

## THE JESSUP MISSION TO THE FAR EAST IN 1950: THE CASE OF MALAYA

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In August 1949, when the United States Government terminated all assistance to the Nationalist Government in China, the American Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced a committee chaired by Dr. Philip C. Jessup, a distinguished international lawyer, to study American policy in Asia and make recommendations for the future.<sup>1</sup> Acheson's instructions to Jessup emphasized:

It is a fundamental decision of American policy that the United States does not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asia Area.<sup>2</sup>

The sending of the Jessup Mission in early 1950 was mainly prompted therefore by the "loss" of China to the Communists. President Harry S. Truman strongly supported this first post-war high-level American Mission to the Far East because it was integral to the United States effort to ensure that the region would not follow the fate of China. In part it was the Democratic Party's response to Republican charges of ineptness and neglect in Asia.<sup>3</sup> But the Mission also demonstrated the Truman administration's new approach towards Asia and its concern about preventing the spread of the Communist menace throughout Southeast Asia.<sup>4</sup>

The United States government also wanted to use the Jessup Mission to explain the new Administration's intentions with respect to President Truman's "Point Four" program, specifically that it did not involve large grants of capital. The program offered simple technical assistance backed up by expanded flows of private investment and public lending through established channels.<sup>5</sup> President Truman had first publicly alluded to the Point Four Program in 1949 when in his Inaugural Address he declared "Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvements and growth of underdeveloped areas".<sup>6</sup>

During his three-month fact-finding tour of the Far East, from December 15, 1949 to March 15, 1950, Jessup spent three days in

Malaya, from February 4 to 7, 1950. As the American Ambassador-at-large to the Far East, he quickly learned from talks with Malcolm MacDonald, the Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, about the importance of Malaya to the security of the entire region. As Jessup reported to the State Department, "It seemed to me there was a great deal of concentration upon Malaya as the focal point, all of the analysis of the other countries ending up with its bearing on the possibility of the British holding out in Malaya."<sup>7</sup>

Jessup also learned that the British believed they could hold out in Malaya. MacDonald acknowledged Malaya's "vulnerability" in case Indochina and Siam fell but insisted nonetheless that the British could hold even under those circumstances.<sup>8</sup> MacDonald admitted, however, that Malaya's difficulties would be enormously increased if its cooperation with the Siamese police on the border was terminated and Communist agents were allowed to be smuggled in from Indochina.

While Jessup did not divulge his own thought as to whether he agreed with MacDonald's assessment of British capabilities, William R. Langdon, the Consul General in Singapore (who with William M. Gibson, Special Assistant to Jessup accompanied Jessup in his talks in Malaya), disclosed that his own views were similar to MacDonald's. Langdon wrote to the State Department, "It is my opinion, resting on two years' association with the British Defence Coordinating Committee, that Malaya will not fall or at worse will be retaken if it falls in the beginning."<sup>9</sup>

Local views about British strength, as Jessup discovered, were not that optimistic. During an after-dinner discussion at MacDonald's residence on February 6, 1950, a Mr. Jumabhoy, a prominent Indian Muslim Counsellor of the Singapore Legislative Council, blurted out, "Dr. Jessup, when is the United States going to protect us?"<sup>10</sup> According to Jessup, a Mr. M. Saravamuttu from Singapore also posed "the point-blank question whether the US was going to help SE Asia and what help it was going to give."<sup>11</sup> These questions indicated not only doubts about British capabilities but also a turning to America for help.

Local dissatisfaction with British rule was, however, at first denied by MacDonald, who told Jessup that British policy was "approved by the Malaysians who felt that they were moving along satisfactorily."<sup>12</sup> Jessup took MacDonald to task about this. As he reported to the State Department, "I told him that from my conversation with Dato Onn (the President of the United Malays National Organization) I felt that/he did not take this position and "McD [ sic] agreed and somewhat modified his statements".

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MacDonald then admitted that the British were far behind in educational reform and had not moved fast enough in training local administrators who could take over when the time for British departure came. In this connection, MacDonald spoke "rather generally in alternatives of 5, 10, 15 or 20 years" and pointed to the "special problem created by the mixture of the social communities".

Jessup obtained a first-hand account of Malay discontent from Dato Onn, who argued that had the British imported Indonesians instead of bringing in cheap Chinese and Indian labor they would have created a homogeneous population. "Dato Onn", as Jessup noted, "with some bitterness argued that the whole British policy had been inspired by their desire to exploit the natural resources for their own advantage".<sup>14</sup> These remarks indicated clearly that the Malays blamed the British for originating the racial problems. When Onn criticized the British, some of the Chinese who were present supported the British against the position of Onn. There were heated exchanges between Onn and these Chinese. At one point, when one of the Chinese defended British actions, Onn exclaimed, "That is utter rot".<sup>15</sup>

Jessup queried whether all present at the discussions agreed with his answer to the press that British action in Malaya was not an example of imperialism. Onn said that he did not consider that the situation in Malaya was satisfactory. Jessup noticed that MacDonald seemed "a little apprehensive" over this topic and that "the faces of the governor and the British military chiefs were interesting". This was so though Jessup had first checked with MacDonald whether it would be embarrassing if the question about imperialism was raised, and although MacDonald had told him and the group that the discussions with Jessup were to be utterly frank" and that "no one should mind having his toes stepped on".<sup>16</sup> The British were already uneasy about criticism of their administration. Some British officials took offense at any hint that Great Britain might not be able to defend Malaya by itself. After Mr. Jumabhoy asked his question about when America was going to protect Malaya, General Sir John Harding, Commander in Chief of the United Kingdom Far Eastern Land Forces, "flushed red and called aloud across the table to this air colleague, "Did you hear that, Hugh [Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyed]? You and I might as well pack up and go home with our chaps tomorrow".<sup>17</sup>

Despite these Anglo-American tensions, however, there was a good amount of cooperation. Jessup did not join in the attacks on the British. Instead, as he himself explained, "I attempted to soften the attacks on the British as they apparently did not wish

to join in the argument but attempted to avoid getting into the position of defending their cause against the Malayan viewpoint".<sup>18</sup> Jessup knew the importance of presenting a united Western front when dealing with the native peoples. So did MacDonald, who stressed several times to Jessup the "absolute necessity... of showing strength".<sup>19</sup> Both realized that strength could best be garnered through cooperation. This question of Anglo-American cooperation, which was vital in the common fight against Communism, was one of the main issues that Jessup and MacDonald discussed. Jessup learned that both sides were equally keen about collaboration.

MacDonald suggested to Jessup the necessity of the United States and the United Kingdom laying down a line in Southeast Asia that both sides would be prepared to hold. MacDonald proposed the line along the southern Chinese frontier, but he was not very specific as to how far they would be prepared to hold that line and admitted the danger of making a broad declaration if both sides were not prepared to back it up.<sup>20</sup> Jessup then asked MacDonald if he agreed that much more extensive and efficient cooperation should be established between their two governments and with the French. Jessup pointed out that while there had been various examples of Anglo-American cooperation (for example, Consul General Langdon in Singapore regularly attended the meetings of the British Defense Coordinating Committee, Far East, and reported to Washington on the proceedings), on the whole both governments had not considered the situation serious enough to warrant the kind of close coordination which existed in wartime.<sup>21</sup>

In reply, MacDonald "enthusiastically agreed" to further US-UK cooperation and suggested that a beginning be made with a joint conference to exchange information and discuss planning. He proposed that it need not be at any very high level.<sup>22</sup> When Langdon pointed out that with such a conference "there was a great danger that the Asian states would feel that the Western powers were ganging up on them", MacDonald admitted that this was a danger but that it would have to be met. He suggested that it would be best to limit the meeting to Britain and America. He said the inclusion of France and the Netherlands would have had repercussions, although he did not explain why. Very likely his reason was connected to the harsher nature of colonial rule in Indochina and in Indonesia before it gained its independence in 1949, and to the correspondingly stronger anti-French and anti-Dutch feelings in both these countries. British rule in Malaya was relatively mild in comparison. Langdon then asked if it would not be better to have a meeting to which the Asian states would also be invited.

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MacDonald did not commit himself to the desirability of a meeting with the Asian states, but he did state that he thought that "carefully planned advance statements as to the nature and extent of the conference would not arouse Asian susceptibilities".<sup>23</sup>

Another aspect of Anglo-American cooperation concerned propaganda. MacDonald agreed with Jessup that propaganda had to be discussed along with economic, political, and military methods to contain Communism. MacDonald thought that the present US line about Soviet encroachments in Manchuria was particularly useful.<sup>24</sup>

MacDonald briefed Jessup on the condition of Malaya's economy. Jessup learned that unless the price of rubber was sustained at a reasonable figure in free competition with synthetic rubber it would have a devastating effect on the Malayan economy. Jessup learned too that grave danger would arise if the Communists controlled the rice-producing areas and tried to exert economic pressure by controlling rice exports. MacDonald divulged that the British had been studying the possibility of drawing on American rice. He claimed that the rubber and rice issues had been referred to London for eventual discussions with Washington. He had not raised these issues with the Andrew-West Mission when it visited Malaya because he had met the Mission at too large and social a gathering.<sup>25</sup> Led by Robert W. West, Deputy to the Under Secretary of the Army, and Stanley Andrews, Director of the Office of Foreign Agriculture Relations, Department of Agriculture, this American Mission visited the Far East in February and March 1950 to investigate the possibility of Japanese participation in the economic development of Southeast Asia. It was part of America's overall plan to use US economic aid as a containment weapon as well as to deal with Japan's economic crisis by opening up Malaya and the other Southeast Asian countries as suppliers of raw materials and as markets for Japan.<sup>26</sup>

Jessup also learned of the very strong measures that the British were taking to restrict Communist activities in Malaya. MacDonald referred specifically to the sale of Chinese victory bonds; the British announced that purchase of the bonds was illegal and violators would be prosecuted. This prohibition was of immense relief to the local Chinese who used it as an excuse for not buying any bonds. MacDonald admitted, however, that the British could probably do nothing to stop local sales if the proceeds were kept in Singapore to finance CCP activities in Malaya.<sup>27</sup>

This led to a discussion of the effects of the United Kingdom's recognition of the People's Republic of China on January 6, 1950. MacDonald frankly acknowledged that the British had underesti-

mated the difficulties in Southeast Asia of the effects of the recognition. They were looking forward with a great deal of apprehension to the establishment of Communist Consular offices in Malaya and elsewhere. MacDonald stated that they expected to stall off these arrangements for some time or postpone them indefinitely. He claimed, rather optimistically, that the Chinese in Malaya could be persuaded to side with the Western powers against the Communists because of their long association with Malaya. MacDonald believed that the Chinese would more easily cooperate if they were sure that the Southeast Asian countries could be held and would not fall into the hands of the Communists. MacDonald blamed the insufficient cooperation of the Chinese in Malaya with the western cause on their fear that Great Britain and America would not stand firm about Malaya. Again MacDonald emphasized the importance of the showing of strength on the part of the Western powers.<sup>28</sup>

Jessup also learned that MacDonald was very keen about the appointment of a top US official for the area. MacDonald proposed to Jessup that it "might be very useful if the US would appoint some single official such as a High Commissioner to deal with the area as a whole". He claimed that this appointment and the proposed UK-US Conference served as "means of giving assurance to the Asian states that the UK and US were prepared to back them up".<sup>29</sup> MacDonald wanted the appointment of a US official of equal rank with whom he could deal with effectively. He was not satisfied with the then American setup because, as he pointed out to Jessup, "Consul-General Langdon in Singapore is geared into the work of his office and is a good official but is unable to speak for the United States with respect to the whole area."<sup>30</sup>

MacDonald's proposal was reminiscent of an earlier suggestion put forward by a "leading American Missionary in this area", Bishop Edwin F. Lee, Head of the Methodist Church in Malaya and the Philippines, about a United States representative for the entire region.<sup>31</sup> Lee had raised the issue with the State Department in 1946 and in 1948 but on both occasions his suggestion had been turned down.<sup>32</sup> Lee said that "as an American" he felt he "should actively work for an improvement in America's representation in the Far East, especially in SEA so as to stop the progressive dwindling of American prestige in that region and to halt the growth of British prestige at the expense of that of the US".<sup>33</sup> Resembling the US Consuls in Singapore in the 1850's to 1880's, Lee saw Malaya clearly in an Anglo-American context and wanted to increase American influence in the area vis-a-vis the British.<sup>34</sup> Like them, he also seemed to make the same impression on the

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State Department. The Chief of the Southeast Asian Affairs Divisions, Charles S. Reed, told Lee of "the technical difficulties and apparent present inutility of appointing such an Ambassador."<sup>35</sup>

Therefore, Jessup's appointment as Ambassador-at-large to the Far East did personify the materialization of Bishop Lee's proposal. Lee's plan was revived and implemented in 1949 because of the increased fears about the encroachment of Communism. With the fall of China the times had changed. The United States probably felt that it had not time to waste if it wanted to save other countries from falling into the Communist camp. Jessup's appointment, however, was on a short-term basis. What Lee had in mind, and what Jessup and MacDonald discussed, was a more permanent arrangement.<sup>36</sup>

Jessup agreed with MacDonald about the necessity of having such a permanent official and brought up the subject when he chaired the Conference of United States Chiefs of Mission in the Far East which was held in Bangkok from February 13-15, 1950. But the Conference "unanimously" opposed such an appointment. It suggested that instead of an Ambassador a regional office of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development be set up, preferably at Manila.<sup>36</sup>

Discussions at the Bangkok Conference revolved around the containment of Communism. Some of the topics included the Communist problem in the Far East, the general economic problems of the area with relation to United States political objectives, the Japanese situation, regional associations, and the need for consultation and coordination with the British on the importance of choosing proper personnel for Point Four Aid.<sup>37</sup> Malaya naturally was a focal point in these talks.

In his summary report at Bangkok, Jessup stressed America's containment policy: the "US must support friendly Asian governments and cannot afford to withhold such moral, economic military aid in our power to give and which likely stiffen non-Communist governments, despite knowledge that some aid will be wasted". He frankly admitted that "we have dispassionate as well as selfish interest in maintenance independence SEA countries".<sup>38</sup>

Jessup acknowledged, however, that while he was convinced that Southeast Asia was "vitaly important" to the US, he was "equally convinced" of the "necessity" of the US's "special emphasis on Europe".<sup>39</sup> Like other American foreign policy makers who dealt with Southeast Asia, Jessup was very aware of the "Europe first" strategy followed by the United States.

In his final private report of the Mission, Jessup declared that he and the officials at the Bangkok Conference were in agreement

with the State Department's report to the National Security Council which held that all measures should be taken to prevent Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. He claimed that "Indochina is the key to the situation" and that Southeast Asia is in balance". He also said "Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia are to be considered less critical spots but are not to be neglected". He found "actual war existing in many areas"; in Korea, Indochina, Malaya, and Burma, there was a hot war".<sup>40</sup>

In characterizing the problems confronting the US in the Far East, Jessup first spoke of the difficulties that the US had to overcome. Under the heading "The Weaknesses of Our Friends", he enumerated these as the non-democratic character of their governments, the lack of trained personnel, corruption and inefficiency, economic and financial difficulties, military weaknesses in meeting Communist guerrillas, Asian psychological attitudes, local Communist strength, distrust of the West and lack of coordination among the western powers. All these applied to Malaya. Possibly because of what he had learned from Datuk Onn, Jessup specifically mentioned that "Anti-western sentiment is not important in Malaya although the Malays bear a grudge against the British"

Jessup then discussed the strength of the Asians, which included their democratic progress, economic potential, military strength, anti-Communist feeling and pro-American sentiment. With particular reference to Malaya he noted that the British had put on "a good demonstration of democratic programs". The British forces were "assets" in the area, but anti-Communist feeling was "considerable in Malaya" where it was "combined with anti-Chinese sentiment". Since the Malays feared China, however, there was pro-American sentiment in Malaya.<sup>41</sup> Jessup recounted in a public report that "in every single country" that he visited "people asked me with almost pathetic earnestness: 'Can we count on help from the United States?'" This was certainly true of Malaya. All these positive responses to the Jessup Mission convinced him that despite "some suspicion of our motives", on the whole there was "a vast respect for the United States and a vast amount of confidence in the United States".<sup>42</sup>

Jessup concluded his private report by noting that the situation in the East was "bad but not desperate", and that "the area cannot be written off. We are committed".<sup>43</sup> He later followed this up by claiming in his public report that "the policy of the United States toward these countries of Asia is a positive and a concrete policy. It has form and substance."<sup>44</sup> He stressed the significance of Point Four Aid as a vital part of that policy.<sup>45</sup>

Jessup's comments were well received by the State Depart-



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ment, particularly his recommendations about Point Four Aid which found expression in the Griffin Mission, led by R. Allen Griffin, a former Deputy Director of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) China program.<sup>46</sup> The State Department sent the Griffin Mission to Asia in late February 1950 to study the technical assistance needs of the area and the ways in which the United States could help the region.<sup>47</sup> The Griffin Mission was later followed by the Melby Mission in June 1950 which studied the military needs of the area.<sup>48</sup> The Jessup Mission, by functioning as a fact-finding tour, laid the groundwork for the Griffin and Melby Missions which also visited Malaya.

In sum, the Jessup Mission to Malaya and other Far Eastern countries manifested greater United States interest in Asia and also America's growing awareness of the region's increasing importance. Jessup's open support for the appointment of a permanent American representative to the area mirrored his own perceptions of Asia's significance to the United States. The Jessup Mission also represented America's first step in implementing its new regional policy towards Asia. This new policy, which arose as a concomitant of the fall of China, was directed at protecting the whole region from the Communist threat. America was fearful of the territorial designs of Russia and China and believed that both powers were working hand-in-hand to spread Communism. United States policy makers, not surprisingly, began to define Asia's importance not so much in economic terms as in geo-political terms. In the case of Malaya, the Jessup Mission began to base Malaya's significance more on its role in containing Communism in the area than on its production of raw material such as rubber and tin. Thus, the Jessup Mission clearly mirrored a shift in the traditional American view of Malaya's importance to the United States. However, the Jessup Mission continued to view the country in an Anglo-American perspective because it was still a British colony. There was both Anglo-American cooperation and rivalry over Malaya as evidenced in the discussions that Jessup held with MacDonald and other top British officials. The Mission also continued to view Malaya in a regional context, as part of a larger region that was important for economic, strategic, and political reasons. Therefore, a case study of the Jessup Mission to Malaya in early 1950 has to be seen against the backdrop of the United States regional and Anglo-American perspectives of Malaya and, more important, of America's preoccupation with containing the area from Communism.

## Notes

1. Evelyn Colbert, *Southeast Asia in International Politics, 1941-1956* (New York, 1977), p. 138. Before his appointment as Ambassador-at-large to Asia, Jessup had served in various important capacities, including Associate Director of the Naval School of Military Government and Administration, Columbia University; United States member of a United Nations committee on the codification and development of international law; and Deputy United States representative to the third and fourth regular sessions of the General Assembly. For a brief history of Jessup's background, see "Ambassador Jessup Answers Senator McCarthy's Charges of Unusual Affinity for Communist Causes", *Department of State Bulletin*, XXII (April 3, 1950), 516-520.
2. Colbert, *Southeast Asia in International Politics, 1941-1956*, p. 138.
3. For further background information on the Jessup Mission, see Samuel P. Hayes, *The Beginning of American Aid to Southeast Asia: The Griffin Mission of 1950*, (Lexington, 1971), pp. 1-6.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. The Jessup Mission was in line with the Secretary of State Dean Acheson's policy statements on Southeast Asia. In early 1950, Acheson had said, "We are organizing the machinery through which we can make effective help possible". He stated that the United States was prepared to help with techniques of administration, agriculture, and industry. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
6. "Point 4 Program for World Economic Progress Through Cooperative Technical Assistance", *Department of State Bulletin*, XX (February 6, 1949), 155.
7. See Memorandum of Conversation by the Ambassador-at-large, Philip C. Jessup, Kuala Lumpur, February 6, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*) 1950, 6:11.
8. *Ibid.*, 13.
9. The Consul General at Singapore, William R. Langdon, to the Secretary of State, January 2, 1951. *FRUS*, 1950, 6:188. Langdon noted that the Air Vice-Marshal, who commanded the Royal Air Force (RAF) in Malaya and who was in charge of the country's air defenses, had told him that his command had "absolute control" of the air approaches to Malaya by any likely enemy. The Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Station (Royal Navy) made the same claim in respects to the sea approaches. To Langdon, "while both Commanders may be bragging, it is a fact that Communist China has no big range air force, no surface navy and no sea-going transports". He believed that "assuming that the worst happens", that the "Red Chinese Army" established Communist national governments successively in Indochina, Burma and Siam and stood "after a long walk overland at the borders of Malaya, at the thin neck of the Malay Peninsular", it was "scarcely likely that strong British defenses will not have been prepared to meet the aggressive mass". Langdon added that at the closed regular periodic meetings of the British Defense Coordinating Committee Far East which he had attended for two years, he had not at any time "detected any fear on the part of Mr. MacDonald, its

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- Chairman, or the UK Armed Forces Commanders-in Chief in the Far East, of losing Malaya to anybody". See *Ibid.*, p. 187.
10. *Ibid.* Langdon himself admitted that Jumabhoy's question was "an illustration of... the poor opinion of British military power on the part of the local public".
  11. Memorandum of Conversation by Philip C. Jessup, February 6, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:17. Twenty-six people attended the dinner which MacDonald hosted for Jessup at his residence in Bukit Serene, Johore Bahru, on February 6, 1950. Those present included high British officials, the Regent of Johore, Dato Onn, a few Chinese and Indians and the Commissioners of Australia, India, and Ceylon.
  12. *Ibid.*
  13. *Ibid.*, 15-16.
  14. *Ibid.*, 16.
  15. *Ibid.*, 17.
  16. *Ibid.*, 16.
  17. Langdon to the Secretary of State, January 2, 1951, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:187.
  18. Memorandum of Conversation by Jessup, February 6, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:17.
  19. *Ibid.*, 14-15.
  20. *Ibid.*, 13.
  21. *Ibid.*
  22. *Ibid.*, 14.
  23. *Ibid.*
  24. *Ibid.*, 13.
  25. *Ibid.*, 14.
  26. For an account of the Andrew-West Mission, see Michael Schaller, "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia", *Journal of American History*, 69 (September 1982), 411.
  27. Memorandum of Conversation by Jessup, February 6, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:15.
  28. *Ibid.*
  29. *Ibid.*, 14.
  30. See "Oral Report by Ambassador-at-Large, Philip C. Jessup, Upon his Return from the East" in Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Policy Information Officer, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:73.
  31. See the despatch by Paul R. Joselyn, American Consul-General in Singapore, to the Secretary of State, August 6, 1949, National Archives Washington D.C. (hereafter NA), Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, 856, 0018-546.
  32. *Ibid.* See "Excerpts of a Personal Letter from Bishop Edwin F. Lee to Mrs. Patricia G. Barnett", April 26, 1948, enclosed in Memorandum by Charles C. Stelle, Chief, Division of Research for Far East, to Kenneth P. Landon, Acting-Chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, April 28,

1948. NA, RG59, 890.00/4-2848. See also Bishop Lee's letter to Mrs. Barnett, April 26, 1948, enclosed in the memorandum by Charles C. Stelle to Kenneth P. Landon, April 28, 1948, NA, RG59, 890.00/4-2848, and Mrs. Patricia G. Barnett's letter to Bishop Edwin F. Lee, April 28, 1948, NA, RG59, 890.00/4-2848.
33. Memorandum of Conversation by Charles S. Reed, May 14, 1948, NA, RG59, 890.00/5-1448. Reed informed Lee that in 1946 his proposal about an Ambassador had not been acted upon because that year the then Chief of the Southeast Asia Division, Abbot Low Moffat, was about to proceed to Southeast Asia to perform some of the functions that Lee had suggested for an Ambassador. The State Department had felt that there was no need to consider sending an Ambassador in addition to Moffat. See the letter by Reed to Bishop Lee, May 4, 1948, NA, RG59, 890.00/5-448.
  34. For information about the United States Consuls in Singapore, see *Despatches from United States Consuls in Singapore 1833-1906 (Microfilm)*, National Archives, Washington D.C., 1959. See also Pamela Sodhy, "United States Consuls in Singapore, 1859 to 1880", *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 56:1 (1983), 12-23.
  35. Reed wondered why Lee was so interested and suspected an ulterior motive. "Inter alia", Reed wrote, "the impression was gained that Bishop Lee thought he would be a very good Ambassador", Memorandum of Conversation by Charles S. Reed, May 14, 1948, NA, RG59, 890.00/5-1448.
  36. *Ibid.* Jessup reported to the State Department that "The Conference believed that the local governments would rely heavily upon such an office which through its ability to offer unpalatable advice would be very useful in the area". W. Walton Butterworth, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, represented the Department of State at the Conference.
  37. The Ambassador in Thailand, Edwin F. Stanton, to the Secretary of State, February 17, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:18-19; and Stanton to the Secretary of State, February 27, 1950, *ibid.*, 28.
  38. See "Summary Report Jessup's remarks in his final summation conference discussions Communist problem Asia", in telegram by the Ambassador in Thailand, Stanton, to the Secretary of State, February 27, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:29.
  39. *Ibid.*
  40. "Oral Report by Ambassador-at-Large, Philip C. Jessup, upon his return from the East", April 3, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:69-76. See also Memorandum on "Permanent Ambassador to the Far East", NA, RG59, FW890.00/8-2949 CS/W.
  41. Oral Report by Jessup, April 3, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:69-76.
  42. Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, "Report to the American People on the Far East", April 13, 1950, *Department of State Bulletin*, XXII (April 24, 1950), 630.
  43. "Oral Report by Ambassador-at-Large, Philip C. Jessup, upon his return from the East", April 3, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:76.

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44. Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, "Report to the American People on the Far East", April 13, 1950, *Department of State Bulletin*, XXII (April 24, 1950), 630.
45. *Ibid.*, 629. Jessup said, "I went out to Asia strongly convinced of the value of technical aid as an arm of American foreign policy. I came back a hundred times more strongly convinced".
46. For the best account of the Griffin Mission, see Samuel P. Hayes, *The Beginning of American Aid to Southeast Asia: The Griffin Mission of 1950*. For the section on Malaya, see pp. 127-149.
47. Memorandum by Interdepartmental Meeting on the Far East, May 11, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, 6:38.
48. For a brief account of the Melby Mission, see Colbert, *Southeast Asia in International Politics*, p. 163.