TO BAN OR NOT TO BAN POLITICAL PARTIES: CORRELATES OF TURMOIL AND THE PROBLEM OF "DEUTSCHIAN CONFLICT" IN BLACK AFRICA

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SINOPSIS

Dalam kertas ini sample 32-negara dari Afrika kulit hitam telah digunakan untuk menguji hipotesis Deutsch bahawa konflik primordial diakibatkan oleh mobilisasi sosial apabila asimilisasi sosial berkurangan. Analisa regresi dua-tahap digunakan untuk menguji hipotesis itu. Diteliti dari analisa regresi bivariate dan multivariate, didapati bahawa petunjuk asimilisasi sosial kurang penting untuk menjelaskan konflik primordial antara kumpulan; sebaliknya, pengharaman parti politik adalah penting secara statistika dilihat dari korelasinya. Ini bermakna konflik di Afrika luar Sahaja adalah jelas bersifat politik tanpa mempunyai hubungan dengan isue kaum dan primordialisme. Akan tetapi, oleh kerana wujudnya masalah data, hasil kajian ini belum boleh dianggap sebagai muktamad.

SYNOPSIS

Using a 32-nation sample from Black Africa, a test is made of Deutsch's hypothesis that primordial intergroup conflict is caused by social mobilization when social assimilation lags. A two-stage regression analysis is used to test the hypothesis. Both in terms of bivariate and multivariate regression analysis, it was discovered that indicators of low social assimilation are insignificant to explain primordial inter-group conflict; instead, it was found that the banning of political parties is statistically significant to the correlation. Simply therefore, conflict in SubSahara Africa is really political and bears little relationship to questions of ethnicity and primordialism. However, given the preliminary nature of the data and problems of data accuracy, the results must be regarded as only tentative.

"Extreme nationalism is thus an epistemological disaster"

— *Karl Wolfgang Deutsch*

The central concept of present-day political identification and loyalty is that of the "nation-state" as contrasted to earlier loci of authority as founded in tribes, principalities, city-states, kingdoms and empires. In primitive societies, socio-political affiliations rested upon ascriptive and corporatist patterns as in kinship and lineal descendance and segmental groups. However, with the

emergence of "new states" which arose concomitantly with the demise of colonial empires after the Second World War, we have also witnessed the prevalence of conflict in many areas of the Third World. As these hitherto traditional states (Shils, 1962) modernize and their peoples become "mobilized" (Deutsch, 1961), primordial group loyalties, as defined by Geertz (1963), are enhanced. Compared against the evolution of "older" Western European nation-states which corresponded with the notion of *volksgeist*, today's developing societies are usually composed of a potpourri of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups within their physical borders (usually because of artificial acts of creation by colonial regimes), and hence efforts at nation-building and national integration or the forging of common *national* ties are compounded and beset with difficulties. It has been suggested (Connor, 1972) that such political processes are better understood as "nation-destroying" rather than "nation-building."

Deutsch (1967) has postulated that if the process of assimilating these diverse (ethnic and linguistic) groups lags behind social mobilization,[1] then there is a high propensity of the occurence of primordial intergroup conflict. Deutsch sees assimilation as a linguistic dimension — as "the average annual percentage shift of the total population to the adoption of the dominant language and culture."[2] But since social mobilization means potential politicization and quite likely potential politicization along the lines of language and ethnic culture, and since, according to Deutsch, social mobilization often is about five times as linguistic assimilation, he predicts or expects another half-century or perhaps one whole century of national tensions and conflicts if present rates of mobilization and assimilation continue.

Apart from Deutsch, casual studies of conflict as a symptom of political instability have, of course, been much in vogue in political science, and will continue to be a constant preoccupation. As stated by Morrison and Stevenson (1972a: 82–83): "In this tradition, the primary 'causes' of political instability are identified as variation in systemic frustration, relative deprivation, statisfaction, or the frustrating consequences of external dependence on foreign control."[3] Most of these "explanations" are quantitive and statistical in methodology but conceivably they do offer multifactor analyses of the political instability problem. But more in line with our concern with Deutsch's works and the formation of political community in new states is Huntington's (1968: 397) qualitative statement that "the common factor giving rise to the problems of national integration and political assimilation is the expansion of political consciousness and participation produced by modernization." In this paper we shall attempt empirical validation of a selected set of "causes" of political instability for a 32-nation sample of Black African countries via a

two-stage regression analysis. In particular, we shall test the validity of Deutsch's hypothesis concerning primordial intergroup conflict: this will be done by means of a simple bivariate regression test. For the sake of convenience, let us simply term the ethnic or linguistic bases of conflict as "Deutschian conflict." In the second stage of our regression analysis we shall reformulate our bivariate regression case with the inclusion of other variables or "correlates of turmoil." The use of the regression technique here is selected simply as a heuristic methodological device.[4]

It is assumed a priori that the unstable political conditions in Black Africa has a strong relationship with the "hodge-podge" character (ethnic pluralism) of the various new states of the continent. Indeed, according to Morrison and Stevenson (1972a: 83), the sources of political instability in the cultural pluralism of national populations have been popular as an explanation in studies of African political development. In the same work, Morrison and Stevenson attempted to test cultural pluralism and political instability; however, in their operationalization of "ethnicity," they did not use language as a cultural trait.[5] In a different work, Morrison and Stevenson (1972b) also attempted to test political instability with integration, but this uses a different index and conceptual construction from our present task.

In any event, the data base we are drawing upon in this paper has been collected by Morrison and Stevenson and their associates as part of the African National Integration Project.[6] These data are available in machine-readable form and cover the following categories of variables: demography and ecology; cultural pluralism; language and religion; labor, energy and investment; social and economic welfare; education; mass communications and transportation systems; political regime characteristics; political parties and elections; extent of governmental influence; military and security systems; political instability; international economic aid; international trade; international relations; urbanization patterns; and ethnic pluralism. These data were collected for a sample of 32 Black African nations — which were independent as of 1969 — and are based on a variety of sources.[7] A glossary appended at the end of this paper provides a detailed description of the variables used in our analysis.

We are assuming here that "conflict" and "turmoil" are part of or may be subsumed under the rubric "political instability." Despite a profusion of works dealing with political instability and conflict, as has already been noted, suffice to note that there is terminological confusion in this area. Morrison and Stevenson (1971) have attempted to provide a clarification of such conceptual difficulties but their discussion itself is not as definitively clear as it may perhaps be.[8] They do assert, however, that political instability must be seen as "conditions in which the institutionalized patterns of authority break down and the expected compliance to political authorities is replaced by political violence." This distinction is quite significant in that we do not adhere to

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it strictly in a theoretical sense in our own analysis here, as will be explained below. But the definition is important because it affects the collection of the data as used in the Black Africa file, and which we utilize.

As Morrison and Stevenson (1971: 349) state, "Our own approach is to define political instability in terms of violence between political actors in conflict over the values governing the distribution of rewards in a society," followed by "We think it useful to distinguish between elites, communal groups (particularly ethnic) and mass movements (in which associational, rather than communal, relationships are the basis of organization), and to distinguish between elite, communal and mass instability depending on the organizational basis of the insurgents and the structural alteration of the political system they intended to carry out." "Elite instability is characterized by the low insensity of violence, and the relatively unchanged character of relations of authority." "Communal instability is violence involving a communal group(s) aimed at a radical restructuring of the authority relationships between communal groups or between the national government and a communal group(s)." "Mass movements are social groupings organized for the attainment of relatively specific political goals in which membership is based on an associational commitment to these goals." But this typology of political violence, however, is not inclusive of all forms of political violence.

As Morrison and Stevenson (1971: 354) explain: "Riots, strikes, demonstrations, assassinations, mutinies, and isolated terrorism are politically motivated, and as we shall discuss later they are frequently classified as turmoil in the quantitative analysis of political instability. However, from the perspective of a theory of national political instability, these events are difficult to classify since they seldom involve an intention to break down the structure of national political authority, and the basis of insurgent organization is seldom discernable for these relatively ephemeral events." Further, (1971: 360) they assert that: "The common interpretation of turmoil as unorganized violence makes little sense of most strike or demonstration behaviour, and, indeed, of a great deal of riot behaviour. To talk of these phenomena as political instability is likewise unacceptable since, by themselves, one of these events constitutes a direct breakdown of the political system, and they may all involve the acceptance of established authorities against whom violence or protest is used as bargaining instrument rather than a strategy for their overthrow." Yet, they find that "the best defined concepts and the most consistently intercorrelated set of measures, are those dealing with turmoil (strikes, demonstrations, etc.)" in comparing "conflict studies."

Morrison and Stevenson (1971: 361, ff) subsequently proceeded to analyze political instability from the Black African data base they had constructed. Aggregating the data for selected time periods (year of independence to 1969, 1960–64, 1965–69, and the first six years of independence) and using factor analysis, they arrived at a set of findings (1971: 364) which we reproduce

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here:

1) The conceptual distinctions between elite and communal instability are empirically substantiated, but that, in Africa, the distinction between mass (revolt) and communal instability is not clear;

2) Turmoil is an independent dimension of violence in African political systems as in other regions of the world;

3) The structure of factor analytic interpretations of political instability is definitely sensitive to the time periods chosen to analysis, but the results for Africa are not greatly dissimilar when different time units are used for analysis;

4) The measures of deaths and arrests are not sensitive indicators of either the total number of events, or the extent of the impact of events which disrupt authority relationships in political systems; and

5) Our summary indices of turmoil, elite instability, and communal instability are good indicators of three relatively independent dimensions of political instability in Africa.

Morrison and Stevenson (1971: 364–365) also discovered that "the relationships between turmoil and elite and communal instability are, however, quite strong — again particularly in the period of 1965–69," but then state that such a strong relationship "may be due to error resulting from poor documentation of turmoil events, or it may reflect the frequency of institutionalized means of political participation and mass-elite communication in Africa, and the pervasiveness of communal identity in African political behavior, relative to other areas of the world."

We have provided an extended coverage in the preceding on the state of the theoretical and empirical foci on political instability because in our own analysis here we are interested in using "turmoil" as a dependent measure and also since we are using a common data base. For the moment, Sandbrook's (1972: 104) point is pertinent: "While it is undoubtedly true that African political life frequently constitutes an 'almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features' and that African regimes face, as a result, a certain inevitability of instability we still do not possess a conceptual apparatus capable of fully comprehending these realities." From the Black Africa file, we have chosen "General Turmoil Composite" (Variable 247)[9] as a measure of "conflict." Whether such turmoil is seen as an attempt to break down authority or not is left as an open question. Indeed, what has been previously discussed should indicate the issue as nonteleological. Furthermore, the utilization of "turmoil" as a "conflict" variable may be appropriate since "both elite and communal instability tend to increase the likelihood of subsequent turmoil." (Morrison and Stevenson, 1971: 367).

In operationalizing the "Deutschian conflict" model, we shall utilize Variable 013 ("Number of Languages") as an indicator of the number of linguis-

tic groups in a country. Although a specific variable (Variable 254) indicates "communal instability," this was not chosen as it weights three indicators of communal conflict in a temporal dimension (length of time of these conflicts) and which were combined as a composite concept. We feel that the number of languages in any country best described the ethnic diversity of such states, rather than other given variables of social structure. In attempting to operationalize Deutsch's propositions expounded upon earlier, we are hypothesizing in bivariate form that conflict is a function of lack of linguistic assimilation. Hence, in the first-stage regression exercise, we then get:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1 X_1$$

where
- Y = General Turmoil Composite (VAR 247)
- B_0 = Intersect at the regression line
- B_1 = Coefficient of X_1 which is the number of languages.

Generating a scatterplot, we get a fairly good distribution of points which we assume posits a linear, if noisy, relationship (by means of a "visual" test). The summary statistics are as follows:

FIGURE 1: Summary Measures of Variables in Equation

Variable	B	Beta	Std Error B	F
VAR 013	0.16613	0.59274	0.04121	16.249
(constant)	5.69974			

The R^2 is 0.35134

Using a 't' distribution and assuming that there is no relationship between the variables (i.e., H_0: $R^2 - 0$)

$$t = \sqrt{F} + \sqrt{16.249}$$
$$+ 4.0$$

But at .01 level of significance, with ($N-k-1 = 30$) cases,

$$t = 2.750$$

i.e., that our 't' distribution is greater than 't' as given in the tables.

Hence, we can reject H_0, the null hypothesis.

Thus, Deutsch's thesis is validated and supported by our regression results. From Figure 1, the Regression slope estimate is 0.166.

But $t = \dfrac{B}{^0B}$

$$= 0.166/0.41 = 4.04878$$

[but $F = t^2 = (4.04878)^2$]

At ($N-k-1 = 30$ cases, 't' with 1-tail at 0.01 level is 2.457

Hence again, there is greater significance in our regression slope estimate.

Further, the causal relationship as posited may be inferred from criteria generally accepted for inferring a causal relationship, namely, covariation, temporal priority, and nonspuriousness. While covariation can be observed and temporal priority established, nonspuriousness cannot be proven, only

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disproven (Moul, 1974: 140). Given the time dimension of our data, we will have to wait for subsequent analysis. As regards temporal priority, it is clear that conflict cannot lead to the number of languages. The "nonspuriousness" test is carried out in our multiple regression model below.

We are investigating intergroup conflict in SubSaharan Africa which we hypothesize as being a function of the lack of linguistic assimilation in the 32 polities in our sample. On the basis of our first-stage regression test, this appears to be a "true" relationship.

In the bivariate model already discussed we have used the "number of languages" (VAR 013) as an indicator of ethnic diversity in a country. However, mere diversity alone, we presume, will not be a strong indication of the propensity to conflict between primordial groups. Accordingly, we respecify our model with the inclusion of other variables, namely, VAR 011 ("Change in percent literate 1950–1967"), VAR 185 ("Number of Parties banned between 1957–69") and VAR 268 ("Aid from excolonial power per capita, 1967 in US$"). As already stated, the "scoring" and definitions of these variables are given in the Appendix.

Inclusion of these variables would, of course, not mean that we will be able to fully explain our "Y" or dependent variable, which is "General Turmoil Composite." However, inclusion of these variables do provide an interesting insight into other factors at work in "influencing" the level of conflict or instability, apart from assumed importance of ethnic diversities as specified in our initial model. If the "additive" variables are insignificant, then we have a strong basis for accepting the "Deutschian Conflict" model, apart from mere methodological evidence.

Each of the "new" variables that we investigate here have their theoretical underpinnings in the extant corpus of writings on conflict and development in the political science literature. Suffice to say here that VAR 137 or "Change in Percent Literate" may be viewed as an indicator of social mobilization (re: Deutsch, 1961; Hibbs, 1973: 54–56); VAR 185 or "Number of Parties Banned Between 1957–69) as a measure of the lack of contestation necessary for polyarchy or democracy (Dahl, 1971) as well as a problem of authority and stability (Huntington, 1968: 397–461), the decline of party rule and the emergence of single party regimes (Zolberg, 1966; Kilson, 1963) and military obligarchies in Africa; VAR 057 or "Change in the Gross Domestic Product/Capita" as the relationship of economic development to stability (inter alia, Lipset, 1959; Cutright, 1963); VAR 268 or "Aid from ExColonial Power/Capita, 1967, in US$" as an indication of dependence on the former colonial or metropole regime and resulting in "frustration" (Midlarsky and Tanter, 1967), and VAR 011 or "Percent of population who speak major language" as an indication of linguistic assimilation already discussed. The measurement of this last variable may indicate that, despite the number of languages or linguistic groups in a country, if there is a lingua franca of sorts,

then this would probably mitigate the incidence of primordial intergroup conflict. Indeed, Deutsch (1953) argues that the more predominant the amount of shared symbols of communications, the higher the level of societal integration.

Thus, given the complex, "real world" that we live in, our respecified model should serve as a better construct of social reality than our earlier bivariate model.

Thus, in our multiple regression model we have:

$$Y^1 = \alpha + B_1 \ B_1 \text{ No. of languages } + B_2 \text{ Percent speak major language } +$$

(General   VAR 013   VAR 011
Turmoil
Composite
VAR 247)

$$\beta_3 \text{ Change in \% literate } + \ \beta_4 \text{ Parties banned } + \ \beta_5 \text{ \% Change GDP/Capita}$$
       VAR 137   VAR 185   VAR 057

$$+ \ \beta_6 \text{ Exmetropole Aid/Capita } + \quad e_i$$
       VAR 268   (error)

Generation of this model in the computer, we then get:

General Turmoil – 4.848 + .063 + .015 – .004 – 1.083 + .005 + .005

(figures to nearest decimal)

Using significance tests, at (N-K-1 = 30) cases, 't' with 1-tail at .01 level is 2.457

't' for each variable may be calculated as $\sqrt{F}$ or $B/^0B$. The Summary values are (Figure 2):

FIGURE 2

Variable	B	Beta	Std Error B	F	t
VAR 268	.00467	.03392	.01865	.063	.250
VAR 013	.06924	22456	.04633	1.845	1.358
VAR 011	−.01463	.03138	.06400	.052	.228
VAR 137	−.00383	.06100	.00803	.228	.477
VAR 185	1.80311	.61676	.46201	15.232	3.90
VAR 057	.00536	.02311	.03058	.031	.176

Our β_1 here is, of course, different from our β_1 in the bivariate case. The true disturbance e in our first-stage model must lie in the "intervention" of our additional variables in our second-stage model. In our bivariate model, all other factors were assumed to be random but this is of course not so in our second model, as already stated. "Omitted variables" in the first model would then have been reflected in the disturbance e.

From Figure 2, all the regression slope estimates are insignificant except for VAR 185. In reality, then, it would appear that turmoil in Black Africa is a function of the proscribing or banning of political parties. Theoretically, we are tempted to posit this relationship in causal terms. As Huntington has stated (1968: 398, 407): "The future stability of a society with a low level of political participation thus depends in large part on the nature of the political institutions with which it confronts modernization and the expansion of political participation"; "the suppression of parties usually accompanies substantial efforts to decrease the level of political consciousness and political activity"; and, "The more hostile a government is toward political parties in a modernizing society, however, the greater the probable future instability of that society."

Thus we posit:

Y''	—	Banning of Political Parties
General		VAR 185
Turmoil		
Composite		
(VAR 247)		

It is highly probable that turmoil or political instability is a consequence when political participation is disallowed in mechanisms such as political parties, as the reverse argument is that "party and electoral systems are institutions designed to regulate the distribution of political control and they contribute to the integration and conflict management of the political system. The theoretical relevance of the study of political parties and elections is closely tied to the study of political order." (Morrison, Stevenson, Paden, Mitchell, 1972: 95). It is equally plausible, however, to posit that turmoil may itself lead to the banning of political parties, as too much political factionalism [and in Africa, political "forces" may really be patron-client factions (Sandbrook, 1972)] may result in antiparty tendencies by, say, military regimes. Either way, then, the correlation is strong and this is not resolved by the criterion of temporal priority. Like the chicken-and-egg problem, the issue may never be resolved.

If political stability is a desired goal, then, in terms of problem-solving, it is not at all clear from our statistical results if the banning of political parties leads to more turmoil or if the allowance of political party activities may also lead to more turmoil, especially if forms of participation are not well institutionalized. Like Hamlet's famous "To be or not to be" phrase, to ban or not to ban political parties is the question! In the long run, perhaps it is arguable that political parties provide for institutionalized participation in a polity, but in a period of modernization, political parties present a destabilizing force. Indeed, in this vein, Huntington's point (1963:403) is instructive: "modernizing polities need them but often do not want them." And clearly

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NOTES

1 Deutsch (1961) defines social mobilization as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken down and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior." He also notes that "this process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life."

2 Deutsch (1967: 211). This is not a definition but a mess of measuring "assimilation."

3 The extensive literature on each of these "causes" are cited accordingly in the original quote, but are not reproduced here.

4 Earlier "conflict" studies predominantly used factor analysis as a tool. In addition, multi-equation models present an even more sophisticated technique to the researcher as was used by Hibbs (1973). Regression techniques of course posit causality. See Hibbs (1974a), (1974b).

5 P. 94: "Another fundamentally important cultural trait, one which is not used in the construction and description of our ethnic units, is language. On the same page, but in a footnote, they point out that "linguistic pluralism may produce peculiarly integrative rather than destabilizing conflicts in political systems.

6 As part of research carried out at Northwestern University, Illinois, and York University, Toronto. The data has been made available at M.I.T. in SPSS form.

7 See Morrison, Stevenson, Paden, Mitchell (1972) for a description. The 32 countries are: Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire and Zambia.

8 On theoretical grounds and semantics, it is not clear if definitional differences need be reconciled. On statistical grounds, as discovered by Morrison and Stevenson (1971: 360), some measures such as "turmoil," may have a high intercorrelation. On epistemological grounds (Payne, 1973: 79–94) the logic in attempting to achieve consensual validation of dimensions of a concept does not necessarily mean the be-it and end-it-all of the problem.

9 See Appendix.

10 For a critical discussion of such problems, see the Chandlers (1974), and Etzioni and Lehman (1967).

11 This was of course done on methodological grounds — that the data was not fully amenable to be verified a la Deutsch's research methods.

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