



Godfatherism and political party financing in Nigeria: Analysing the 2015 general election

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Abstract

Godfatherism is one of the major obstacles towards genuine democratisation and good governance in Nigeria. In every political setting, there are financiers of politicians for elective positions and the financed ones. In Nigeria, the phenomenon of godfatherism denotes multi-billionaires sponsoring anointed candidates for elections at all levels in return for favours and undue advantage towards the sponsors. This is a problem which impedes the emergence of popular and credible candidates who can deliver the dividends of democracy. The work examined the role played by godfathers in sponsoring politicians during the 2015 General Elections including the nature and dimension of the financing as well as its effects on the outcome of elections. The paper used a qualitative method of data collection and analysis where interview was conducted with some selected informants from various categories involving politicians, party stakeholders, academicians and focus group discussion with some selected electorates. The primary data obtained was analysed using qualitative method with existing secondary data on the subject of study. The study discovered that, godfatherism played a vital role in determining candidates for the major parties and that, a new dimension in godfatherism emerged where politicians who control power now transformed into financiers of their elections unlike before. The study recommends that, for a better selection of candidates and transparency in fielding contestants for elections, party primary elections should be transparent and INEC as the electoral body responsible for election conduct in Nigeria should intensify measures of checkmating money politics and fostering of candidates selection based on party principles and not anointment.

Keywords: elections, godfatherism, money politics, political financing, political parties, politicians

Introduction

In every democratic setting, politics and electoral contest requires huge money and financing either directly by the candidates or their sponsors. In Nigerian context, such sponsors are known as 'Godfathers' because they provide financial muscles for sponsoring campaign finances of their identified godsons in return for a political favour (Human Rights Watch,

2007). The absence of effective political party financing made all sorts of private sponsorship feasible in Nigerian politics (INEC, 2005). Godfathers are service providers and professional owners of political information and financiers of political activities including violence and other manipulations to get their anointed candidates win at all cost in return for an agreed negotiated benefit in a cliental fashion (Olarinmoye, 2008).

The issue of political party financing is a recurrent one in contemporary democracies owing to its relevance and influence of money in world politics (Biezen, 2003). The accountability and transparency as well as fairness of political parties are very important and necessary for any democracy (Doublet, 2012). This is because citizens are becoming more concern about finances of political parties and their transparency due to corrupt practices that are reported in the process (OECD et al., 2012; Innocent & Nkechi 2014). This is where the phenomenon of godfatherism emerged in Nigerian context when it comes to financing of parties and candidates (Adetula et al., 2008; Ogundiya, 2009).

The 2015 General Elections is one of the elections that recorded high expenditure and money politics (Ahar, 2015; Olorunmola, 2016; Sule et al., 2017), as a result of the influence of godfathers and their financial support to candidates of the major parties. Although, the elections was tagged the most credible (IRI et al., 2015; Omilusi, 2016, it also was the most expensive election in the history of the country where trillions of Naira (billions of dollars) were spent (Sule et al., 2017).

Objectives of the study are: i) To examine the role of political godfathers in sponsoring candidates for various elective offices in the 2015 General Elections; (ii) To explore how the influence of the godfathers' political financing determine the outcome of the elections' results and (iii) To evaluate the changing nature and character of godfatherism in Nigerian politics.

Literature review

In this section, various existing literature would be discussed from the previous researches by scholars in the field and this will enable for identification of areas of contribution. The literature was reviewed in a thematic form where some sections were discussed according to groupings of knowledge.

Concept of godfatherism

Godfatherism is a well-known phenomenon in Nigerian politics and godfathers are popular in their activities and operations during elections. Godfatherism has become more influential in Nigerian politics because of the increasing level of money politics and weak electoral regulations that allow for private funding (INEC, 2005). Due to exorbitant rate of contesting for an elective position, not all contestants are financially sound enough to finance their campaign expenses therefore; the most successful candidates are those that are financed by wealthy godfathers (Human Rights Watch, 2007). In return, the financiers of elections known as godfathers demand for control of politicians that they sponsored into political offices in terms of sharing of public loot, award of lucrative contracts, offer of juicy political appointment in most cases. (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

Godfathers are investors and contract providers who take the burden of political party voter mobilisation and undertake the responsibilities of candidates' elections expenditure adequately as they wield huge financial muscle (Olarinmoye, 2008). The politics of godfatherism has become a worrisome scenario in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic and most

pronounced as a result of the abolition of state sponsorship of parties and increased in private spending (Ayoade, 2008).

Godfathers are self centred politicians who rule by proxy. They sponsored politicians in order to manipulate them and control power underground. Sometimes they may not be qualified themselves to contest so they anoint candidates to rule on their behalf (Ayoade, 2008). They subvert democracy through illegal practices as observed above by Olarinmoye (2008). It has been observed that, most candidates that emerged successful during the general elections were those sponsored by godfathers as they take over the control of political parties and imposed candidates on them (Kura, 2014).

Thus, it can be sum up from the above divergent views that godfatherism is simply the act of providing political party financing through a group of small elite body that constituted itself into power brokers and king makers in return for indirect power control and material benefit being an investment that is massively made for profit.

Political parties

Political parties are the engine room for democratic governance and a platform that allows for a constitutional acquiring of power. Burke identified parties as a group of men with common interest to establish a union to foster national interest and advance their personal principles in power (Johari, 2012). Political parties serve as a motivating force in articulating and aggregating public opinion as well as a coordinating agency that make the working of democracy successful (Kapur, 2009). Parties are aggregating organisations that make men stronger and individuals powerful making them to acquire and achieve collectively what they cannot get individually in a democratic system (Appadorai, 2004).

A political party is a voluntary organisation where people with the same ideals decided to form in order to capture power and exercise it (Adamolekun & Osuntokun, 1977). Political parties have played many important functions in democratic regime including: articulation and aggregation of diverse interests; struggles to capture and control power; political mobilisation; recruitment and training of political leaders; ideological exposition; role of opposition; political modernisation and public agenda policy setting (Salih, 2003).

One distinguishing feature of Nigerian political parties since independence to date is; they are regional in outlook, ethnic in composition and religious in principles. With three dominant regions of North (Hausa/Fulani), West (Yoruba) and East (Igbo) establishing parties based on regional and ethnic sentiments (Agbaje, 2008). In essence, political parties are necessary for democratic rule and legal transfer of power in any democracy whether liberal or authoritarian.

Political party financing

Political party financing is now a global concern as many scholars are exhibiting issues related to that in many parts of the world while the citizens are becoming more conscious of the sources of campaign spending and the means of spending of politicians in their country. This is because there are lots of scandals emerging on political party financing globally awakening the conscience of voters and researchers alike (Biezen, 2003). The accountability and transparency of political parties is necessary for a sound democracy and good governance to be consolidated. For such a transparent process to be achieved there is a need for sound policies and regulations governing donations, campaign spending and political party monitoring and auditing (Doublet, 2012).

Citizens today worldwide pay much attention to political financing activities as a result of allegations of corrupt practices in the process. Most of the citizens interviewed in a study believed that, there is corruption in the process of political party financing in their countries. For instance, 87.9 % of people interviewed in Greece believed that political parties and politicians are corrupt, 80.8 % in Spain and Italy, 70.9 % in Portugal, 66.1 % in UK, 57.3 % in Germany, 53.8 % in France and 61.9 % in Hungary (OECD, 2012). In Africa, it is also the same as 86.7 % in Kenya agreed that political parties and politicians are corrupt while in Nigeria 88.6 % believed so (Innocent & Nkechi, 2014).

The OECD member countries in a bid to ensure transparency in the electoral process and political party financing set some regulations among them which focus on regulation of private spending and campaign spending limit (OECD, 2012). In addition, there is an international effort in addressing the issue of political party financing in a study conducted by IDEA international data base on 180 countries worldwide identifying that, there are attempts at regulating political party financing by different countries that were studied (Ohman, 2014).

The IDEA data base conducted regional studies on political party financing in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Central and Southern Europe, Northern and Western Europe and in America. The study concluded that, in each of the above mentioned regions, there are uniqueness and peculiarities in campaign financing. The major problems identified in Africa are the major problem identified with political financing are; access to funds for all political actors, abuse of state resources, clientalism, vote buying, illicit funding, dependency on foreign funds and the cash nature of African economy (IDEA, 2014). State funding is minimal in Asia as such; candidates with low financial muscles find it very difficult to contest for an electoral office (IDEA, 2014).

One region in which money play an important role in election process and that is marred with corruption is Latin America (Londono & Zobatto, 2014). In the case of Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe, they have no uniform means of regulating political financing due to their dictatorial nature with majority of them being communist weak democracies (Smilow, 2014). In the Northern, Southern and Western Europe, money played a crucial role in determining who will contest for a political position owing to the nature of modern democratic system they operated (Piccio, 2014). In America, during the 2017 General Elections, money played an important role in determining who has access to power. The election of President Donald Trump witnessed a massive money use and huge campaign spending (Ben & Smith, 2016).

In Nigeria, political party financing underwent series of transformations and regulations for instance, the absence of clearly defined regulations to regulate party finance made it possible for politicians and political parties to engage in illicit party financing and corruption in Nigeria's First Republic (1960-1966) (INEC, 2005). In the Nigeria's Second Republic (1979-1984), a mixture of private and public funding was used for the first time. The political parties played a major role in the politics of the Second Republic (INEC, 2005). In the Aborted Third Republic (1991), there were no clear regulations known as the Constitution of 1979 was not used but the military Decree was utilized to conduct the elections which was annulled on June 12 1991. Little or none was known on the provisions and regulations of the electoral acts that guided the finances of political parties. A financial ceiling was set up in the 2006 Electoral Act to curb such excessive spending but it was violated by the politicians and their political parties alike. As such, the 2010 Electoral Acts recommended and withdraw public subventions from the government to political parties and made the affairs of political party financing an exclusive affair of political parties and candidates' private sponsorship (INEC, 2010).

Theoretical framework

The theory of Clientalism is adopted for this work. It is adopted because it is a plausible explanation of elections and financing of elections for a specific benefit or rewards by a certain group of elites or politicians who conglomerates themselves into a syndicate of power brokers for material and personal benefit. Clientalism is a theory that explains the process of practices of political financing and sponsorship (GIGA, 2010). Studies on Clientalism (Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter et al., 2010; Daramont, 2010; Roniger, 2004), emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in an attempt to explain patron-client relationship in a democratic government particularly during elections.

Clientalism is a political economy model which explains the use of money by politicians and their sponsors in acquiring power by all means including vote buying, rewarding swing votes, political violence, illegal campaign spending all in a way that perpetrate corruption and abuse of political power and office (Morse et al., 2010). It is a symbiosis relationship between patron and their client in the struggles for acquiring power using corrupt means if necessary (Isaksson & Bigsten, 2013). Clientalism sometimes stretches towards intimidation, coercion, blackmail and manipulation by either politicians themselves or their sponsors known as godfathers (Stockes, 2013).

Clientalism as a theory of election and corrupt practices perception has five major assumptions as follows: i. the relationship is dyadic because it involves patron- client activity; ii. The relationship is asymmetrical as it leads to vertical or unequal benefit; iii. The relationship is personal and enduring because it happens at personal level and not official; iv. The relationship is reciprocal since it involves benefit for the patron and the client alike and it is voluntary because it was not by force but by mutual agreement (GIGA, 2010).

In applying the above theory to explain the research paper, it is pertinent to observe that Clientalism is an exposition of the struggles using all means to acquire power either directly or indirectly by politicians or their sponsors in order to control power and confer undue advantage on themselves and their cronies. A good example is Nigerian context.

Methods

The paper used qualitative method of data collection and analysis. It is the used of both primary and secondary sources for research in a qualitative way suitable for research in question and the environment of the research (Sharan 2002; Sekaran & Bougie, 2013; Creswell, 2014). It is a case study qualitative method type where the 2015 General Election was taken as the specific case of analysis.

The research used interview as primary source of data. Some informants were selected from certain categories including politicians, party stakeholders, INEC senior officials, academicians and electorates. The research also used primary documented sources such as reports and statistics from governmental organisations. In addition, secondary sources were used including existing literature on the subject matter of study and other researchers conducted on the area of study. This enabled for identifying a unique area unattended in the chosen subject of research in this work specifically.

The data obtained particularly from interview was grouped into tabular form and simple statistical analysis such as percentage in explaining the research findings while being complemented with the previous works in the area. A theory was used to explain the data collected and the phenomenon of godfatherism and money politics in Nigerian context.

Regulations in political party financing in Nigeria

In Nigeria, there are two legal means and sources of regulating and monitoring of political party financing in Nigeria; the Constitutional provision and the 2010 Electoral Act. These are discussed below.

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria empowers the electoral body; INEC to monitor and set spending limit for political parties and contestants. This has been presented in a tabular form below (Table 1).

Table 1. Constitutional provisions on regulations in political party financing in Nigeria

Sections and sub-sections	Regulations
Section 225(1)	Political parties publish their statement of assets and liabilities
Section 225(2)	Submission of detailed annual statement and sources of funds
Section 225(3)	Prohibits parties from foreign holding or possession of any asset
Section 225(4)	INEC takes over foreign possession by parties within 21 days
Section 225(5)	INEC can monitor financial transactions and records of parties
Section 225(6)	INEC is empowered to delegate auditors to inspect parties' expenses
Section 226(1)	INEC prepares and submit to the National Assembly parties balance sheet
Section 226(2)	Constitution of investigations into parties expenses by electoral body
Section 226(3)	INEC officials have unrestricted access to parties' books of account

Source: Nigerian 1999 constitution as amended (compiled by the authors)

In addition to the above provisions, the 2010 Electoral Act also provides in various sections the rules and regulations in political party financing in Nigeria including maximum spending limit, disclosure, auditing of parties' income and expenditure, rules of elections and campaign conduct as well as sanctions for offenders (Table 2).

Table 2: 2010 Electoral Act Provisions on Regulations in political party financing in Nigeria

Sections and Sub-sections	Regulations
Section 88(1), (2)	Any party that holds or possess any fund outside Nigeria commits an offence and shall be punished to a fine of not less than N500, 000.00 (\$1, 373.40).
Section 89(1,2,3 &4)	Every Political Party shall submit to INEC a detailed annual statement of assets and liabilities from 1 st January to 31 st December every year and granting of access to examine the records as well as publish the reports on national dailies by the INEC.
Section 90(1)	INEC has powers to limit contribution to parties and candidates by individuals.
Section 91(1,2,3,4,5,6 &7)	Elections expenses should be limited to: Presidential one billion naira (N1, 000, 000, 000=\$2, 746, 339. 891); Governorship two hundred million naira (N200, 000, 000=\$549, 304.773); Senatorial seat forty million naira (N40, 000, 000=\$109, 873.99); House of Representatives twenty million naira (N20, 000, 000=\$54, 938.636); State Assembly election ten million naira (N10, 000, 000=\$27, 468.690); Chairmanship election to an Area Council ten million naira (N10, 000, 000=\$27, 468.690) and councillorship election to an Area Council one million naira (N1, 000, 000=\$2, 747.060).
Section 92(1,2,3,4,5,6 &7)	Election expenses period is notified by INEC; the expenses shall be determine by the Commission; audited election expenses shall be submitted to INEC; amount of money spent by parties shall be shown clearly; parties should publish their expenses in two national dailies; any party that spent beyond

	limit is guilty and shall be sanctioned and audited expenses of the political parties shall be made available by INEC to the public for scrutiny.
Section 93 (1,2,3 &4)	No political party shall receive or keep any anonymous funds; every political party shall keep an account and asset book; no political party shall accept any monetary or other contribution exceeding N100, 000=\$274.697 unless it can identify the source of the money and every political party shall reveal its campaign expenditure of all sponsored candidates within three months after election.


Source: 2010 Electoral act (compilation made by the authors)

Money politics and its impacts on Nigerian elections

Money politics is an influential factor in Nigerian democracy particularly during elections. The relationship between money and politics is very high with an implication on the Nigerian polity (INEC, 2005). Money politics in Nigeria manifested in vote buying, godfatherism, bribery, corruption which describe the dubious behaviours of the politicians, voters, political parties and the electoral body itself (Adetula & Adeyi 2008. Money is very important in democratic settings since political party financing requires funds and it has become a subject of concern for the occurrence of political corruption (Walecki, 2008). Vote buying has been reported in all the elections held so far in the Fourth Republic (Adetula, 2008).

Party politics and ideology has been eroded leading to indiscipline as a result of money politics especially in the Fourth Republic. Politicians see themselves as financiers of their elections while parties as mere tools for achieving their ambition (Aiyede, 2008; Adeyi, 2008; Smah, 2008). A very good analysis of how money influence politics is given in a model by Carlson et al. (2006). The model examined the variables in the pre and post-election periods that made money influential and the circular nature in which it will keep on influencing politics around the globe with Nigeria inclusive. It has been shown below (Figure 1).

The 2015 General Election recorded an improved electoral process and a historical event that set a record for the first time of an opposition winning election at the national level in Nigeria. The opposition APC at the Presidential level won the elections with total votes of 15, 424, 921 (53.96 %) as against the then incumbent PDP with the total number of votes 12, 853, 162 (44.96 %). The election was contested at national and local level by many parties but the All Progressive Congress (APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) were the major contenders. The 2015 General Election and the outcome were entirely different from the previous elections in Nigeria in many different ways most especially because the incumbent lost to the opposition by 45 % to 54 %, the opposition won more States 21 out of 36 (CPPA, 2015).



Source: Adopted from Carlson et al. (2006).
 The 2015 General Elections

Figure 1: How money can influence politics

In the National Assembly Elections which was held the same day with Presidential Elections on 28th March, 2017 involving the Senate and Federal House of Representatives, the APC won most of the seats in the upper chamber with 55.05 % and the lower chamber with 62.5 % which enabled the APC to form the leadership of both the houses thereby replacing the PDP from its strong hold majority leadership of 16 years rule (INEC, 2017).

The election was adjudged as the most credible (Chukwudi 2015; Omilusi 2016) as a result of improvement in the electoral procedures, re-strategisation of the opposition which led to the formation of an alliance that gave them an equal strength to challenge the PDP, voters' rationality in choice owing to political and socioeconomic crisis that bedeviled the country as well as the massive corruption allegations against the incumbent President Jonathan of PDP.

The informants also attested to the credibility of the 2015 General Election and the role of godfathers in sponsoring the elections for the two major parties. The results of their discussions was summarised in Table 1-5.

Table 1. Summary of the informants and their views on the 2015 general elections (category A, politicians)

Informants	Category	Responses
1	A	The conduct of the election, defeat of the ruling party and little influence of the huge money spent in the process.
2		Improvement in the electoral umpire and the use of card reader
3		Introduction of measures that curbed rigging and the defeat of the ruling party by the opposition
4		The process is fair and there was an improvement from that of the previous years also, the opposition APC too has godfathers or financial sponsors
5		A mass revolution of the masses, violation of zoning arrangement by PDP and inability to rig

Table 2. Summary of the informants and their views on the 2015 general elections (category B, party stakeholders)

Informants	Category	Responses
1	B	The introduction of smart card readers, general, merger of opposition parties, decamping of newPDP into APC as political godfathers.
2		The credibility of the management of the electoral umpire, a level playing ground for all parties, strong opposition, and spending of unprecedented amount of money in campaign by political godfathers which did not influence the results for the incumbent.
3		The introduction of card readers or electronic voting, merger of strong opposition parties making them financially stronger and the voters are wiser and rational.
4		The opposition parties denied the ruling party from rigging and raised public concern wherever such an attempt was made and that prevented rigging.

Table 3. Summary of the informants and their views on the 2015 general elections (category C, INEC staff)

Informants	Category	Responses
1	C	INEC restrategised to meet up with the global standard of elections conduct in 2015 and the 2010 Electoral Reforms improved the general conduct of the elections.
2		The introduction of reforms especially the use of card readers for accreditation and voting exercise.
3		INEC was better funded, supported locally and internationally, rigging was minimized through electronic voting. However, INEC could not check excessive activities of godfathers in financing the elections because of loopholes in the law and the dubious nature of politicians.

Table 4. Summary of the informants and their views on the 2015 general elections (category E, academicians)

Informants	Category	Responses
1	E	The introduction of biometric election minimized rigging drastically. The opposition too has political godfathers who financed their elections.
2		The introduction of smart card readers which reduced manipulation of results and the defeat of the ruling party by opposition in a peaceful manner.

Table 5. Summary of the informants and their views on the 2015 general elections (category F, focus group discussion)

Informants	Category	Responses
1	F	The introduction of card readers
2		Defeat of an incumbent by opposition with godfathers' backing
3		Rationality of the voters
4		Issue-based campaign
5		Merger of strong opposition parties with financial support
6		Role of social media in awareness

Thus, it can be inferred from the above dispositions and diverse views of the informants in addition to the already existing literature cited above that, the 2015 General Election is more credible than the previous four (4) elections (1999, 2003, 2007 & 2011) conducted so far in the Fourth Republic. The views and responses also indicated the continuous role of godfathers in political financing of the major parties and candidates for electoral offices.

Discussions

The paper discovered that, the politics of godfatherism still exists and became more pronounced in the 2015 General Election which seems the most expensive election in the history of the country. This has been proved by the information discovered from the field on the sources of campaign financing as indicated from the informants (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Sources of campaign funding of 2015 general elections according to informants' views

The informants' views have also been supported by a study conducted in 2008 by Wakili, Zango and Mohammed where political party members were interviewed on the sources of their campaign financing and they responded that; donations from wealthy individuals is the second major source and that constitutes 61.4 % of the total respondents interviewed from the study.

The election is the most expensive in the history of the country in terms of campaign spending and also the expenditure in terms of the conduct as INEC was allocated the highest vote of funds never witnessed in the previous elections. Indeed, the 2015 General Election in Nigeria was tagged as the most expensive in Africa with a whopping sum of N125 billion (USD 340, 863, 696.382) spent by INEC in the electoral process (Ahar, 2015).

Godfatherism became most powerful and influential in financing of the 2015 General Election as revealed in the case of Dasukigate and Diezani scandal of bribery of INEC officials. It should be noted that, in this election, godfatherism was transformed from multibillionaires sponsoring their godsons to an advanced level of politicians turning into their own godfathers through the direct looting and diversion of public treasury for election campaign purpose. In the first instance, godfathers were made out of political fortune of the power holders. A staggering sum of \$2.1 billion (N777, 133,624,337, 580.00) was provided by the then ruling PDP in proxy for godfathers to handle campaign expenditure. It was provided through the allocation of the amount to the office of the National Security Adviser to the President Colonel Sambo Dasuki for procurement of weapons to address insurgency in the Northeast (EFCC, 2017). The money was directly diverted by Colonel Sambo Dasuki and distributed to various political godfathers including retired and serving Military Generals; major stakeholders of the ruling PDP; traditional rulers; religious clerics; bureaucrats and technocrats.

The second instance is the case of the Diezani bribery scandal. The former Minister of Petroleum Resources Mrs. Diezani Allison Maduekwe where she used her office and diverted billions of dollars from the proceeds of the crude oil sale and used her office to recruit some godfathers to bribe the INEC officials with N23 billion (USD 63, 822, 813.191). It is discovered that, about 223 of the INEC staff were placed on half salary pending the outcome of the final investigation before appropriate measures are taken on them. The investigation also disclosed that, the money was distributed to the INEC officials in all the six geo-political zones in the 36 states of the Federation (EFCC, 2017; INEC, 2017).

In addition, the paper realised from the exclusive views that, the ruling APC too benefitted from the corrupt practices and financing of the godfathers to secure victory in the 2015 General Election. The APC Presidential candidate contested three times in 2003, 2007 and 2011 but lost the elections serially as a result of financial inadequacy; incumbency factor and malpractices in the electoral process (USAID & UKAID, 2015).

Conclusion and recommendations

The paper concludes that, godfathers played an important role in Nigerian politics particularly elections expenditure where they sponsored their godsons to acquire political power in return for a material benefit. However, the paper discovered that, unlike the previous trend of the godfathers using their financial resources to sponsor politicians into elective offices; the trend has now changed into a system where the politicians became the sponsors of the godfathers and directly siphon the public resources and handed to the godfathers as their front men to handle their campaign expenditure.

The research recommends the following:

- i. For a better conduct of election in future, the anti-graft agency EFCC should be involved in screening the contestants where those with corrupt allegations must be screened out;
- ii. The INEC should endeavour in enforcing electoral rules and regulations and sanctioning of the offenders accordingly to deter such deviant behaviour in future;
- iii. There is need for the INEC to embark on massive civic voter education to discourage vote buying and influence of money politics and
- iv. Monitoring of campaign financing by INEC should be continuous and timely not only annually or during elections only.

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