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THE MODERNISATION OF INDONESIAN NAVAL FORCES IN JOKOWI ERA

As an archipelago country, Indonesia has faced a lots of threats from the sea. Because of that, Indonesia has implemented Global Maritime Axis Policy (GMA) as a new strategy to protect its national interest and sovereignty. One of the GMA objective is to modernise Indonesia Naval Force. Using data and research findings from 2014- 2018, this article will debate about the modernization of Indonesia naval force under Jokowi Administration. This study has three objectives, namely toexplains the Indonesia naval capabilities, toanalyse the development of Indonesian naval force and to analyse the evolving of Indonesian navy doctrine. The findings reveal that first, Indonesia's government has taken in an effort to get in the linkages between the changing contours, its function in the area, which, shifted, is being backed through its naval modernisation and expansion, and second, Indonesia has collectively doubled their military spending with warships, maritime patrol aircraft, radar systems, submarines and naval defence systems based on their Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) doctrine so that Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut (TNI-AL) capable an enhance the Green Water Navy concept.

Keywords: *Indonesia, Jokowi, Naval Modernization, TNI-AL, Technology.*

Introduction

The Global Maritime Axis's (GMA) policy aim is to enhance the connectivity and maritime infrastructures such as the construction of sea-lane communication, infrastructures, marine ports and logistics communications assets which has the potential to enhance the maritime tourism, fisheries and maritime sectors.¹ It also aims to modernize the maritime tourism sector, promoting fishermen's activities and native marine industries. This has the potential to promote the empowerment of the food security for Indonesia. The new maritime doctrines emphasize on the reinterpretation of Indonesia's interest as the largest archipelago country in the world's, which is located geographically at the convergence of major interests.²In Jokowi's maritime policy, has to strive to reverse on national's foreign policy and renew the nation's

international affairs are based on the significant points of archipelago.³First, national's maritime diplomacy to promote a border dispute resolution among neighbouring countries. Furthermore, its avoid loss of economic aspects of those had countries involved in longer period if it is not resolved immediately. Thus, the Indonesian government had promoted the cooperation of strategic industrial relations within countries participant such as includes marine and defence industry. Second, maintaining the integrity of the maritime sovereignty, security and social towards outer islands. The Indonesian government had redesigned the defence plan includes the emergence the Indonesia Armed Force's capability as the main sea guard towards its maritime territory. Third, to protect the country's resources and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by modernising the Indonesian Armed Forces and local maritime authority's agency. Indonesia also had encouraged the maritime partnership arrangement between Asia Pacific region countries to strengthen the security elements within the EEZ. Fourth, establishing the Intensify Defence diplomacy by conduct military exercises partnership with Asia Pacific countries. Jokowi had the intent to conduct a military bilateral exercises between the military units from Asia Pacific to suit his vision of expanding the influences and maintaining security within the maritime region. At the same time, Jokowi encourages the neighbourhood countries to maintaining a selected the commercial maritime approach for mutual benefits. These initiatives were in form of cooperation such as Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), Joint Patrol Navies of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore (MALSINDO), Eyes-in-the-Sky (EiS), the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP) and the Trilateral Maritime Patrol (TMP).⁴ Fifth, reducing maritime competition among the Superpowers and resolve the territorial disputes in the region by implementing peace agreements such as China and India. The Indonesian government realise that as nation maritime is required a keep maintaining a relationship with Major Power countries for gains the economic growth and strengthen the maritime security territory.

Promoting the GMA concept, Jokowi's intent was to set Indonesia as an influential maritime nation in the Pan Indo-Pacific (PACINDO) region. Jokowi is interested in the idea of interconnected Pacific and Pan Indo-Pacific's lines, which has served as the main theatre of Indonesia's foreign policy involvement. Therefore, Indonesia is enhancing to improve diplomatic presence in the region by implementing the policy manners: (1) Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN Summit as a platform for encourage on unity among countries: (2) Strengthening the position and cooperation within the regional group: (3) Striving and encourage a bilateral strategic partnerships: (4) As a manager to control the regional of commerce a collaboration and peaceful commerce for government beneficial; and (5) Advertising an integration a maritime culture, especially under the Indian Ocean Circle Association (IORA).

Literature Review

Indonesia had concerns that the region is going to be a new sea global of crucial theatre for SLOC.⁵ Their emphasis was on SLOC in the PACINDO due to development of the oil and gas resource sector. However, disturbance in the industry of mineral resources will be affected by Indonesia's economic and energy sector. Indonesia's defence forces were taking action to secure one of the vital SLOC is Malacca Strait to address its energy security factor. Simultaneously, Indonesia's government has responded that GMA as a major maritime security guarantor in the Southeast Asia including the PACINDO region. Therefore, the GMA's policy response towards other maritime countries as a partnership and expand the naval force as a Sea Guardian in the PACINDO region. Indonesia's vision of security, a potential threat existed and effort to improve Indonesia's relationship with potential countries in the region also described a priority of Indonesia's defence strategy to enhance national security capability via enhancing an economic, energy and security cooperation with strategic allies, strengthening strategic defence cooperation within its sovereignty and modernizing the defence system in line with latest version requirements.⁶ As result analyses regard, Indonesia's Security Challenges had impacted a nation's maritime by examined the Mahan's principles of Sea Power.

Indonesia's government understands and implemented the concept of maritime security especially on its responses to its maritime issues and the planning towards more comprehensive⁷ Indonesia had the potential for a more comprehensive agenda. Thus, this places the significance of Indonesia as a capable partner to maintain and improve maritime security policy between the Southeast Asian countries. In addition, urge to encourage an Indonesia's cooperation relationship between the state and non-state actors also foreign countries and privates sector. Therefore, the research had analysed Indonesia's comprehensive agenda on its maritime with foreign countries and privates sector by applying Mahan's principles of Sea Power. The influences of TNI-AL have been modernizing are based on historical on the TNI-AL's legacy of development, requirement current maritime strategy and TNI-AL's operation requirements.⁸ The TNI-AL's modernization planning and simultaneously had applied the Mahan's six principle concept.

The implication of TNI-AL's roles and responsibility in Indonesia's strategic culture has not caused any major impact on the strategic culture and has yet to show significant signs of being able to be the leader in the national military strategy.⁹ The phenomenon has changed the strategic maritime culture in Indonesia by making it difficult for TNI-AL to defend the country's maritime security and to relish the task of enforcing an internal maritime law to local authorities within the archipelago ocean. The future's Naval Force of Southeast Asia had been influenced by International Relation and Paradigm of Realism.¹⁰

Further discussed the Southeast Asia countries would respond if any threats had been escalated and invested more in defensive force. Southeast Asian countries are also eager to develop military forces rather than naval forces to overcome their country's security problems. However, the Southeast Asian countries' army dominance has become privatized, the military's weakness control of civilian while the government may be unable to reallocate funding to maintain capabilities.


Indonesia's decision making process at the government level of response the challenges in implementing Jokowi's vision.¹¹ It also addressed that challenges of naval modernization would broad decision making by a level of government, such as policymakers at the level of Grand Strategy, execution and resource of Grand Strategic, Defence Strategy and Naval Policy. The article also discusses Indonesia's foreign policy to shape it naval modernize plan and economic factor and how those plans will be enhanced. Underpinned, new Maritime Doctrine and had comprised with five key elements and one of the elements is Maritime Defence. It is covered by the continuity of implementation of the Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) program by 2024 and intends to modernize on naval and air force. Therefore, this research had analysed the relevancy of MEF 10-year program by the analytical approach from Mahan's Sea Power Principles.

Most literature had identified that the signs towards the influencing factors affecting Indonesia's maritime domain. The literatures reviewed had explained that traditional and non-traditional threats which have the potential to pose disastrous impact toward Indonesia's economic stability and possibility to threaten its maritime security domain. The literatures additionally had highlighted the responses such as modernizing the naval forces as a counter-measure to control and maintain the country's maritime interests which may address other challenges in the further chapters.

1. Indonesian Naval Capabilities

The Global Maritime Axis's policy is essentially domestic initiative activities focused on building Indonesia's Blue Economy which includes upgrading seaport facilities and sea-lane communication.¹² The enhancement of Indonesia's maritime defence forces is part of the five pillars in Jokowi's GMA doctrine.¹³ The doctrine's aim to protect and remain security within Indonesia's maritime sovereignty and safety guardians for national's interests such as a matter of maritime resources and safety in shipping sea-lanes.¹⁴ It also has an approach vital maritime strategy for modernising the TNI-AL capabilities. As stated by President Jokowi that the maritime country is required to establish the ability of a powerful navy is an essential part of the realization of the new nation's objective.¹⁵ This realization has increased the grading up of the navy in order to aspire the newly-established doctrinal through GMA doctrine.¹⁶

Table1: Indonesia Military Expenditure



Source: <https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/military-expenditure> (2019)

As regards, Table 1 had shown that spending in Indonesia military had increased to USD 7910.80 million in 2017 from USD 7385.40 million in 2016 and it also described that the budget had an upward trend. After implementing the GMA doctrine, its military expenditure projects had spent USD 30,083.6 million and average expenditure from 2014 until 2017 in USD 7520.9 million.¹⁷In this amount of military spending, national security has become a priority in Indonesia a decade ago.¹⁸These expenses are expected to increase from USD 6.4 billion in 2018 to USD 9.6 billion in 2022 at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 10.46%.¹⁹ Indonesia’s economy has possessed a capacity to accomplish a yearly development rate of more than 5% for the past couple of years and this has given the defence expenditure will be growth in the future. Indonesia also had increase in spending a military gear and asset and becoming shortlisted the top 20 military spenders in the world. Moreover, Indonesia has shown its intent to increase the annual military budget USD 20 million by 2019.²⁰

The TNI-AL was established on 22 August 1945 after the Declaration of Indonesia’s Independence.²¹ The status is under the full command towards the Chief of Staff in the TNI-AL organisation, including the Western fleet HQ had located in Jakarta, the Eastern Fleet HQ in Surabaya, and the Marine Corps. There is likewise the Training Command and Military Sealift Command for facilitating the logistics support element towards forwards naval bases in order to maintain security within national’s maritime domains.

Table 2: Status of TNI-AL Battleship

Serial	Type	Active	Remarks
1.	Frigate	8	
2.	Corvettes	24	

3.	Patrol Craft	74	
4.	Submarine	4	
5.	Mine Warfare Vessel	12	
Vessel Active		122	
Total Navy Vessels -221			Non-Active - 99

Source:https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=indonesia (2019)

As regards, Table 2, there has been indication on the current strength of TNI-AL's fleet which is with 221 with various vessels in 2018.²² However, there were only 122 vessels equivalent to 55% of the active status in the readiness to engage in national maritime. In other hands, 99 vessels are status non-active which may plan for an upgrade or decommissions from TNI-AL. Indonesia's archipelago had covered with three vital of sea-lane communication which combines the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok which engage PACINDO region. This places Indonesia in a crucial geo-strategic position of the maritime in the region and the required to get sufficient opportunity to expand its Sea Power.²³ The beginning of the 1980s, external and internal situation are required to empower the security towards Indonesia's Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), encourage the improvement of the TNI-AL to become effectively and efficiently as well.²⁴

The Development of Indonesian Naval Force

Indonesia as an aspiring maritime nation are met by multiple challenges. To address these challenges, it is necessary to modernise its current naval asset which is majority it from the Soviet-era.²⁵ The escalating nature of threats and copes a more complex, required for a priority the procurement plan for the Indonesian Navy in the future. This is being accomplished through various defence trades in the form of complete import of defence equipment or defence co-produced as well as co-development with various foreign defence entities. For instance, Indonesia intends to increase its defence collaboration with Asia Pacific nations.²⁶ It also considers countries which have the potential to develop mutually beneficial defence cooperation, including defence industries, peacekeeping missions, and the cooperation between the navies of the two countries. For example, Indonesian government have signed the official agreement with Denmark for the maritime collaboration in 2017 and had signed with China as a strategic partnership on defence technology since 2005.²⁷

In addition, Indonesia is also enhancing its naval capabilities by establishing the collaboration with the neighbouring countries which is sharing

the international maritime boundary.²⁸ From the partnership term with other foreign models, it has facilitated Indonesia's government to plan for building ships and at the same time produce their own military vessels. Therefore, it is important to encourage the GMA doctrine to maintain a maritime security domain.²⁹ Indonesia is keen to establish a maritime collaboration with the Pacific countries including India.³⁰ However, Indonesia still prefers to continue its military ties with its traditional partners with the major power including the US and China.

Simultaneously, the current strategic domains will remain challenging in the visible future.³¹ In that regard, the Indonesian government aims to seek the country's significance in the economic industry by developing collaboration tiers among navies in the PACINDO region. Thus, the Indonesian government announces GMA's basic vision aimed at demonstrating national interests and enhancing collaborative relationships with participating countries through bilateral relations and through multilateral relationship with the consideration of private industries. With that intent, the Law on Indonesia's National Defence has stressed that TNI-AL is not only involving in the naval warfare for the defence of national's maritime territory but also participating in the combine naval tasks.³²

(a) Indonesian Navy Modernization via partnerships on Technology Transfers

In 2010, the US and Indonesia had launched the Comprehensive Partnership for continuing a gained the benefit and respect the sovereignty in territorial each other.³³ Hence, both countries committed to a partnership platform for expanding the collaboration on strategic interest together. As regards, The US and Indonesia Society (USINDO) had established as a programmer that aim to enhance the understanding between both countries such Legislative Partnership Program, the Indonesia-US Council on Religion and Pluralism and Maritime Cooperation.³⁴ In 2015, the US and Indonesia had signed the defence relationship that focuses on maritime security collaboration, military domain, joint infrastructure, transnational threats challenges, disaster relief and peacekeeping.³⁵ Additionally, the MoU is keen for co-production the development of defence technology and transfer technology in the future.³⁶ However, the Indonesian government had indicated that the USINDO Program would be considered and based on the nation's priorities.³⁷

Map 1: Location Indonesian Six Outer Island



Source: [www.http://cntravelre.com/post/indonesia](http://cntravelre.com/post/indonesia) (updated 10 July 2018)

On 3rd February 2015, the Indonesian and Japanese government had planned for being defence partnership in the future.³⁸ Both sides had agreed that the MoU will be covering the transfer of defence manufactured equipment and upgrade the military capability in joint operation for both countries. The Japanese had continued offering the patrol boats that Japan had to publish offered in the Philippines and Vietnam. Thus, both countries had confirmed and agreed that signed the MoU in strategic partnership on 29th June 2018. The main notes of the MoU that Japan will be invested with USD 23 million for the development of fishery facilities centres in six outer islands of Indonesia in Natuna, Biak, Moa, Sabang, Saumlaki and Morotai. The location of Indonesian Six Outer Island as per Map 1. Additionally, both countries also agreed that conduct the Combine Exercise to enforce maritime law agencies for keeping a stability and prosperity in the PACINDO region. The exercise will be conducted in August 2018 and the concept of exercise is a freedom for navigating in a maritime territory, including a sharing technology transfer of both maritime assets.³⁹

On 31st March 2017, both of France’s and Indonesia’s Defence Industries had agreed and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to improve relationships towards the submarine and surface warship cooperation projects.⁴⁰ The MoU had agreed that France’s Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS) and Indonesia’s Penataran Angkatan Laut (PT PAL) would work hand in hand in long-term cooperation period by sharing naval high-tech industrial information. Additionally, the DCNS had committed that will emphasize in technology transfers for providing the naval industry

project and empower the TNI-AL operational capability. Furthermore, both the defence industry will enhance the potential to develop a multi-purpose submarine capability to take 18 torpedoes and missiles or 30 sea mines as well as equipped with the system auto load weapon.

On 31st August 2017, South Korea Shipbuilder Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) had been offered the defence contract from Indonesia's government for replacement the Indonesian Navy's submarine (Indonesia Cakra) with approximately USD 26.7 million.⁴¹ Under the contract, the DSME required to give an expose and joint work on operational the Submarine Type Diesel-Electric by Indonesia Navy. The DSME also responsible for performing work on upgrading the submarine facilities and equipped with a new Combat Management System (CMS). On 25 April 2018, Indonesia had received 2 type 209/1400 submarine and one more submarine will be received by Indonesia from DSME end of the year 2018.⁴² While an existing submarine will be modified by DSME after serving since 1981. While Indonesia Navy had already an operating with current two smaller type 209 submarines from German since 1982.

On 10th January 2018, TNI-AL had commissioned its second vessel class guided missile frigate at Benoa Harbor, Bali.⁴³ The vessel is a part of the project rehabilitation under Indonesia's Ministry of Defence an initial plan for equipping the modern technology since 2010. It also upgrades the performance of a vessel on the primary task as a defender in maritime security and secondary task as a SAR and humanitarian support team. The vessel's drive system with Combine Diesel or Electric (CODOE) and install with highly combat system technology. The Dutch Shipbuilder Damen Group from Netherland had been awarded the contract for the enhancement of the first vessel in December 2010 until today.

The United Kingdom (UK) had the intent for cooperation with Indonesia on defence industries.⁴⁴ The Secretary of UK Defence, Christian Ayres had mentioned that Indonesia will be significant for military partnership in the future. Hence, the British's defence industries including MacTaggart Scott from Scottish naval supplier will be seeking the opportunities for collaboration to supply the military gadget, communication system spare part, support element service for strengthening the TNI-AL capability. The British's defence industry had expected in realizing beneficial mutual cooperation for the long-term industry military projects. By materializing the military partnership agreement, the TNI-AL's capable of monitoring and command its maritime territory from non-traditional threats in the future. The Indonesian government also strongly agreed that will be seeking opportunities to work and gain beneficial together on defence industries.

(b) Indonesian Navy Modernization via Cooperation and Partnership Opportunities

Since 2002, TNI-AL and Indian Navy had been conducted joint maritime patrol along the international maritime border within the Indian Ocean.⁴⁵ Traditionally, they named it India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (IND-INDO CORPAT) had participated in twice a year. The IND-INDO CORPAT is to empower the naval capabilities to conduct the maritime operation such as Search and Rescue, security management, maritime domains and to ensure the safety of the commercial ship and International trade in the Indian Ocean. On 24 October 2017, both of naval forces had embarked the IND-INDO CORPAT Serial 30/2018 in Port Belawan. Furthermore, this operation will also be included on official visits, the visitor reception on board, guard tours for members of the Indian Navy and professional interaction between naval forces of both countries.

The US and Indonesia's military relations had become tier genuinely via cooperation on counterterrorism was essential and effective.⁴⁶ However, the strategic partnership relationship between both governments is beyond a scope area operation on counterterrorism and military education. The US Defence Secretary, James Mattis had stated that the US would focus a seriously on maritime cooperation and support that Indonesia's archipelago as a vital point upon the geography and politics domains of the PACINDO region. He added that the US would facilitate an Indonesia to strengthen the capacity of the new maritime enforcement agencies by providing training and equipment. At the same time, it increases the ability of Indonesia to monitor it maritime domains. During the era of Obama, the US and Indonesia relationship are a comprehensive partnership and but currently, the relationship has grown even shared strategic maritime.⁴⁷ Now, US-Indonesia relations in the future are clearly a more towards maritime cooperation such as aerospace and cyberspace. The aim is to modernise the nation's ability and capable of contributing to the community in the PACINDO region.

On 5th June 2017, Maritime Defence Force of Australia and Indonesia have conducted maritime patrol under Australia-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (AUSINDO CORPAT) 7/2017 in Darwin, Australia.⁴⁸ This joint operation aims to prevent illegal fishing and improve regional security. The training was held in Benoa, Bali on May 27 and covers the maritime of Australia and Indonesia within 10 days. The joint operation targeting is natural resource activities illegal by focusing on illegal fishing along the both of maritime border countries. Maritime Commander, Rear Admiral Peter Laver had stressed that the operation had contributed to regional security and enhance the ability of both countries to counter illegal activities in their maritime domain. In addition, as a neighbour in a dynamic region, Australia and Indonesia defence relations are very important. Both countries have common interests and able to maintain security its stability of the territorial waters and investment movements freely through their respective domains. The involvement of the maritime assets from the Australian Defence Force is Armidale class patrol vessels HMA Bathurst

and G119, and AP-3C Orion aircraft. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Armed Forces participate with two naval vessels, KRI Sharks and Pandrong, and a maritime patrol aircraft.⁴⁹

On 6th September 2017, Indonesia and Japan had formal discussions for the development of maritime cooperation within a significant area in the Indonesia maritime territory, including Natuna Island issue and fisheries industries was held in Jakarta, Indonesia.⁵⁰ There were also discussion on security cooperation as a part of the agreement on the upgrading for patrol and multipurpose vessels.⁵¹ Additionally, Japan had agreed that provide the coastal radar system and satellite coverage for facilitate the fisheries sector capabilities and expected TNI-AL with 12 law marines agencies willing to protect its maritime from illegal fishing vessels including those from China.⁵² The partnership agreement will be focused on six outlying Indonesian regions, including the Natuna, Sabang, Morotai, Saumlaki, Moa and Biak Island, which lies at the end of southern SCS and which the TNI-AL intercepted a number of Chinese fishing vessels last year.⁵³

Since 2012, the Indonesia and China government had established the formal meeting under the name Technical Committee Meeting (TCM) to enhance both countries' effort towards maritime cooperation in the relevant technical area.⁵⁴ On 14th December 2017, the 10th TCM was held in Jakarta, Indonesia. It recalls and discussed the ongoing progress the maritime cooperation projects. The projects, including the Capacity Building to Conduct Training Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) Operator for VTS Lombok and Sunda Strait, China-Indonesia Joint Table Top Maritime SAR Exercise Project, and Navy-to-Navy Cooperation.⁵⁵ On 3 May 2018, China Navy had joint the EXERCISE KOMODO 2018 hosted by the TNI-AL.⁵⁶ The Chinese Navy had joint third time the exercise with two battleships was participating, including from Russia, France, Malaysia, Thailand, the US, Indonesia and 37 other states. The concept of exercise had been conducted are top table exercise and command post exercise on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), drills of Engineering Civic Action Program (ENCAP), Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP), maritime interception, VBSS (Visit, Board, Search and Capture) and sailing base on balls, and take share in social consequences including the city parade, maritime exhibition and cultural performances, sports activities, and hence along. The findings show the development placed by Indonesia especially towards reestablishing its significance as a security player in the region.

On 19th April 2018, the Singaporean Naval Forces and Indonesia Naval Forces are participating in the Exercise EAGLE INDOPURA which conducted at Changi Naval Base, Singapore.⁵⁷ The aim is to upgrade the capabilities and polished the naval doctrine for both of forces on the surface and against air fighting serials and maritime threats serials as well. For the first year, the exercise will include counterterrorism serial between both of naval

within the maritime domains. Both naval forces practised data sharing and sense-production to upgrade maritime situational awareness. Simultaneously, Joint Command Headquarters required giving a response via activating the contingency plan of regional maritime security. Amid the serial, both naval headquarters will be teamed up viably to propel the navy to neutralise a simulated terrorist attack group that threatens shipments of commercial vessels through the Singapore Strait. For this year, Singapore was impressed by participating with three battleships from the class frigate, corvette and littoral. Meanwhile, Indonesia has participated with two vessels from class frigate included attachment helicopter, 1 vessel from class patrol craft and maritime patrol aircraft.⁵⁸

The Evolving of Indonesian Navy Doctrine

Since the 1940s, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) had upheld the legality of maritime to facilitate the ideas of politics in the internal and external aspect, namely the *middle road* and later renamed *dwifungsi* or *dual function*.⁵⁹ Thus, the concept of defence function is facilitating the *socio-political* in Indonesia's political domain and enhance its roles as a sea guardian of Indonesia's territory. The dual function fitted easily with the doctrine of Total People's Defence and Security (*Sistem Pertahanan Dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta-Sishankamrata*), a Maoist-style concept of people's war that contemplated mass mobilisation to defend the country against external or internal threats.⁶⁰ It emphasised on guerrilla warfare and involved seeking support and assistance from the population, and merged ranks of civilian and military cadres.⁶¹

From the late 1990s, TNI has responsible the restructured its military organisation, including doctrinal and operational principles due to the escalating of security crises as well as followed the fall of the Suharto government.⁶² Hence, the TNI had kept responding to the pressures by reducing its involvement in the political domain and enhancing a revision of its doctrine. The *Total People's Defence and Security* doctrine were replaced with the *New Paradigm* doctrine. This new doctrine provided for a shift from TNI's traditional focus on internal security towards external defence; thus, eliminating the entire territorial structure as it enshrined the army's political domains and also led to cuts in the number of army personnel who were transferred to the Marine Corps and the police. The military also abandoned the doctrine of *dual function* and accepted the reduction and eventual elimination of its corporate representation in the main of the country's legislature.

Based on Indonesia's Ministry of Defence (KEMHAN) strategic planning, the national aims is to apply the new concept of Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) by transforming the current of TNI-AL organisation into the TNI-AL's capabilities with *Green Water* in 2024.⁶³ The TNI-AL's aims to increase its capacity based on the requirement and objectives of the government, especially

in determining the security of maritime lane strategic and vital point. For the management of defence, the TNI-AL had a future planned that requires 3 fleets with weapons, namely the Integrated Weapon System Integrated including combat troops, patrol, the element of the marine corps and logistics support element.

For the naval battle force had plans for increasing its battleship capabilities by the prudent procurement plan include destroyers with missile-guided, battle submarines, fast attack missile ships, torpedo ships and minesweepers in the future. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps elements will be developed and possibly located in the western, central, and eastern Indonesia.⁶⁴ The TNI-AL had aspired that uphold the Sea Power and *Extent of Territory* by beyond its boundaries and its emergence the MEF's capability within the next 20 years.⁶⁵ However, the new MEF's procurement plans affected because of limited financial resources to strengthen its naval capabilities. Next, the government will increase the defence allocation from 1.5 to 2 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country if the national economy increases in double profits.

Thus, TNI-AL's doctrine will provide a new approach for the deployment of the naval base. It will improve the commanding sea at the upper level with a show of presence in effectively and efficiently.⁶⁶ Additionally, its emphasis on the measure of confidence within its naval forces by exposing the engagement of operation with foreign navies. This includes improving the quality of battleship in aspects of combat readiness at a high level, flexible in implementing the operational risk and the ability to perform the duties of defence and safety at sea and on land in the long-term periods.

Conclusion

Indonesia's government has taken in an effort to get in the linkages between the changing contours, its function in the area, which, shifted, is being backed through its naval modernisation and expansion. It is important to see that ever since its independence, Indonesia has seen itself as an important actor in the region, given the huge geographical expanse of its territory. The launch of the GMA in 2014 will be to address the current challenges as well as secure Indonesia's economic and maritime in the future. It likewise shows a modification in its tactics which is being adopted given the shifting nature of threats, such as the escalating issue of non-traditional threats in its territorial waters along with the rising confrontation for its EEZ around its Natuna Islands in the SCS. Thus, Indonesia continues to remain the cornerstone of its foreign policy approach which it seeks to ensure stability in the ASEAN region. According to the criteria in Alfred Thayer Mahan's concept Sea Power model, Jokowi's ideals for spreading influence on maritime security via the GMA doctrine which is complementary with foreign and defence policy. The

GMA policy is a fundamental element for developing the Indonesian foreign and defence policy. Not only is it trying to maintain ASEAN's sentiments, it is also aimed at expanding the influence of GMA policy within the PACINDO region. Indonesia also realised that the ongoing security challenges, which it faces internally as well as externally, cannot be fully matched by its current naval capability. Thus, Indonesia has collectively doubled their military spending with warships, maritime patrol aircraft, radar systems, submarines and naval defence systems based on their MEF doctrine so that TNI-AL capable an enhance the *Green Water Navy* concept. Therefore, the current naval procurement, part of the doctrine of MEF 2024 and the GMA is a tent for emerging the modernisation of TNI-AL had equipped the *Green Water Navy* capability.

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12. Mahan had mentioned that six fundamental principles to establish the nation with formidable sea power which is geographic, physical conformation, the extent of territory, number of population, character of the government and national character (Mahan, A.T. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*, 31). Thus, under the Jokowi's administration, Indonesia currently on track to enhance its ultimate goal to become a prosperous a maritime nation via the GMA's policy.
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14. The Mahan's principles in national character had considered that nation's interest by promoting an industry and commercial as well as whether it was capable to invest in those endeavours (Mahan, A.T. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*, 50-52). This is important for Indonesia's character towards its implication of the nation's policy potential and overcomes its vulnerable ability in order to maintain its current policy Thus, Indonesia's has pursued commercial interests within PACINDO region and continued to apply its policy wisely.
15. The Mahan's principles in character of the government had mentioned that the government had influenced by two different environments which are during a peace and war domains. During peace, the government is improving an economy sector and spreading its influences via a regional maritime cooperation. Whereas, during the war will use the navy to command the sea and keep maintaining security within its maritime territory. (Mahan, A.T. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*, 82-83). Indonesia is populated by the peoples with the nationalism of the maritime nation are encouraged to become as one like a water for their survivability and future depend on the sea and how they could manage the resources wisely.
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17. The Mahan's principles in number population had concerned that number following the sea, or at least the awareness and readiness for employment on a battleship for naval assets (Mahan, A.T. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*, 45). Although greatly outnumbered in Asea region, the status of the maritime industry in Indonesia remains favourable compared with others sea power's nations. Thus, the government is required for allocated a defence budget to strengthen the TNI-AL capabilities to achieve the GMA's policy goals.
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