

THE PEOPLE OF AL-AYYAM IN THE ARAB CONQUEST OF IRAQ

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TO begin with, who were the people of al-ayyam? The answer to the question must necessarily be sought in the early history of the Arab Conquest of Iraq, in which this group was involved.

The Arab Conquest of Iraq began in 12/633, just after the Ridda War 11/632, in which Khalid b. al-Walid of Makhzum, one of the most powerful clans of Quraysh, became eminent among the Arab army commanders. Being a great and influential leader, Khalid fought the apostates (*ahl al-ridda*) with minimum instructions from the Caliph Abu Bakr.¹ In this famous war Khalid succeeded in defeating *ridda* tribesmen of Asad, Tayy, Ghatafan, Fazara and Tamim, most of whom were nomads.² The last and most crucial campaign was against the settlement of the most powerful Central 'Arabian tribe of Hanifa at al-Yamama.³ It had never been a party to the Madinan alliance and had its own so-called false prophet, Musaylima, whose aim was to establish his own power in the area centred in al-Yamama, a populated and well cultivated area. Its main market had been Makka until the latter was brought under the Prophet Muhammad's control.⁴ The number of its forces is reported to have amounted to 40,000 men.⁵ Its leader, Musaylima, appeared to have tried to control the nomads in the surrounding territories,⁶ but they refused to follow him and obeyed only their own leaders or their so-called false prophets. Two of them are known by name: Tulayha b. Khuwaylid of Asad and Sajah of Tamim. Tulayha was supported by mainly the clans of Asad in Samira', Ghatafan in Tiba and Tayy in the area between Samira' and Tiba,⁷ though some of them declared their support for Abu Bakr.⁸ Sajah, belonged to Hanzala of Tamim. On her mother's side she was related to the clan of Taghlib of Jazira. She arrived from Jazira at the head of a band of followers belonging to *afna' Rabi'a*, i.e. splinter

¹ Al-Tabari Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Jarir, *Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk* (ed. M.J. de Goeje), Leiden 1879-1901 (hereafter, Tab.), 1/1922-3.

² *Ibid.* 1/1871, 1893, 1896, 1902, 1908, 1921, al-Baladhuri, Ahmad b. Yahya, *Futuh al-Buldan*, (ed. M.J. de Goeje), Leiden, 1866 (hereafter, BF.) p. 98; M.A. Shaban, *Islamic History. A New Interpretation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971, p. 24.

³ Tab. 1/1930, 1946, 1962 (where the tribesmen of Hanifa are called *ahl al-qura*, settlers).

⁴ *Ibid.* 1/1930-4; Ibn Hazm, 'Ali b. Muhammad, *Jumharat Ansab al-'Arab*, (ed. Harun), Cairo, 1962, p. 309; Baghdadi, 'Abd al-Qahir b. Tahir, *al-Farq bayn al-Firaq*, Cairo, 1910; WM Watt, Muhammad at Medina, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1956, pp. 135-6; Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 20; D.F. Eickelman, Musaylima, *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 1967, pp. 17-52, see particularly, pp. 41, 47, 52.

⁵ Tab. 1/1930

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1/1930-4; Eickelman, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁷ Tab. 1/1871, 1873, 1902.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1/1871, 1889, 899.

clans of Rabi'a. Among their leaders at this time were al-Hudhayl b. 'Imran of Taghlib, 'Aqqa b. Hilal of Namir, and Abu 'Adyy b. Watad of Iyad.⁹ In 'Arabia she was followed by the clan of Hanzala of Tamim. Shabath b. Rib'i b. Husayn al-Riyahi was one of their leaders, who accompanied Sajah in her campaign.¹⁰ Yet, some of Sajah's followers of Tamim also went over to Abu Bakr's side.¹¹ Although Sajah is reported to have been allied to Musaylima and come over to al-Yamama, her stay in the region was only for a short span of time.¹² She then returned to Jazira taking with her half of the revenue of al-Yamama.¹³ The essential point here is that neither Tulayha nor Sajah appeared to be among Musaylima's forces in the great battle of 'Aqraba.

Some of the nomads who declared their support for Abu Bakr were actively involved in the army of Khalid.¹⁴ Most of these nomads came mainly from the 'Arab clans of Asad led by Dirar b. al-Azwar and Sinan,¹⁵ Ghatafan,¹⁶ Fazara,¹⁷ Tayy, 1,000 of Jadila and 500 of 'Adyy,¹⁸ Hawazin,¹⁹ Hanzala of Tamim²⁰ and Sulaym led by Ma'an b. Hajiz and Turayfa b. Hajiz.²¹ It is interesting to note that different terms were used in this situation to denote these groups. If a whole clan joined, they were called *barara*, i.e. those who proved true and obedient; if only a section, they were called *khiyara*, i.e. select or chosen. Because of the pressure and fear of being controlled by the powerful tribesmen of Hanifa these fragmented clans decided to throw in their lots with the Madinan regime against the powerful army of Musaylima. With these tribesmen, together with the *Muhajirun* (those Makkans who had accompanied Muhammad to Madina) and The Madinese *Ansar*, (helpers), and other 'Arab clans who did not fall into apostasy, Khalid was able to defeat the Hanafite forces at 'Aqraba.

It is worth noting that during this campaign a group of people from Madina

⁹ *Ibid.* 1/1911-12; BF. p. 99.

¹⁰ Tab. 1/1912, 1919; BF. p. 99; Ibn Hazm, *Jamhara*, p. 227.

¹¹ Tab. 1/1911

¹² BF. p. 151; Tab. 1/1917 - 9; Einkelman, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

¹³ Tab. 1/1919-20.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 1/1871, 1889, 1899, 1963, 1970.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 1/1893, 1894; BF. p. 91.

¹⁶ Tab. 1/1894.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 1/1891.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 1/1887, 1889, 1894.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 1/1871, 1894.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 1/1911, 1922.

²¹ *Ibid.* 1/1905.

called *ahl al-qura*, i.e. the villagers, were present at 'Aqraba. The same narrative in Tabari reports that there was another group called *ahl al-badiya*, i.e. the nomads, who also appeared among the Madinan forces in this campaign. These two groups were arguing among themselves. *Ahl al-qura* told *ahl al-badiya* that they were more skilled at fighting other *ahl al-qura* (Hanafites in al-Yamama) than *ahl al-badiya*.²² On the same occasion, Baladhuri reports that a group of people called *al-qurra* were found among the Madinan forces at 'Aqraba, and according to this account, many of them were killed in battle.²³

During this time, al-Muthanna b. Haritha b. Salama al-Shaybani with his troops numbering 8,000 men,²⁴ were fighting against the Sasanians on their own initiative, particularly in the region of al-Hirah which was later known as Kufa.²⁵ According to al-'Askari al-Muthanan b. Haritha al-Shaybani was the first 'Arab to raid the Sasanian territories on this front.²⁶

It is reported that when Khalid reached Iraq, the Caliph Abu Bakr wrote to al-Muthanna advising him to join forces with Khalid. At al-Ubulla, the most important port in southern Iraq, Khalid was joined by al-Muthanna and his forces because they were eager to join Khalid in the hope of gaining success against the Sasanians in Iraq.²⁷ Our sources do not particularly give the number of the 'Arab forces of Khalid in Iraq. But during the Ridda War several 'Arab clans were present and fought with Khalid. The maximum number from any one clan was 1,000,²⁸ but during the campaign many of them were killed.²⁹ Perhaps only a few hundred or less than a hundred of each clan remained with Khalid. It is almost certain that not all of these clans had followed him to Iraq. On the way he was probably joined by other tribesmen from different 'Arab clans of the inhabitants of Fayd, in central Najd, and Tha' labiya, on the west bank of the Euphrates, who were probably not involved either for or against Madina in the Ridda War.³⁰ In Iraq, Khalid was reinforced by a force, also its number was unspecified, led by al-Qa'qa' b. 'Amr

²² *Ibid.* 1/1946.

²³ BF, pp. 241, 340—M.A. Shaban has already seen and explained that the people called *al-qurra* whom Baladhuri has referred to were the same people which Tabari called *ahl al-qura*, as the word *qurra* simply derives from the root *QRY*, meaning "the people of the villages" or *ahl al-qura*. (M.A. Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 23).

²⁴ Tab, 1/2021.

²⁵ BF, pp. 241, 340; Tab, 1/2016, 2018.

²⁶ al-'Askari, Abu Hilal al-Hasan b. 'Abdillah, *Kitab al-Awa'il*, Madina, 1966, p. 225; see also Ibn Hazm, *Jamharat*, p. 325.

²⁷ BF, pp. 241, 340; Tab, 1/2016, 2018, 2021; al-'Ali, Salih, *al-Tanzimat al-Ijtima'iyya wa al-Iqtisadiyya fi al-Basra*, Baghdad, 1953, p. 23.

²⁸ See above, p. 4.

²⁹ BF, pp. 97—8.

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 242.

al-Tamimi. Eventually, Khalid's forces exceeded 2,000 men,³¹ but was still small if compared with that of al-Muthanna's 8,000 men. However, all these forces were put under the general leadership of Khalid.

If we examine the formation of Khalid's forces in Iraq we find that several 'Arab clans were involved, particularly those of Shayban, Tamim, Tayy, Muzayna, Asad, Dhuhl, Himyar, 'Ijl and Aslam. With these clansmen, the majority of whom were from Shayban, Khalid fought the Sasanians at al-Ubulla and succeeded in capturing it. He then proceeded to al-Mazar, leaving Ma'qil b. Muqarrin al-Muzani in al-Ubulla to look after the area. In the meantime, he sent al-Muthanna b. Haritha al-Shaybani to Nahr al-Mar'a to pursue the enemy.³² In the raid of al-Mazar Khalid was also able to subdue the region and defeat its population. The latter agreed to pay a tribute to the 'Arabs, and Suwayd b. Muqarrin al-Muzani was put in charge of collecting it.³³

From al-Mazar Khalid advanced to al-Walajah and appointed Suwayd b. Muqarrin over al-Hafir in al-Hirah.³⁴

With the enemy defeated in al-Walajah, Khalid advanced to 'Ullays then to Amghisiya. Many other minor raids were made in the regions of al-Hirah but all ended with victory without any serious resistance from the Sasanians. Several 'Arab leaders were involved and became eminent in these raids. They were al-Muthanna b. Haritha al-Shaybani, al-Qa'qa' b. 'Amr al-Tamimi, 'Adi b. Hatim al-Ta'i, Bishr b. 'Ubaydillah b. al-Khasassiyya al-Duhali, Suwayd, al-Nu'man, Dirar, Ma'qil, the sons of Muqarrin al-Muzani, 'Utayba b. Nahhas al-'Ijli, Dirar b. al-Azwar al-Asadi, Hasaka al-Habaty, al-Husayn b. Abi al-Hur, al-Hajjaj b. Dhi al-'Unuq, Busr b. Abi Ruhm, Khalid b. al-Washima, 'Atta and Rabi'a b. 'Isl.³⁵ The outcome of these raids was that all the booty gained on the battlefield was distributed among the 'Arab fighting-men and only one-fifth of it was set aside and sent to Abu Bakr in Madina.³⁶

After a short period,³⁷ Khalid was transferred to the Syrian front, together with his military forces, to fight the Byzantine forces there. His departure for Syria took place in Rabi' 11, year 13/634. The number of Khalid's forces going to Syria

³¹Tab. 1/2021.

³²*Ibid.* 1/2025.

³³*Ibid.* 1/2029.

³⁴*Ibid.* 1/2030.

³⁵*Ibid.* 1/2022, 2052, 2057-8.

³⁶*Ibid.* 1/2027, 2028 (also 2037, where the amount of the booty received by the 'Arab fighting-men reached 1,500 dirhams each).

³⁷Although Sayf b. 'Umar pointed out to the contrary (Tab. 1/2056 ff, where he mentions that Khalid's campaign extended to far north of 'Iraq, and took nearly two years).

was, as estimated by Baladhuri and Tabari, only 800 men.³⁸ The total number of the 'Arab army in Iraq at that time was 10,000 men.³⁹ It was made up of different unimportant 'Arab tribesmen of al-Hijaz and Eastern Arabia; only a small number of them were Muhajirun and Ansar. However, the authorities of Ibn Ishaq and Ya'qubi have emphasised that the forces brought to the Syrian front were from *ahl al-quwwa* and the rest were left with al-Muthanna b. Haritha al-Shaybani in Iraq.⁴⁰ Only a few from *ahl al-quwwa* — after a special request of al-Muthanna b. Haritha — were left in Iraq.⁴¹ They were Furat b. Hayyan al-'Ijli, Bishr b. 'Ubaydillah b. Khassasiyya al-Dhuhali, 'Abdullah b. 'Awfa al-Aslami, Haritha b. Bilal al-Muzani and 'Asim b. 'Amr al-Tamimi. Some of Khalid's forces in al-Hirah led by al-Qa'qa' b. 'Amr al-Tamimi, Maz'ur b. 'Adi al-'Ijli, Dirar b. al-Khattab al-Fihri and Dirar b. al-Azwar al-Asadi, were taken to the Syrian front.⁴² From this it is obvious that the 'Arab forces in Iraq at that time were divided into two categories, namely *ahl al-quwwa* and *non-ahl al-quwwa*. In order to distinguish between these two groups of people, it is important to examine every account dealing with this event. The account of Ya'qubi refers to the forces going to Syria as *ahl al-quwwa* without describing the rest who were left in Iraq.⁴³ The accounts of Baladhuri and Tabari do not describe either of these groups.⁴⁴ Sayf's account divides them into *sahaba* and *non-sahaba*, saying that *akhdara Khalid ashab rasuli al-Allah wast'sara bi-him 'ala al-Muthanna. . . taraka (Khalid) li-al-Muthanna a'dadahum min ahl al-qana'a mimman lam yakun lahu suhbah*.⁴⁵ While Ibn Ishaq's tradition says *bi-man ma'ahu (Khalid) min ahl al-quwwa. . . wa yastakhlifu 'ala da'afat al-nas rajul^{un} minhum*.⁴⁶ From these various accounts one can easily conclude that the first group, *ahl al-quwwa*, were the strong people (or according to Sayf, the companions of the Prophet), and the other, *ahl al-gana'a*, were *non-sahaba*, and *da'afat*, weak Muslims, or tribesmen from unimportant 'Arab clans.

With the departure of Khalid, the raiding parties, *ahl al-qana'a* and *da'afat*, in Iraq remained under the command of al-Muthanna b. Haritha al-Shaybani. not long after, al-Muthanna went to abu Bakr asking him if he could enlist ex-ridda tribesmen for his raids in 'Iraq, but the Caliph turned a deaf ear to the plea.⁴⁷

³⁸BF, p. 110; Tab, 1/2109 — Only Sayf b. 'Umar gives 10,000 or 9,000, about half of the 'Arab's army of Iraq. Tab. 1/2089, 2090, 2111, 2154.

³⁹See above, p. 7.

⁴⁰Tab. 1/2121–2; Ya'qubi, Ahmad b. Abi Ya'qub, *Tarikh*, Beirut, 1960, vol. 11, p. 133.

⁴¹Tab. 1/2116–7.

⁴²*Ibid.* 1/2018, 2117, 2193.

⁴³Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p. 133.

⁴⁴BF, pp. 110, 249; Tab. 1/2109.

⁴⁵Tab. 1/2115

⁴⁶*Ibid.* 1/2121.

⁴⁷*Ibid.* 1/2120.

Al-Muthanna then returned to 'Iraq to continue raiding with his forces.

From this it is clear that the main characteristic of the policy of Abu Bakr in Iraq was the prohibition of *ahl al-ridda* from participation in the 'Arab campaign, and none of them was to be found in the earliest conquest, *fa lam yashad al-ayyam murtaddun*⁴⁸ This policy had been carried out successfully by Khalid and other 'Arab leaders during Abu Bakr's reign.⁴⁹ The Caliph Abu Bakr had put his full trust in non-ridda tribesmen, either Qurayshites, or non-Qurayshites for the campaign against the Sasanians. But this campaign did not gather momentum until *ahl al-ridda* were allowed to join 'Arab fighting-men after 'Umar's succession in 13/634.

'Umar b. al-Khattab was proclaimed as a successor to Abu Bakr in Madina. His first act was to reverse the policy of Abu Bakr by bringing all elements, *ridda* and non-*ridda*, together to campaign in Iraq. The Caliph 'Umar took this decision for two reasons: firstly, he realised that a strong 'Arab force would be needed to defeat the numerous and strong army of the Sasanians in Iraq. Secondly, he also realised that by depriving *ahl al-ridda* of participating in these campaigns he would undoubtedly deprive the Islamic community, not only of fighting-men but also of an important source of wealth.⁵⁰

Before the arrival of *ridda* forces in Iraq, Abu 'Ubayd of Tha'qif was appointed by 'Umar as a new leader of the 'Arab forces on the Sasanian front.⁵¹ The newly appointed leader, Abu 'Ubayd, began his campaign against the Sasanians and met them at al-Qarqas or al-Jasr, the bridge, in Ramadan 13/634, where the 'Arab forces were defeated. Abu 'Ubayd and seven commanders of Tha'qif, including his brother and son were killed, while al-Muthanna b. Haritha al-Shaybani was wounded but continued the campaign.⁵² During this time, many of the Madinan forces and their families, *ahl al-Madina*, had returned to Madina and the rest scattered in the desert, leaving al-Muthanna with this own forces.⁵³ The latter took his men to Ullays, then to al-Buwayb, where he was joined, for the first time, by *ahl al-ridda*. The first *ridda* forces to arrive in Iraq were led by Rib'i b. Husayn and his son, Shabath b. Rib'i al-Riyahi of Hanzala of Tamim, Anas b. Hilal of Namir and Anas b. Fihri of Taghlib. All of them had been with Sajah's army in the Ridda War against Abu Bakr.⁵⁴ In fact, the followers of Sajah were the weakest among *ahl al-ridda* and mainly belonged to *afna' Rabi'a*, splinter clans of Rabi'a, e.g. Namir and Taghlib,

⁴⁸Tab. 1/2021 – for the prohibition of *ahl al-ridda* from 'Arab campaign during the time of Abu Bakr, see Tab. 1/2014, 2046, 2081, 2225, 2458; Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, 11, p. 131.

⁴⁹Tab. 1/2046.

⁵⁰Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁵¹Tab. 1/2161–2, 2165; BF. p. 250.

⁵²Tab. 1/2166–79; BF. pp. 251–2; Khalifa, *Tarikh*, 1/92–3.

⁵³Tab. 1/2180; Ibn al Athir, 'Izz al-Din, *al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh*, Dar al-Sadir, Beirut, 1965, vol. 11, p. 440.

⁵⁴Tab. 1/2188–9, 2190.

in which 'Aqqa b. Hilal, Anas's brother, and al-Hudhayl b. 'Imran were prominent.⁵⁵ Likewise Shabath b. Rib'i al-Riyahi is reported to have been with Sajah and became prominent among ahl al-ridda of B. Tamim.⁵⁶

Besides *ahl al-ridda*, many non-*ridda* tribesmen were also invited by 'Umar to join al-Muthanna in Iraq. The most important among them was Jarir b. 'Abdillah al-Bajali who had with him 2,000 Bajalis. They are reported to have agreed to join al-Muthanna provided one-quarter of the booty would be assigned to them.⁵⁷ Others were clans of comparatively little importance, or fragmented 'Arab clans. The names of their leaders are as follows:— Qurt b. Jammah of 'Abd al-Qays, Ibn al-Muthanna al-Jushami of Tamim, Rib'i b. 'Amir b. Khalid of 'Amr of Tamim, Hilal b. 'Ullafa al-Taymi of Tamim, 'Isma b. 'Abdillah al-Dabbi, Ibn al-Hawbar al-Dabbi, al-Mundhir b. Hassan al-Dabbi, Ghalib b. 'Abdillah al-Kinani, 'Arfaja b. Harthama al-Azdi, 'Abdullah b. Dhi al-Sahmayn al-Khath'ami.⁵⁸ All these 'Arab tribesmen, *ridda* and non-*ridda*, were taken to al-Buwayb, where a battle was fought in which the Sasanians were defeated and their properties seized by the 'Arabs. The booty gained was distributed between the conquerors, but the non-*ridda* tribesmen had received proportionately bigger shares than *ahl al-ridda*;⁵⁹ and a proportion of it was also set aside and sent to the children of non-*ridda* tribesmen who had been left at al-Hirah during the campaign.⁶⁰

Having defeated the Sasanians at al-Buwayb, al-Muthanna continued to raid by sending troops to different directions. He sent Bishr b. 'Ubaydillah b. al-Khasassiyya al-Dhuhali to al-Hirah, Jarir b. 'Abdillah al-Bajali to Maysan and Hilal b. 'Ullafa al-taymi of Tamim to Dast Maysan, while he himself went to Ullays, a village in al-Anbar, and then to al-Khanafis. However, after these expeditions they returned to al-Hirah to prepare for another campaign.⁶¹ Shortly afterwards, al-Muthanna and his troops raided Dhu Qar, Jull, Sharaf and Ghuda, where Hilal's brother, al-Mustawrid b. 'Ullafa al-Taymi of Tamim was in charge of his clan of al-Ribab. With him were three of *afna' Tamim*, i.e. splinter clans of Tamim, Jaz' b. Mu'awiya of Sa'd, al-Huayn b. Niyar of 'Amr and al-Husayn Ma'bad of Hanzala.⁶² At the same time, the Caliph 'Umar appointed sa'da b. Abi Waqqas, the prominent companion, to lead the 'Arab campaign in Iraq. This appointment came about not

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 1/1911.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 1/1918–9; Ibn Durayd, Muhammad b. al-Hassan, *al-Ishtiqaaq*, (Ed. A.S. M. Harun), Cairo, 1958, p. 223; Ibn Hazm, *Jamharat*, p. 227; al-Isfahani, Abu al-Faraj, 'Ali b. Husayn, *Kitab al-Aghani* Matba'ah Bulaq, Cairo, 1285 A.H., vol. XVIII, p. 165.

⁵⁷ Tab. 1/2183, 2186, 2199; BF. p. 253.

⁵⁸ Tab. 1/2183–90

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 1/2198.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 1/2197

⁶¹ *Ibid.* 1/2202–8.

⁶² *Ibid.* 1/2211, 2245.

because of his military skills, but rather because of his services to Islam, and his readiness to co-operate in full measure with the ex-apostates, *ahl al-ridda*.⁶³

Sa'd set out from Madina for 'Iraq. There is some disagreement about the number of Sa'd's forces. On the authority of Ibn Ishaq says it was 6,000;⁶⁴ according to Sayf, the number of Sa'd's forces was 4,000:600 from Hadramawt, 1,300 from Madhhij, 1,000 from Qays 'Aylan and 1,000 or so from other tribes, of whom only 2,000, including their wives and children were taken to 'Iraq.⁶⁵ Most of them belonged to the 'Arab clans of Madhhij and Qays 'Aylan.⁶⁶ On the way, he was joined by other 'Arab tribesmen : 2,000 from Yaman and 2,000 from Ghatafan and Qays.⁶⁷ Finally he reached the area of Zrarud/Tha'aliyya and Sharaf, between Madina and al-Hirah, where he was again joined by 1,700 Yamanites led by al-Ash'ath b. Qays al-Kindi,⁶⁸ one of the prominent leaders of *ahl al-ridda*,⁶⁹ who had been confined to Madina since his rebellion against the Madinan regime.⁷⁰

When Sa'd reached Qadisiyya at the end of 15/636, he was joined by 12,000 of *ahl al-ayyam*, and the people of *al-hamra'*, the local population who had sympathised with the 'Arabs and converted to Islam.⁷¹ Of the 12,000 *ahl al-ayyam*, 8,000 of them had been with al-Muthanna throughout his raids in 'Iraq.⁷² Before he died, al-Muthanna appointed Bishr b. 'Ubaydillah b. al-Khasassiyya, one of the companions, to take charge of this army. But because the majority of al-Muthanna's forces were from the clan of Shayban, Ibn al-Khasassiyya was proved to be incapable of holding this task and was removed from his command. The leadership fell to al-Muthanna's brother, al-Mu'anna b. Haritha al-Shaybani, who then brought the army to Sa'd at Zarud, not far from Qadisiyya, according to al-Muthanna's will. But Sa'd departed from the area before their arrival. However, all of them were taken to Sa'd at Qadisiyya and joined him in the fighting.⁷³

Al-Mu'anna's forces were later on joined by 1,000 tribesmen led by Hashim b. 'Utba b. Abi Waqqas or al-Qa'qa' b. 'Amr al-Tamimi according to Sayf. According

⁶³ *Ibid.* 1/2202, 2215, 2221; Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁶⁴ *Tab.* 1/2202

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 1/2218, 2219, 2222.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 1/2218-9.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 1/2221.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 1/2222.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 1/2004, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2011; BF. pp. 100-4.

⁷⁰ *Tab.* 1/2012.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* 1/2226, 2261.

⁷² *Ibid.* 1/2221.

⁷³ *Ibid.* 1/2222, 2226, 2245.

to al-Ya'qubi, these tribesmen belonged to *afna' al-muslimin*, splinter groups of Muslims.⁷⁴ While Sayf's account says they belonged to *afna' al-Yaman min ahl al-Hijaz*, splinter groups of the Yamanite tribe of al-Hijaz.⁷⁵ Elsewhere, in Sayf's tradition, he refers to them as *ahl al-ayyam*, the earliest conquerors.⁷⁶ However, these tribesmen had been actively involved in the earliest conquest of 'Iraq and 800 of them are reported to have been with Khalid's forces in al-Hirah.⁷⁷ The rest 200 are not mentioned in the sources. It is, however, very probable that they were of al-Ashtar Malik b. al-Harith al-Nakha'i's group. There is no reason not to believe this since al-Ashtar himself was a Yamanite and fought gallantly at Yarmuk before he was sent to Qadisiyya.⁷⁸ But because al-Qa'qa' b. 'Amr was a Tamimite he looms large in Sayf's account, who was also of B. Tamim, and is given the credit of leadership from the very beginning of the Arab Conquest of 'Iraq.

The Arab fighting-men in the earliest campaign of 'Iraq were — with the exception of *Muhajirun* and *Ansar*, — made up of tribesmen of little tribal standing, who had fought against the apostates in the Ridda War, and had been earlier, before the arrival of Khalid in 'Iraq fighting against the Sasanians. All of them were taken on Khalid's expeditions. It was to their participation in these expeditions that the term *ahl al-ayyam* was subsequently applied, in distinguishing them from the people of Makka and Madina (*Muhajirun* and *Ansar*).⁷⁹ The people of *al-ayyam* mainly belonged to comparatively unimportant 'Arab clans, or splinter groups, *afna'*, of 'Arab clans. Despite this, they had an equitable share of the gains, and were privileged by being *ahl al-ayyam* which was of great value for them in the future. They came mainly from Eastern-Arabian clans of Rabi'a: 6,000 of Shayban/Bakr b. Wa'il, and 2,000 of other Rabi'a clans, which represented the core of al-Muthanna's forces in 'Iraq.⁸⁰ Some others were from the 'Arab clans of Tayy, Muzayna, Dabba, Kinana, Asad, Dhuhl, 'Ijl, Aslam and splinter groups of Tamim clans such as al-Ribab, Sa'd, Hanzala and 'Amr. They were actively involved in the campaign of Iraq before the arrival of Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas,⁸¹ all of them were taken by Sa'd to Qadisiyya; and some of them were heroes there.⁸² At Qadisiyya, they were joined by their families; 1,000 of their women were from Bajila and 700

⁷⁴ Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, 11/145.

⁷⁵ Tab. 1/2305.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 1/2367.

⁷⁷ See above, p. 9.

⁷⁸ Tab. 1/2101; Ibn al-Kalbi, Hisham b. Muhammad, *Jamhara al-Nasab al-Arab*, manuscript, British Museum, add. 23297, fol. 244B; Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, 11/142.

⁷⁹ Tab. 1/2021; Shaban, *op. cit.*, 45.

⁸⁰ Tab. 1/2021, 2221.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* 1/2183, 2187–8, 2189, 2207, 2221, 2236, 2239.

⁸² *Ibid.* 1/2226, 2245, 2261–7, 2340; BF. p. 259; Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p. 145; Isfahani, *Aghani*, vol. XIV. p. 29; Dinawari, Abu Hanifa Ahmad b. Dawud, *Kitab al-Akhbar al-Tiwal*, Cairo, 1960, p. 120.

from Nakha' who married men of the *afna'* just before and after the battle of Qadisiyya.⁸³ This suggests that the number of *ahl al-ayyam* increased at Qadisiyya, and it also suggests that the people of *al-ayyam* began to develop their own power.

The prominent leaders of *ahl al-ayyam* are as follows:— Hilal b. 'Ullafa al-Taymi of Tamim, had been sent to Dast Maysan in al-Anbar by al-Muthanna b. Haritha al-Shaybani to campaign against the Sasanians in 13/634, this campaign took place just after the battle of al-Buwayb at which he was present and during which he was in charge of al-Ribab.⁸⁴ He is also reported to have been prominent at Qadisiyya and during the battle he was able to kill Rastum, the Sasanian King.⁸⁵ Al-Mustawrid b. 'Ullafa, Hilal's brother, al-Taymi of Tamim, was among al-Muthanna's forces, and accompanied his brother, Hilal. Al-Mustawrid was active in the expedition of Ghuda, near the area which was later known as Basra, in 13/634 following the battle of al-Buwayb, in which he commanded al-Ribab with three other leaders of *afna'* Tamim, Jaz' b. Mu'awiya with Ibn al-Nabigha of Sa'd, al-Husayn b. Ma'bad of Hanzala.⁸⁶ Al-Ashtar, Malik b. al-Harith al-Nakha'i of the clan of Madhhij, had been with Madinan forces in the Ridda War,⁸⁷ and was a hero in the earliest campaign of Iraq before he was taken to Yarmuk; he was then sent to Qadisiyya.⁸⁸ Suwayd, al-Nu'man, Dirar and Ma'qil, the sons of Muqarrin al-Muzani of Aws/Ansar, the number of their followers was small.⁸⁹ All of them, particularly al-Nu'man and Suwayd had been active in the Ridda War against the apostates,⁹⁰ and became prominent in the army of Khalid in Iraq.⁹¹ Then they went to Qadisiyya, where al-Nu'man was particularly eminent.⁹²

The battle of Qadisiyya took place at the end of 15/636 and the approximate number of its participants was 30,000 of different 'Arab clans,⁹³ *ridda* and non-*ridda*, including the followers of al-Ash'ath b. Qays al-Kindi and Qays b. al-Makshuh al-Muradi. The participation of *ahl al-ridda* in this battle needs to be

⁸³Tab. 1/2362—4

⁸⁴*Ibid.* 1/2188, 2202

⁸⁵*Ibid.* 1/2337, 2340, 2356; Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p. 145; Mas'udi, 'Ali b. al-Husayn, *Muruj al-Dhahab*, Cairo, 1948, vol. 1, p. 327.

⁸⁶Tab. 1/2245.

⁸⁷Usama b. Munqiz, *Kitab al-I'tibar*, (ed. P.K. Hitti), Princeton, U.S.A., 1930, pp. 37—8.

⁸⁸Tab. 1/2101, 2154; Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p. 142; Ibn Kalbi, *Jamhara*, BM/ms. fol. 244B; Isfahani, *Aghani*, vol. XIV, p. 29; Dinawari, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁸⁹Ibn Qutayba, 'Abdullah b. Muslim, *Kitab al-Ma'arif*, (ed. Tharwat Ukashah), Cairo, 1960, p. 229.

⁹⁰Tab. 1/1876, 1878.

⁹¹*Ibid.* 1/2029, 2052, 2057—8.

⁹²*Ibid.* 1/2236, 2239; Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p. 143.

⁹³Tab. 1/2218—9, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2330.

examined. According to our sources, the maximum number allowed by 'Umar for a *ridda* leader to lead at this time was only 100 men.⁹⁴ However, we are very doubtful whether this limit had been effectively applied by Sa'd in this battle. According to Sayf, the number of al-Ash'ath's forces at Qadisiyya was 1,700 Kindis.⁹⁵ It is also clearly mentioned in our sources that the number of Qays b. al-Makshuh's followers was 700 men.⁹⁶ Yet, we believe that the power and influence of these *ridda* leaders had been held in check; and none of them had been appointed to any responsible positions, either in the army or the conquered territories, during the time of 'Umar.⁹⁷ Two other leaders of *ahl al-ridda*, Rib'i b. Husayn and his son, Shabath b. Rib'i al-Hanzali of Tamim, were also present in Iraq since the battle of al-Buwayb, fighting along with al-Muthanna's forces. Yet, the number of their followers is not mentioned, and they had never been appointed to any responsible position, neither at al-Buwayb nor at Qadisiyya.⁹⁸

However, the participation of *ridda* forces at Qadisiyya had its significance: the 'Arabs were able to defeat the Sasanians and their empire in Iraq began to decline. All 'Arab warriors, *ridda* and non-*ridda*, were given their share of the booty gained on the battlefield.⁹⁹ To their participation in this great battle the term *ahl al-Qadisiyya* was subsequently applied and due *ata*, stipends, were given.¹⁰⁰ It was the first time that *ridda* and non-*ridda* tribesmen had been placed on an equal footing under the newly acquired term *ahl al-Qadisiyya*.

It is also worth noticing that during the battle of Qadisiyya a group called *qurra'* appeared again, but, with the precise task of reciting the Qur'an. Sayf's account refers to these *qurra'* as Qur'an reciters. According to this, these *qurra'* were asked to recite some verses of the Qur'an from sura al-Anfal, in order to boost the morale of the 'Arab fighting-men in this battle. All of them were encouraged to learn the sura, *wa-kana al-muslimun yata'alamunaha kulluhum*.¹⁰¹ At this point, one is inclined to doubt if the *qurra'* of Qadisiyya were really Qur'an reciters, as Sayf has emphasised. Apart from this, it is also illogical to conclude that all of the 'Arabs (30,000) at Qadisiyya were Qur'an reciters. According to Ibn Ishaq in Tabari, there was only one Qur'an reciter, *qari'*, named Mu'adh of B. Najjar of

⁹⁴BF. p. 256; Tab. 1/2350; Khalifa, *Tarikh*, 1/102.

⁹⁵Tab. 1/2222.

⁹⁶BF. p. 256; Tab. 1/2350.

⁹⁷*Ibid.* 1/2225, 2327, 2457; Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁹⁸Tab. 1/2188-9; see also above, pp. 12, 13.

⁹⁹Tab. 1/2356; Khalifa, *Tarikh*, 1/101 — even the people of *al-hamra'* had also shared the booty by their being *ahl al-Qadisiyya* (Tab. 1/2261).

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.* 1/2165, 2183, 2217-22, 2633, 2852-3; Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

¹⁰¹Tab. 1/2295 — elsewhere in Tabari Sayf mentions only one Qur'an reciter, named al-Miqdad in the battle of al-Buwayb in 13/634 and refers to him as *qari'* (Tab. 1/2095).

Madina emerged in the year 13/634 at al-Qarqas, but since then this Mu'adh is not mentioned in the sources.¹⁰²

Having succeeded at Qadisiyya, Sa'd and his 'Arab forces moved on to al-Mada'in in Safar 16/637, making their base in Iraq, and living in deserted houses which had been left by Yazdajird, the Sasanian King, and his family and officials after their defeat.¹⁰³ By this time, many people of Madina and Makka had returned home with their families.¹⁰⁴ The rest of Sa'd's troops were brought to Kufa and only some of them preferred to stay behind. These were *aqwam^{un} min al-afna'*, *wa-aktharuhum banu 'Abs*, i.e. splinter groups, most of them from the clan of 'Abs,¹⁰⁵ who moved to Kufa probably in the same year (16/637).

During the period of settling at al-Mada'in some important campaigns were launched to the east and north, aiming at establishing garrisons, *masalih*, in those regions. One of these was Jalula'. This campaign was headed by Hashim b. 'Utba b. Abi Waqqas al-Zuhri and al-Qa'qa' b. 'Amr al-Tamimi with an army of 12,000 men. Another 600 men were sent from al-Mada'in to Jalula' to reinforce Hashim and al-Qa'qa's army.¹⁰⁶ Hujr b. 'Adi al-Kindi, who had earlier been at Qadisiyya,¹⁰⁷ was appointed as the leader of this army and accompanied by three *ridda* leaders, Qays b. Makshuh, 'Amr b. Madikarib and Tulayha b. Khuwaylid.¹⁰⁸ After several battles, the Sasanian troops were defeated, and plenty of booty, land and property was left to the 'Arabs.¹⁰⁹ The 'Arab forces then returned to al-Mada'in.¹¹⁰ Another expedition led by Sa'd himself went to Masabadhan. It took place just after their return from Jalula'. In the meantime, a campaign was made to Hulwan led by al-Qa'qa' b. 'Amr al-Tamimi with an army of *afna' al-nas*, splinter groups, and the people of *al-hamra'*. Hulwan was soon conquered and al-Qa'qa' returned to al-Mada'in, leaving some of his troops behind to look after the region.¹¹¹ This took place while Sa'd and his forces were still at Masabadhan fighting against the Sasanians. An Army from al-Mada'in was soon sent to Masabadhan to reinforce Sa'd. In this army 'Abdullah b. Wahb al-Rasibi, a *halif*,

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 1/2182 — another account in Tabari cited by Muhammad b. 'Umar gives no more than two Qur'an reciters who appeared in the year 14/635 (Tab. 1/2749).

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* 1/2443, 2441, 2451.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* 1/2400, 2451, 2362–3; BF. p. 256.

¹⁰⁵ Tab. 1/2487.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* 1/3456–61; BF. p. 264.

¹⁰⁷ Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqat*, vol. VI, p. 151; al-Maqdisi, Mutahar b. Tahir, *al-Bad' wa al-Tarikh*, Paris, 1916, vol. V. p. 108.

¹⁰⁸ BF. p. 264; Tab. 1/2462.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 1/2464–5; BF. p. 265.

¹¹⁰ Tab. 1/2471; BF. p. 265.

¹¹¹ Tab. 1/2463.

ally of Bajila,¹¹² was appointed in command with three other leaders, Dirar b. al-Khattab al-Fihri, al-Mudarib b. Fulan al-'Ijli and Qaddam b. al-Hudhayl al-Asadi. In the fight, Sa'd's army was able to defeat the Sasanians and returned to al-Mada'in. But before their arrival another army of 5,000 was sent to Takrit from al-Mada'in under the leadership of 'Abdullah b. al-Mu'tamm and was accompanied by Rib'i b. al-Afkal al-'Anzi, al-Harith b. Hassan al-Dhuhali, Furat b. Hayyan al-'Ijli, Hani' b. Qays al-Shaybani and 'Arfaja b. Harthama al-Azdi.¹¹³ The defeat of the enemy at Hulwan, Masabadhan and Takrit, respectively marked the end of the Sasanian empire in Iraq, and again a vast amount of fertile land was occupied by the 'Arabs.¹¹⁴

Sa'd's essential task now was to protect the conquered territories, and find a new and suitable base for his 'Arab forces. But, as he was ordered by the Caliph 'Umar to attack Qarqisiyya in the north, Sa'd sent another army from al-Mada'in, its leader was Rib'i b. 'Amir b. Khalid al-'Amri of Tamim,¹¹⁵ one of the early conquerors who had been with al-Muthanna b. Haritha al-Shaybani since the battle of the bridge.¹¹⁶

Sa'd then began moving his base from al-Mada'in. Several sites were suggested, and at last they decided on Kufa. It has been suggested by some sources that the reason for their move from al-Mada'in was that the situation of the province did not suit the 'Arabs: the place was too dirty and pestilential due to the insects there.¹¹⁷ But this reason is not very convincing, because this move was due much more to military rather than any other reasons. If we examine the geographical situations of the area, there are three alternatives to take into consideration: Kufa "was more strategically placed to send help to Syria should it be needed",¹¹⁸ Secondly, Madina could be easily cut off by a thrust from the still unsubdued and powerful province of Fars.¹¹⁹ Thirdly, "in a large city like Mada'in it was probably not easy to control the tribesmen effectively, an easier task in the garrison town of Kufa".¹²⁰

All 'Arab tribal leaders, *ridda* and non-*ridda*, and their followers were brought

¹¹²*Ibid.* 1/2478.

¹¹³*Ibid.* 1/2473-7.

¹¹⁴BF, pp. 265-6.

¹¹⁵Tab. 1/2479.

¹¹⁶See above, p. 13.

¹¹⁷BF, pp. 275, 277; Khalifa, *Tarikh*, 1/109.

¹¹⁸Tab. 1/2360, 2483; BF, p. 276; Ya'qut, al-Hamawi, *Mu'jam al-Buldan*, Cairo, 1906-1907, 7/297; Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹¹⁹Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹²⁰*Ibid.* p. 51.

into Kufa, and every tribal grouping set up their houses and mosques under their own leader; for example, 'Adi b. Hatim in Tayy, Jarir b. 'Abdillah in Bajila and Al-Ash'ath b. Qays in Kinda.¹²¹

In connection with *ahl al-ayyam*, the majority of them had followed Sa'd to Kufa under their own leaders.¹²² Only a few of them preferred to stay at al-Mada'in, where their houses and property had already been established.¹²³ These groups of people were the ones Sayf refers to as *aqwam^{un} min al-afna'* splinter groups, and some of them were from the clan of 'Abs, Shuraysh b. 'Awfa's clan.¹²⁴ Some others such as al-Nu'man and Suwayd, the sons of Muqarrin al-Muzani al-Ansari were appointed to supervise *al-kharaj*, land tax, in the regions of the Euphrates and Tigris and remained there until the campaign of Nihawand, 21/642 in which they fought and died.¹²⁵ These responsibilities were then taken over by other members of *ahl al-ayyam*, namely Hudhayfa b. al-Yaman al-'Absi, a *halif*, ally, of Banu 'Abd al-Ashal,¹²⁶ and 'Uthman b. Hunayf al-Ansari.¹²⁷ Both of them had been at Qadisiyya.¹²⁸ Those on the new fronts, Hulwan, Jalula', Masabadhan, Qarqisiyya and Takrit, were also left to look after these areas, but their stay in those regions was only temporary. These people were some times referred to by Sayf as *afna' al-nas*.¹²⁹ Some of them had their appointment from al-Mada'in and others from Kufa when the 'Arab base moved to Kufa. The names of their leaders who were involved on these new fronts are mentioned in our sources as follows:— Hujr b. 'Adi al-Kindi in Jalula', Qabbas b. 'Abdillah of *al-hamra'* in Hulwan, Muslim b. 'Abdillah of *al-hamra'* in Takrit, Rafi' b. 'Abdillah of *al-hamra'* and 'Abdullah b. Wahb al-Rasibi in Masabadhan, 'Ashnaqa b. 'Abdillah of *al-hamra'* and Rib'i b. 'Amir al-'Amri of Tamim in Qarqisiyya.¹³⁰

The point to be noted here is that these new fronts, Hulwan, al-Muda'in, Jalula', Masabadhan, Takrit and Qarqisiyya, were in the Sawad and have been regarded by our sources as villages like Kufa. An example of this is Jalula', which Ya'qubi in his *Tarikh* refers to it as *qaryat^{un} min qura al-Sawad*, i.e. one of the villages in the Sawad.¹³¹ The conclusion is inevitable therefore, that those who

¹²¹ BF. p. 275; Ya'qubi, *Kitab al-Buldan* (in Ibn Rusteh, *al-'A'laq al-Nafisa*, Leiden, 1891, pp. 310–11); Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqat*, vol. VI, pp. 13–4.

¹²² Tab. 1/2222, 2236, 2356.

¹²³ BF. pp. 265–6; Tab. 1/2471.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* 1/2455–6; Ibn Hazm, *Jamhara*, p. 202; al-Maqqisi, *al-Bad'*, V. 103.

¹²⁶ Tab. 1/2637; BF. p. 269; Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p. 152; Ibn Qutayba, *Ma'arif*, p. 263.

¹²⁷ Tab. 1/2637; BF. p. 269; Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p. 152.

¹²⁸ Tab. 1/2223, 2238, 2376; Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p.

¹²⁹ Tab. 1/2473.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* 1/2463, 2474, 2485, 2497, 2462, 2465, 2478; BF. p. 264.

¹³¹ Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p. 151.

were involved and in authority over these villages came to be called *al-qurra'*, the villagers.

Kufa now became an important military base and served as a centre for the occupied territories in the Sawad. In Kufa all 'Arab forces were settled and organised in tribal groupings. Of the people of *al-ayyam* the majority were in Kufa; only a small number of them were outside Kufa in the Sawad performing their duties. However, all of them were on an equal footing and had shares of the booty gained on the battlefields and conquered territories.

The following lines will be devoted to the situation of Iraq following the 'Arab victory at Qadisiyya, and the position of *ahl al-ayyam* dealing with the conquered lands, and how they got their privileges.

When Iraq was conquered — after successive victories at Qadisiyya, al-Mada'in and Jalula' by the 'Arabs — a vast amount of land fell into 'Arab hands. This area is known as al-Sawad and it stretches from the head of the Persian Gulf to Mawsil in the north and from the borders of the Syrian-Iraq to Hulwan in the east. With regards to these occupied lands, our sources do not tell us exactly how they were organised. Modern historians such as Gibb in his "Interpretation of Islamic History" have pointed out that because the 'Arab leaders were at that time unfamiliar with the structure of an agricultural economy the Caliph 'Umar decided to leave the administration of these lands in the hands of the former officials who were familiar with it.¹³² Gibb's explanation is rather vague, partly because he made no clear distinction between the abandoned land and the rest of the occupied lands in the Sawad, and partly because he assumed the Sasanian officials, rather than peasants, were still there administering these lands. The same mistake has been made by Dennet in his "Conversion and the Poll-tax in Early Islam".¹³³ According to Shaban in his "Islamic History", when Iraq was conquered "the Sasanian King and many court and government officials fled eastwards in the hope of later regaining their position, but the vast majority of the population and the local nobility remained on the land. Those Sasanian subjects who went over to Islam posed no problem. Considerable numbers of the Sasanian army did accept Islam, joined the 'Arab armies, were warmly welcomed and given the highest pay. A few of the local nobility, *dihqans*, also accepted Islam and were allowed to keep their property. Since the 'Arabs were comparatively few, economic necessity dictated that the conquered population should be free to cultivate the land".¹³⁴ From this it is obvious that the essential point at issue regarding the occupied territories in the Sawad was not concerned with the administration of the land as much as with the cultivation of the land. In order to keep these lands under cultivation the 'Arabs decided to leave the peasants on the land to continue their work, provided that due

¹³²Gibb, H.A.R. Interpretation of Islamic History, in *Journal of World History*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 1953, p. 42 (Studies on the Civilization of Islam, London, 1962, p. 6).

¹³³Dennet, D.C. Jr. *Conversion*, Cambridge, 1950, see particularly, pp. 13–5.

¹³⁴Shaban, *Islamic History*, pp. 46–7.

taxes were paid to the 'Arabs. The revenue of these taxes was divided among the conquering tribesmen.¹³⁵ A fifth of the taxes was not sent to Madina, and any surplus, *fadl*, was to be distributed among the conquerors.¹³⁶ The most important part of the conquered land in the Sawad was the abandoned, the land which belonged to those who were killed during the battles, those who fled, all the land of Khusrau, the Sasanian King, and his family and relatives, and the huge holding of the fire-temple.¹³⁷ The revenue of these lands at the time of 'Umar was 7,000,000 dirhams.¹³⁸

There was some disagreement between the conquerors in dealing with these abandoned lands. Some of them had proposed that the land should be divided, considering it the booty of the war as usual, whilst others disagreed with this proposal. For *ahl al-ayyam*, they would have been strongly opposed to the division of the land because they knew that if the land was divided the greater part of it would go to *ahl al-ridda*, whose numbers were continually increasing. Some of the Muhajirun and Ansar of the 'Arab army in Iraq had returned to Madina.¹³⁹ The Caliph 'Umar, at first, is reported to have agreed with the first opinion, namely to distribute the land among the conquerors and to allow them to settle on it as they wished, provided that one-fifth of its revenue was set aside to be sent to Madina. Significantly, this distribution did not come about for several reasons; firstly, the abandoned land was scattered all over the Sawad. If the land were divided, the 'Arab fighting-men would practically be divided too; the military system would collapse.¹⁴⁰ Secondly, the possibility of unrest among the competitors involved was greater if the land were distributed.¹⁴¹ In addition to this, such a prominent companion as 'Ali b. Abi Talib perceived the advantage of the land not being divided, saying "let them (the abandoned lands) be a permanent source of revenue of the Muslims".¹⁴²

Being undivided, the land soon went into collective ownership, and the owners of this land were called by Sayf *ahl al-fay'*, i.e. those who were involved in the

¹³⁵Tab. 1/2467-8; BF. pp. 269-71; Abu Yusuf, Ya'qub b. Ibrahim, *Kitab al-Kharaj*, Cairo, 1302, A.H. p. 38.

¹³⁶Tab. 1/2418; BF. p. 384 and also, p. 453, for an example of the distribution of surplus; see, Hinds, Kufan Political Alignments and their background in the mid-seventh century A.D. in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 11, 1971, p. 350.

¹³⁷Yahya b. Adam al-Qurashi, *Kitab al-Kharaj*, Cairo, 1929, pp. 60-1; BF. pp. 272-3; Tab. 1/2371, 2468, 2469, 2471; Abu Yusuf, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-3.

¹³⁸Abu Yusuf, *op. cit.*, p. 63; BF. p. 273.

¹³⁹Tab. 1/2180, 2362-3, 2451, 2456, 2596, 2400; BF. p. 256 p. 50; see also above, pp. 12, 23.

¹⁴⁰Tab. 1/2371-2, 2468, 2469, 2471; BF. p. 268.

¹⁴¹Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, vol. 11, p. 522.

¹⁴²Yahya Adam, *op. cit.*, p. 40; BF. p. 266; Abu Yusuf, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

conquest of Iraq, including the *ridda* and non-*ridda* tribesmen.¹⁴³ Syaf has also emphasised that *ahl al-fay'* were ahl al-Mada'in, i.e. those who had participated in the conquest of al-Mada'in, and those who had helped them; some of them were living in towns and some others were in villages, *fahim sukinat al-mada'in wa al-qura*; and some of them were in the frontiers defending the territory, *wa bihim suddat al-furuj wa dawwikh al-'aduww*.¹⁴⁴

From this, two important facts can be noticed. Firstly, the transference of the abandoned land into collective ownership must have occurred after the conquest of al-Mada'in (16/637). Secondly, it is obvious that *ahl al-fay'* were composed of a wide variety of people, which can be divided into three main groups: *ahl al-ridda*, Makkans and Madinans, and *ahl al-ayyam*. This division has already been made by Shaban in his "Islamic History".¹⁴⁵ Other scholars such as Martin Hinds have also studied closely the affairs of the occupied land in the Sawad and the people involved, and some conclusion have been drawn. Unfortunately, many of these conclusion are inadequate. Martin Hinds, for example, has discussed this land on the basis of dividing it into *dhimma*, (protected) and *sawafi*, (fief), land. With regards to the *dhimma* land "it was to be the inalienable property of the Kufans and the revenues from it were to be used to pay their stipends, which constituted payment for the maintenance of the *dhimma*, protected land; no fifth was to be sent to Madina from this revenue, and any surplus was to be divided among those who were entitled, to stipends". In the case of the abandoned land, he says that "provincial Islamic priority did infact count further in connexion with a second category of land, which was not *dhimma* land. This was the land generally called *safiya* pl. *sawafi*, . . . which was for the exclusive use of the original conquerors. The early-comers were to be entitled not only to large stipends out of the *dhimma* revenues, and so to proportionately large shares in any division of the surplus of those revenues, but also to exclusive enjoyment of four-fifths of the revenue of the *sawafi* land". Hinds's view of the occupied lands in the Sawad and the distribution of their revenues was essentially based on the principle of "Islamic priority" upon which the Arab fighting-men acquired their privileges in the Sawad. This is clear when he says that "in most cases *'irafas* were probably composed of people from the same clan, but an *'irafa* was essentially a group of people with identical Islamic priority".¹⁴⁶

Although it is true that the Caliph 'Umar, in Sayf's account, is reported to have said that "the system of stipends must be made on the basis of *al-sabiqa fi al-Islam*, i.e. Islamic priority",¹⁴⁷ this, unfortunately did not offer guidance on the question of the land, particularly the abandoned land, in the Sawad regarding the distribu-

¹⁴³Tab. 1/2371, 2372, 2375, 2468; BF. p. 266; Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹⁴⁴Tab. 1/2414.

¹⁴⁵Shaban, *op. cit.*, pp. 49—50.

¹⁴⁶Hinds, M., *Kufan Political Alignments*, pp. 349—50.

¹⁴⁷Tab. 1/2412.

tion of its revenue and ownership, as Martin Hinds has seen. In discussing the affairs of the occupied land in the Sawad, M. Hinds does not also distinguish between *ahl al-ayyam* and the rest of early arrivals, *Muhajirun* and *Ansar*, and *ahl al-ridda*. Although all of them were original conquerors and early arrivals or what M. Hinds calls "early-comers" in 'Iraq, this does not mean that all of them were on an equal footing and acquired privileges in the occupied land in the Sawad. We will now try to explain the reasons for this according to *Tarikh* of al-Tabari.

For the purpose of collecting and distributing the revenue of the abandoned land, a system of trusteeship had to be established, and the trustees would be chosen from *ahl al-fay'*.¹⁴⁸ The first group of *ahl al-fay'*, that is *ahl al-ridda*, would be excluded, since we accept the fact that the definite policy of the Caliph 'Umar from the very beginning was to exclude them from any responsible positions, either in the military or in the conquered territories. The second group, that is the people of Makka and Madina (the *Muhajirun* and *Ansar*), were not on the land. So, it automatically fell to the third group, that is *ahl al-ayyam*, to take up the responsibility as trustees, or what Sayf calls *umana'* or *umara'*.¹⁴⁹ They established the abandoned land as an inalienable, *mawquf*, for them, and were put in charge of it. This newly acquired gain was very important for them in the future. In expressing this feeling, Shaban is perfectly right when he says: "to call them simply *ahl al-Qadisiyya* would in fact mean equating them with *ahl al-ridda*. Understandably this represented a threat to their hard-gained prestige and ultimately to their newly acquired gains. Determined to keep their distinction and because of their trusteeship responsibilities, they eventually acquired a new nomenclature, the *qurra'*. It is also possible that it was encouraged by the *qurra'* themselves to enhance their ever waning prestige".¹⁵⁰ By calling themselves the *qurra'* this may have served not only to distinguish them from *ahl al-ridda*, but also to identify them with their field of action in the villages of the Sawad, where the abandoned land was to be found.¹⁵¹ To put it differently, whether they were inhabitants of the villages or not, their authority extended over these villages.

For the purpose of housing and social organisation, the 'Arab forces in Kufa were organised in tribal groupings. At first, they were organised in the system of *a'shar* tenths but it was altered to the system of *asba'* sevenths and *'arafa* unit. This change occurred because, according to Sayf, the system of *a'shar* was unsuitable for organisation.¹⁵² Many of the original members of the *a'shar*, i.e. *ahl al-ayyam*, were no longer in Kufa, but were on duties in conquered territories, whilst others were involved in fighting on new fronts. It is also important to note that the system

¹⁴⁸Tab. 1/2469.

¹⁴⁹Tab. 1/2469, 2496.

¹⁵⁰Shaban, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-1.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*,

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁵²Tab. 1/2495.

of *a'shar* was devised for military purposes,¹⁵³ but now the military campaign had decreased and the *a'shar*, which contained a random assortment of clan group, was no longer useful. The newly devised system, the *asba'* was organised along genealogical lines, and continued to be practised until the re-organisation of Ziyad, *arba'* quarters. The system of *asba'* was formed as follows:— (1) Kinana and its allies of Ahabish and others (2) Jadila Banu 'Amr b. Qays 'Aylan (3) Kuda', Bajila, Khatham, Kinda, Hadramawt and Azd (4) Madhhij, Himyar, Hamdan, and their allies (5) Tamim and Hawazin (6) Asad, Ghatafan, Muharib, Namir, Dubaya' and Taghlib (7) 'Iyad, 'Abd al-Qays, *ahl Hajar* and *al-hamra'*.¹⁵⁴

For the purpose of financial administration, the stipends were paid to the *umana' al-asba'* and *ashab al-riya*, who in return made them over to the '*urafa'*, *nuqaba'* and *umana'*, i.e. trustees, who duly paid them to those who were entitled to them.¹⁵⁵ The '*arafa* became a unit for the distribution of 100,000 dirhams in the following ways:— (i) a '*arafa* of *ahl al-ayyam*, received 100,000 dirhams for 20 men (3,000 each) 20 women (300 each) and it is assumed that the children 340 received (100 each). (ii) a '*arafa* of *ahl al-Qadisiyya* the people of Qadisiyya, received 100,000 dirhams for 43 men (2,000 each) 43 women (200 each) and 500 children (100 each). (iii) a '*arafa* of *ahl al-rawadif* new-comers, received 100,000 dirhams for 60 men (1,500 each) 60 women (100 each) and 40 children (100 each).¹⁵⁶

From the figures, it is obvious that *ahl al-ayyam* had received proportionately bigger stipends than any other group. When a *diwan*, the list of the 'Arab warriors entitled to stipends, was established in 20/641,¹⁵⁷ the stipends of *ahl al-ayyam* were still in the top grades and higher than those of *ahl al-qadisiyya* and *ahl al-rawadif*, which the figures below show:—

- (i) *Muhajirun* and *Ansar*, received 3,000 — 5,000 dirhams per annum
- (ii) *ahl al-ayyam*, received 3,000 dirhams p.a.
- (iii) The people of Yarmuk and Qadisiyya, *ridda* and non-*ridda*, received 2,000 dirhams p.a.
- (iv) *rawadif*, i.e. new-comers to Iraq after Yarmuk and Qadisiyya received between 1,500 to 2,000 dirhams p.a. according to the time of their arrival.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 1/2224—5.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 1/2495.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 1/2495—6.

¹⁵⁶ Tab. 1/2495; Hinds, *Kufan Political Alignments*, p. 349.

¹⁵⁷ Only Sayf's account that the *diwan* was established in 15/636, but according to others, such as Baladhuri, BF. p. 450, Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p. 153, it was established in 20/641.

¹⁵⁸ Tab. 1/2412—3; BF. p. 449; Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqat*, vol. 111, pt. i, pp. 213—5; Ya'qubi, *Tarikh*, vol. 11, p. 153; al-Mawardi, Abu al-Hasan 'Ali b. Muhammad, *al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya*, Cairo, 1973, pp. 199—201.

The people of *al-ayyam* were not only to have large shares from the abandoned lands, and the surplus of their revenue, but also to have exclusive enjoyment of the authority over the occupied land in the Sawad. Moreover, it is hard indeed to believe that the *diwan* of 20/641 was put into effect immediately, and it is very clear from Ibn Sa'd, Tabari and Baladhuri's accounts that by the time of 'Umar's death 23/644 the *diwan* was still incomplete.¹⁵⁹ According to Hinds, "it was only at the tail-end of 'Umar's caliphate that the beginning of administrative organization in Iraq appeared; and by then the early-comers had enjoyed what amounted to a free run of the area for five years or more",¹⁶⁰ a period which started from the time of the establishment of the trusteeship of the abandoned land, which took place after the conquest of al-Mada'in in 16/637¹⁶¹ until the death of the Caliph 'Umar in 23/644. In fact, not all original conquerors had enjoyed the authority over the occupied land in the Sawad, particularly that of the abandoned land, as Hinds has seen,¹⁶² but only those of *ahl al-ayyam*, the trustees, to whom the Caliph 'Umar entrusted it. Some of *ahl al-ayyam* also shared the task of receiving the taxes collected by *dahaqin*, local heads and officials, and the transferring of the money to the public treasury.¹⁶³ They probably also supervised the assessment and collection of the poll-tax, *jizya*.¹⁶⁴ Some of their names and the villages to which they were sent are mentioned above.¹⁶⁵

In order to relieve the pressure of ceaseless immigration into Iraq a new garrison town at Basra was established. In order to understand the situation of Basra, it is important to go back to the beginning of the 'Arab Conquest in its territories. According to our sources, during the time of Abu Bakr (12/633) there were some 'Arab forces mainly from the clans of Bakr b. Wa'il, raiding at al-Ubulla. However, there is some disagreement about the name of their leader. According to Abu Mikhnaf, it was Suwayd b. Qutba al-Dhuhali,¹⁶⁶ while al-Mada'ini, says that it was Qutba b. Qatada al-Sadusi.¹⁶⁷ The account of al-Mada'ini is more reliable concerning the affairs of Basra and the eastern provinces than Abu Mikhnaf, whose main interest was Kufa and its affairs. So, one is inclined to accept al-Mada'ini's narrative on this particular point.

According to our sources, Qutba b. Qatada al-Sadusi and his men fought

¹⁵⁹ Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqat*, vol. 111, pt. i, pp. 144, 214; Tab. 1/2752; BF. p. 452; see also, Hinds, *Kufan Political Alignment*, p. 350.

¹⁶⁰ Hinds, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-1.

¹⁶¹ See above, p. 33.

¹⁶² Hinds, *op. cit.*, p. 350 early-comers is mentioned here.

¹⁶³ Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 53.

¹⁶⁵ See above, pp. 24, 25, 28.

¹⁶⁶ BF. pp. 241, 340.

¹⁶⁷ Tab. 1/2381; see also, 1/2016, where Qutba b. Qatada al-Sadusi, is also mentioned.

separately from al-Muthanna b. Haritha al-Shaybani's forces, who at the same time were raiding the same area. This is shown by the fact that when the 'Arab forces led by Khalid b. al-Walid arrives, Qutba and his men made their way to al-Khurayba, the ruins of the old Sasanian post, while al-Muthanna and his troops joined Khalid and succeeded in defeating the Sasanian army at al-Ubulla.¹⁶⁸ This early raid of Qutba is mentioned by Salih al-'Ali who suggested that the number of Qutba's forces was small and they achieved no significant victory in this raid. They fought on their own initiative without receiving any instructions from the Caliph Abu Bakr in Madina.¹⁶⁹ When 'Umar became Caliph he sent Shuraysh b. 'Amir al-Sa'di with a small force to campaign on this front, but he was also unsuccessful and was killed in one of the battles against the Sasanians in the area.¹⁷⁰ Not long after, according to al-Mada'ini and al-Sha'bi, in 14/635,¹⁷¹ another 'Arab force was organised to raid in the Basran territory. This newly organised 'Arab army was led by 'Utba b. Ghazwan al-Muzani al-Ansari who set out from Madina with a force of 300 men and another 200 *a'rab*, nomads, who came to join them on the way.¹⁷² Having reached al-Khurayba, 'Utba, a prominent companion of the Prophet, chose this location to establish his military camp where his army could rest during the winter when they were not campaigning.¹⁷³ It has been pointed out by al-'Ali that few women were brought with 'Utba on this campaign, showing that the 'Arabs did not at that time intend to settle in Basra permanently.¹⁷⁴ It is also worth noting that the 'Arab forces brought by 'Utba had achieved no significant victory in their raid against the Sasanians in the Basran territory.¹⁷⁵ Understandably, the founding of Basra at this time was a temporary measure and its importance was not as great as Kufa as a military base. In reviewing the importance of Kufa, Hinds is right when he says "the difference between Kufa and Basra at this stage was, therefore, that Kufa was established from necessity and Basra from convenience".¹⁷⁶

At the end of 17/638 the 'Arab tribesmen from Eastern Arabia began to pour into Basra. This took place following the 'Arab defeat on the expedition to Fars. This expedition was sent by al-'Ala' b. al-Hadrami with a force from Bahrayn.

¹⁶⁸ al-'Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-4.

¹⁶⁹ Tab. 1/2382; BF. p. 242; al-'Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-5.

¹⁷⁰ Sayf gives the date of 'Utba's raid in 16/637, Tab. 1/2377. Sayf's chronology of this particular event is, however, not attested by Tabari, Tab. 1/2377. All our authorities such as al-Mada'ini, al-Sha'bi and Tabari give the date of 'Utba's campaign in 14/635, Tab. 1/2377.

¹⁷¹ Tab. 1/2377, 2384, 28385 citing al-Sha'bi.

¹⁷² BF. p. 346.

¹⁷³ BF. p. 346.

¹⁷⁴ al-'Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹⁷⁵ Tab. 1/2378; al-'Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁷⁶ Hinds, *The Early History of Islamic Schism in Iraq*, Ph. D. Thesis, London, 1969 (unpublished), p. 82.

According to Baladhuri, this force was led by 'Arfaja b. Harthama al-Bariqi of Azd,¹⁷⁷ while Sayf says it was headed by Khulayd b. al-Mundhir b. Sawi al-Hanzali of Tamim, with two other 'Arab leaders, named al-Jarud b. 'Amr b. Hanash b. Mu'alla and al-Sawwar b. Hammam of 'Abd al-Qays.¹⁷⁸ They raided Fars by sea without receiving the Caliph 'Umar's order, showing their tendency towards acting independently from the Madinan regime. When they arrived at Fars they were strongly resisted by the Sasanian forces and defeated at Tawus; their two leaders, Khulayd and al-Jarud were killed and the rest withdrew to Basra, the safest and nearest place to Fars.¹⁷⁹

Al-'Ali's book, *al-Tanzimat al-Ijtima'iyya wa al-Iqtisadiyya fi al-Basra*, is perhaps one of the best works about the early history of Basra. The author discusses in detail the social and economic system of Basra from the time of 'Umar. He also gives a detailed account of the 'Arab expeditions into Basran territory. From this he concludes that the founding of Basra was made during the time of 'Utba b. Ghazwan in 14/635.¹⁸⁰ Although al-'Ali was aware that the number of 'Utba's army was small and they did not intend to stay in Basra permanently,¹⁸¹ he nevertheless failed to realise that the coming of the 'Arab tribesmen from Bahrayn into the province was the turning point of the history of Basra. Having stayed temporarily they decided to settle permanently in Basra. This decision had to be made in order to accommodate those tribesmen. We may, therefore, agree with Shaban's suggestion that the coming of the tribesmen from Bahrayn, after their failure to establish a safe base in Fars, was another factor in the establishment of the garrison town of Basra.¹⁸² From this we can conclude that the actual founding of Basra was not made until the year 17/638, by which time the garrison town of Kufa was already established.

According to Sayf, when the Caliph 'Umar was informed about the defeat of the al-'Ala's army in Fars, he wrote to 'Utba b. Ghazwan in Basra, asking him to recruit a strong army to fight the Sasanians in Fars. 'Utba was able to gather as many as 12,000 men from the Eastern-Arabian tribesmen, including those who were already with him in Basra. By this time, tribesmen from nearly all the clans of Eastern-Arabia were involved in fighting against the Sasanians in Fars. The prominent leaders who appeared at this time were 'Asim b. 'Amr al-Tamimi, 'Arfaja b. Harthama al-Azdi, Hudayfa b. Muhsin al-Himyari, Majza b. Sur al-Sadusi of Bakr, al-Ahnaf b. Qays al-Tamimi, Sa'sa'a b. Mu'awiya al-Tamimi and Abu Sabra b. Abi Ruhm al-'Amiri of 'Abd al-Qays.¹⁸³ From this it is obvious that they belonged to

¹⁷⁷ BF. p. 386.

¹⁷⁸ Tab. 1/2546.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 1/2547-8; BF. p. 386.

¹⁸⁰ al-'Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁸² Shaban, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-2.

¹⁸³ Tab. 1/2548-9.

different 'Arab clans of Tamim, Bakr, Azd and 'Abd. al-Qays, who in actual fact represented the core of the 'Arab army fighting on this front at that time.¹⁸⁴ After their campaign in Fars most of these tribesmen followed 'Utba to Basra.¹⁸⁵

Towards the end of 'Utba's governorship of Basra (17/638) he and his Basran forces also raided al-Ahwaz and Tustar, but before these areas were subdued 'Utba died and the governorship of Basra was taken up by Abu Musa al-Ash'ari. The latter continued the campaign, particularly in the regions of Ramhurmuz and Tustar with the help of the Kufan army.¹⁸⁶ With the defeat of the enemy at Tustar the 'Arab campaign in Iraq came to a standstill until the year 21/642 in which the important battle of Nihawand took place in which the Kufan forces were predominant.

From this we can draw the conclusion that the campaigns of the 'Arab tribesmen of Basra achieved no significant progress if compared with that of Kufa. The composition of the 'Arab tribesmen of Basra at the time of its founding was mainly from Eastern-Arabian clans of Tamim, Bakr, Azd and 'Abd al-Qays. The majority of them were new-comers to Iraq who had taken no role either in the Ridda War¹⁸⁷ or in the earliest conquest of Iraq. From the names of their leaders listed above, only 'Asim b. 'Amr al-Tamimi, 'Arfaja b. Harthama al-Azdi and Hudhayfa b. Muhsin al-Himyari were clearly involved in the Ridda War and the conquest of Iraq. For 'Arfaja b. Harthama and Hudhayfa b. Muhsin, although both of them are reported to have been among the Islamic-'Arab army's leaders in the Ridda War,¹⁸⁸ their task was confined only to fighting against the weak and small group of apostates in Mahra.¹⁸⁹ The Islamic-'Arab forces regained their position when they received support from tribesmen of Najiya led by al-Khirrit b. Rashid, 'Abd al-Qays led by Sayhan b. Sawhan and other 'Arab tribesmen of Rasib and Sa'd of Tamim.¹⁹⁰ This suggests that the two leaders, 'Arfaja and Hudhayfa, had played no important role in defeating the apostates in the Ridda War. Some of them such as 'Arfaja and his tribesmen did not come to Iraq until the battle of al-Buwayb in 13/634, after the departure of Khalid for Syria.¹⁹¹ So, the number of early arrivals in Basra must have been very small and probably did not exceed 300 men, while the rest were new-emigrants, who did not come to Iraq until the year 17/638. A good number of these new-emigrants came from the 'Arab clans of 'Abd al-Qays of Bahrayn who did not apostate during the time of the Prophet and remained loyal to the Madinan

¹⁸⁴BF, p. 386.

¹⁸⁵Tab. 1/2550; Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, 11/539.

¹⁸⁶Tab. 1/2541 ff.

¹⁸⁷Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

¹⁸⁸Tab. 1/1880-1.

¹⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 1/1976-9.

¹⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 1/1979, 1980.

¹⁹¹See above pp. 13-14.

regime after the death of the Prophet.¹⁹²

For the purpose of distributing the stipends, the people in Basra were at first organised along genealogical lines, but it was unsuccessful, because the arrival of the newcomers into it was not regular, and as a result, the tribal grouping in Basra varied in size from one to another.¹⁹³ As a solution to this problem, the system of *'arafa* was applied in Basra. Only the recognised leaders received 2,500 dirhams, while the rest of the 'Arab tribesmen in Basra received between 250 to 300 dirhams.¹⁹⁴

Meanwhile, new waves of tribesmen continued to pour into Kufa. These newcomers were given low stipends and resented the position of *ahl al-ayyam*. They once complained to Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas, the governor of Kufa, for having divided the wealth unequally among the people.¹⁹⁵ Al-Ash'ath b. Qays al-Kindi and *rijal min ahl al-Kufa* i.e. men from the people of Kufa, are reported to have said "that Sa'd was biased and deprived us of our right".¹⁹⁶ But no trouble arose, partly because the Caliph 'Umar is said to have raised the stipends of the new comers who had shown valour at Nihawand to the level of the stipends of *ahl al-Qadisiyya*, 2,000 dirhams per annum,¹⁹⁷ and partly because the plentiful booty gained on the battlefields during 'Umar's caliphate had helped to ease the situation.¹⁹⁸

However, when the campaign of Nihawand (21/642) was over and Sa'd, the governor of Kufa, was replaced with 'Ammar b. Yasir, the situation changed as the activities on the battle-field decreased, and the new emigrants became more numerous in Kufa. 'Ammar b. Yasir, the governor of Kufa, was accused of being weak and having no political shrewdness.¹⁹⁹ The people of Kufa opposed 'Ammar because he was trying to impose order in Kufa and to exercise more authority over them. He is reported to have been inclined to satisfy the demand of the Basrans of having authority over the province of Masabadhan and refuse to grant control of Ramhurmuz to the Kufans.²⁰⁰ In fact, these two provinces, particularly

¹⁹²Tab. 1/1958-9, 1960, 1961 (with special reference to al-Jarud and his tribesmen of 'Abd al-Qays).

¹⁹³al-'Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

¹⁹⁴Tab. 1/2413, 2496; Ibn Sa'd, *Tabaqat*, vol. 111, pt. i, pp. 112 ff.; al-'Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-9; Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

¹⁹⁵BF, p. 278; Tab. 1/2606-7.

¹⁹⁶al-'Askari, *Awa'il*, p. 225.

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¹⁹⁷Tab. 1/2633.

¹⁹⁸Shaban, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹⁹⁹Tab. 1/2676-7; BF, p. 279.

²⁰⁰Tab. 1/2672.