

Thang, H.C. and Masran Mohamad Salleh. 1991. Sustained yield forest management in Peninsular Malaysia. Paper presented at the Seminar on National Forest Policy, 21-22 January 1991, Kuala Lumpur.

Troup, E.C. 1940. *Colonial forest administration.* London: Oxford University Press.

Tsing, A.L. 1993. *In the realm of the diamond queen*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Turton, A. 1984. Limits of ideological domination and the formation of social consciousness. In *History and peasant consciousness in Southeast Asia*, edited by Turton, A. and Tanabe, S. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.

Uchibori, M. 1984. Transformations of Iban social consciousness. In *History and peasant consciousness in Southeast Asia*, edited by A. Turton & S. Tanabe. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.

Utting, P. 1993. *Trees, people and power*. London: Earthscan Publications.

Van Cott, D.L. 1994. Ed. *Indigenous peoples and democracy in Latin America*. New York: St. Martin's Press/Inter-American Dialogue.

Van den Top, G.M. 1998. Deforestation of the Northern Sierra Madre. In *Environmental challenges in Southeast Asia*, edited by King, V.T. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press.

Welyne Jeffrey Jehom. 1999. The problem of ethnic identity in Sarawak. *Akademika* 55: 85-100.

Westoby, J. 1978. Forest industries for socio-economic development. Paper presented at the Eighth World Forestry Congress, 16-28 October, Jakarta, Indonesia.

Westoby, J. 1989. *Introduction to world forestry, people and trees.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Whitmore. 1991. Tropical rain forest dynamics and its implications for management. In *Rain forest regeneration and management* (Man and the Biosphere Series), edited by Gomez-Pompa, A., Whitmore, T.C. and Hadley, M. V.6 . New Jersey: United Nations Economic and Social Commission, Parthenon Publishing.

Wilmer, F. 1993. *The indigenous voice in world politics*. Newbury Park, California: Sage.
World Rainforest Movement/Sahabat Alam Malaysia. 1990. *The battle for Sarawak's forests*. Pulau Pinang, Malaysia: Sahabat Alam Malaysia.

Fadzilah Majid Cooke
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
Department of Human Geography
Australian National University
Canberra, Australia
E-mail: fadzilah.cooke@anu.edu.au