

Indonesian Muslims and Christians Positions During a Terror Attack: Analysis on Facebook Posts #prayforsurabaya

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ABSTRACT

Indonesians and the world were shocked by a series of terror attacks in Surabaya, East Java, 13-14 May 2018. As predicted, Indonesians went online to share their mourning and condemnation of the attacks. Facebook posts with the hashtag #prayforsurabaya are places for online users to express their thoughts. This research employed content analysis and Leximancer's thematic analysis to investigate three research questions: the dominant themes among the Facebook users' responses as shown in #prayforsurabaya, how Facebook users position the terror attacks and religious identity within the Indonesian and global socio-political dynamics and presumptions Facebook users have regarding inter-groups and citizen-government relations. This study shows that Facebook users mostly went to two different discursive activism through which both Indonesian Christians and Muslims perceived themselves as the victim of the terror attack. Christians regarded themselves as the direct target of the attack, while Muslims perceived themselves as the victim of slander and discursive hijacking. #Prayforsurabaya also hosts counter-frames, mainly to challenge the identification of Islamic teaching as the breeder of terrorism and defy the burqa as one denominator of terrorism. Most Facebook users also engaged in corrective action against the circulation of pictures and videos of terror victims and against the idea that terror attack was merely the government's effort to divert people's attention from criticizing their allegedly poor performance.

Keywords: *Indonesian Muslims, Indonesian Christians, hashtag, terror attack, discursive activism.*

INTRODUCTION

On 13 May 2019, three churches in Surabaya were attacked by suicide bombers of one Muslim family (Kresna & Sholih, 2018; Irawan, 2018). These attacks were followed by an explosion accident at an apartment in Wonocolo, the outskirts of Surabaya, a few hours later, in which two family members of the would-be bomber were killed due to mishandling of the bomb. The would-be bomber was shot dead by police at the scene because he was alive and holding the bomb switcher (*ibid.*). The next day, 14 May 2019, another bomb attack occurred at Surabaya Police Headquarter (*ibid.*). The public in Surabaya and Indonesia flocked to social media platforms to respond to the terror attacks, especially Facebook, the largest social media platform in Indonesia (Statista, 2017). As predicted, Indonesians went online to share their mourning and condemnations of the attacks under the hashtag #prayforsurabaya.

Indonesia has been largely praised as a Muslim-majority country with sectarian conflicts far less significant compared to those in the Middle East (Varagur 2015; Weiss 2010). However, the conflict is still there and for some, has been growing (Arifianto, 2020; Pearson, 2014; Kine, 2014; Rogers, 2012). The relationship between the Muslim majority and the Christian minority is usually at the forefront of this discussion. Ambon sectarian bloody conflict in 1999-2002 and the internationally scrutinized 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election pitted Indonesian Muslims and Christians as adversaries. Given the fact that Surabaya terror attacks were carried out by a Muslim family aimed at churches, the two communities were pitted against each other once again.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This paper aims to investigate the focus of people's responses when they posted Facebook statuses with #prayforsurabaya. Content analysis and Leximancer's thematic analysis were employed to investigate the dominant themes among the Facebook users' responses, as shown in #prayforsurabaya; how Facebook users position the terror attacks within Indonesian and global socio-political dynamics; and Facebook users' presumptions regarding the inter-groups and citizen-government relations.

This research chose to examine responses that were put together in a hashtag due to the hashtag's power to attract and converge people's responses which can then be capitalized to initiate a movement, create a discursive shift, and ultimately challenge the pre-existing power constellation among actors. Hashtag is an agreed way to "find others interested in a topic in which you are interested" (Boynton & Richardson, 2016, p.1924).

In this way, hashtags facilitate conversation among unconnected individuals, resulting in an important form of digital political communication and behaviour (Bode et al., 2015, p.151).

Similarly, Bonilla and Rosa (2015, p.5) describe a hashtag's function as an "indexing system" clerically and semiotically. Therefore, when online users use a specific hashtag in their posts or comments, they actually "performatively frame what these comments are "really about" (*ibid.*, p.5). The way Facebook users frame the Surabaya terror attacks is the core investigation of this paper.

Bonilla and Rosa (2015) argued that "hashtags have the intertextual potential to link a broad range of tweets on a given topic or disparate topics as part of an intertextual chain, regardless of whether from a given perspective, these tweets have anything to do with one another" (p.5). Furthermore, "hashtags also have the interdiscursive capacity to lasso accompanying texts and their indexical meanings as part of a frame" (*ibid.*, p.6).

Investigating the use of the hashtag #Ferguson, Bonilla and Rosa (2015) found that groups who are misrepresented mainly in the media, given negative labels and discriminated against by the government or its apparatus are the ones "turning to digital activism at the highest rate" (p.8). This paper aims to reveal the dominant discourses offered through #prayforsurabaya. In particular, the paper will determine if the narrative portrayed is mostly related to the plight of Indonesia's Christian community directly targeted by the terror attack or, instead, Indonesia's Muslim community and Islamic teachings which were associated with Muslim-held terror attacks.

Social media, including Facebook, has been hailed as new avenues for political conversation, political deliberation, and political mobilisation (Saud, *et. al.*, 2020; Stier, *et. al.*, 2018; Papacharissi, 2002), which can empower audiences, one of which is by creating active audience participation (Kreiss, Meadows & Remensperger, 2014). The social media audience is not a passive consumer of media anymore as they can fluidly ally with either side of competing actors vying for support. Investigating the discursive activism of #WhyIStayed, Clark (2016, p.792) stated that social media users could cast their support on either the movement actors or the targets of the movement, shaking the constellation of influence between the two.

Through social media platforms, audiences have almost equal opportunities to speak out and offer their frames for something. The audience can even produce their definitional claim about issues of their interest, as serious as reasons for staying with an abusive partner to the gossipy assessment of Meghan Markle (ABC News, 2019). While the area of making definitions or interpreting phenomena were traditionally given to those with academic, cultural, professional, or political authorities, social media throws this area to anyone willing to make claims, regardless of the level of authority they have in their hands. Active audience participation in the #WhyIStayed movement, for example, successfully produced a counter-frame about the victims of domestic violence (Clark, 2016, p.798).

The collapse of elite-dominated discourses in social media allows the public to create frames and definitions according to their claims. Their voices participated in enlivening deliberation activities in the broader public spaces. This development has the potential to create discursive shifts. The significant increase of “calls to domestic violence hotlines and state-funded programs during September 2014 first and most active month of #WhyIStayed (Covert, 2015; Doyel, 2014; Valley, 2015, as cited in Clark, 2016, p.800) is evidence of the discursive shift. A shift in discourses possesses a tangible impact in the offline world. Following the massive movement of #WhyIStayed, Clark noted three notable developments: “The NFL’s alteration of its public image, news media’s adoption of a framework that supports survivors, and individual victims’ newfound voices”, which all show “the dialectical relationship between online feminist activism and offline social life” (Clark, 2016, p.800).

The occurrence of discursive shift is significant to study, at least for two reasons. First, it describes which party is more powerful (or becoming one) in a particular context, place, and time. This illustrates the power constellation among actors. Second, the discursive shift also reflects the shift in the pendulum of people's thinking and attitudes in general. An assessment of whether a society is moving to the Right (becoming more ultra-nationalist or less friendly to immigrants and minority groups), for instance, can be predicted from this discursive shift.

This research aims to find out what people were talking about when they discussed the terror attacks in Surabaya on 13 and 14 May 2018 through Facebook posts with the hashtag #prayforsurabaya. What logical narrative did the audience present to develop their definitional claim? What does #prayforsurabaya tell us about inter-group relations in Indonesia?

The logical narrative, an “ability to produce and connect individual stories” (Clark, 2016, p.789) owned by a hashtag, boosts its political significance. However, Clark cautioned that “the escalation [of hashtag movement] into online collective protest depends on the nature of interaction among multiple actors and their sociopolitical contexts” (*ibid.*, square bracket is mine). It is important and exciting to reveal what socio-political contexts were used when people talked about the terror attack through #prayforsurabaya. Did it shed light on broader characteristics of how Indonesian social media users discuss such identity-prone events? The Surabaya bombing attack is very suitable to serve this aim due to the nature of the event as the perpetrators were Muslims and the victims were primarily Christians worshipping in churches. Will the hashtag show the existence of a resistant act that McFarland (2004, p.1251) defines as “a type of nonconformist behaviour that questions the legitimacy of the current social order”? The act challenges the existing normative cognitive framework of interaction or even provides an alternative (*ibid.*). It is crucial to identify what

social order is perceived as “the” actual (or dominant) social order and by whom. How did the group perceiving themselves as a minority try to supplant this social order?

McFarland (2004) elaborates the act of resistance into six steps: ceremonial deconstruction (breach of social order, norms, discourse), social drama, a crisis among actors, frame alignment, alignment, and reintegration. This process entails what Lu (2019, p.875) described as corrective actions, that is sets of actions (online, offline, or the combination of both) “to counter-balance the perceived negative influence of undesirable messages, which include the dissonant information encountered on Facebook” (Lim, 2017, as cited in Lu, 2019, p.875). Claiming media as the source of messages circulating among people, Rojas (2010, p.347) defined corrective actions as “political behaviours that are reactive, based on perceptions of media and media effects, and seek to influence the public sphere”. Lim and Golan (2011, as cited in Lu, 2019, p.877) noted that “the prevalence of emerging technologies” enables people “to take corrective actions by creating and circulating their own opinions online”. Therefore, here I argue that the dissonant information to which people react and offer a counter-balance interpretation is not always initiated by the media but rather offered by fellow online users. Therefore, this paper seeks to identify whether online users interpret the Surabaya bombing attack differently and whether these unparallel interpretations lead to corrective actions.

METHODOLOGY

Exclusion and Inclusion

Among the abundance of Facebook posts about the Surabaya terror attacks, this study only extracted and analyzed posts with the #prayforsurabaya hashtag. In addition to facilitating data search, the hashtag also reflects the specificity of the issue being discussed and the attitude toward the said issue. The disadvantage is many responses to the same topic without the said hashtag cannot be netted.

The extracted statuses were then treated in two ways: a content analysis where the researcher became the coder and automated textual analysis using Leximancer to get the thematic and conceptual maps. The two forms of analysis also function as triangulation of methods which will show whether automated textual analysis with Leximancer and manual content analysis produce similar findings. However, the purpose of triangulation in this paper is not to cross-validate the results of both methods. Instead, it aims to apprehend different dimensions of the data under study.

Data Mining

This paper examined 500 posts on Facebook which have #prayforsurabaya (including #pray4surabaya) hashtags within them. These statuses were obtained randomly by typing "prayforsurabaya" and "pray4surabaya" in the Facebook search bar. The extracted statuses came from the "anyone", "your friends", and "public" categories with two specific privacy settings, namely "public" and "friends". The public privacy setting makes the posts readable to anyone and has the potential to appear through search via the search bar. Meanwhile, the privacy setting "friends" allows the posts to be read by friends and friends of friends of the account owner. These two privacy settings are public, albeit at a different level and scope. Any Facebook user who chooses one of these two privacy settings should be aware that the public can read their statuses. Thus, this paper only took and analyzed posts in the public domain and can be read by the public.

Data mining was done several times because Facebook's internal mechanism only brought up a limited number of posts in each searching cycle. To get 500 different statuses, the researcher must search numerous times.

Content from other people's posts shared within a Facebook status is considered one text and hence included in this study.

Data Processing

The extracted posts were classified into columns: name of posters; type of posters; date of posts; geo-location, contents of posts; privacy setting; and illustrations/links. The 'name of posters' column is only used to ensure that the extracted 500 statuses are non-identical. Within the analysis, posters were only identified through numbers in the excel table and not their actual Facebook names. The posts' contents and inserted illustrations/links were then processed in two ways: content analysis and textual analysis using Leximancer to reveal the most prominent themes.

The coding manual for content analysis can be found at <https://mediaandpoliticstalks.blogspot.com/2019/01/prayforsurabayacoding-manual-for.html>. While to code the illustrations/links is not a big deal in content analysis, it requires additional effort for the Leximancer-based textual analysis. Leximancer cannot process pictures and videos, hence the researcher describes the content of the illustrations/links -- including re-typing the content within pictures-- to enable Leximancer to process them. This is another limitation of this research as the researcher only described the content of inserted videos rather than fully transcribed and described all of the videos.

Leximancer extracts concepts, "a group of related words that travel together in the text" (Angus, 2014). Leximancer has the ability to infer and show a concept that was not presented in the list of the words (seed words).

FINDING AND ANALYSIS

The finding and analysis of this research will be presented in two sequences, that is the content analysis followed by thematic analysis using Leximancer. This paper will also address the gap between the results of both methods.

Content Analysis

Frequency Overview

Most of the posters are individuals (72% laymen and 2% prominent individuals). Only 26% of the posters are non-individual, in which mass media (including online news media outlets) is the largest (5%). It resembles the population of Facebook users in which individuals dominate the user category (see Chart 1).




Chart 1: Type of posters

Most statuses were posted on the day of the first attack (13 May 2018) (54%), while the second largest was posted on the second day of the attack, which was also the day of the second attack (31%) (see Chart 2). It shows that people quickly reacted to such a prominent event and shared their thoughts.




Chart 2: Date of posts

Most users perceived the terror act as a public matter, therefore most users did not mind sharing their thoughts and opinions with the public. The vast majority (94%) of the statuses were open to the public, while 6% others were open to their friends (see Chart 3).




Chart 3: Privacy setting

It implies that showing sympathy toward the terror attack victims was widely agreed as the right thing to do. The fact that users were still commenting on the fifth day of the attack implies the significance of this event and the deep attachment of users toward it.

Most users did not specify where they were when posting the statuses using #prayforsurabaya. Therefore, most of the statuses (89%) were unidentifiable in terms of geo-location (see Chart 4).




Chart 4: Geo-location

From those with identifiable geo-location, Indonesia is still dominant compared to overseas (2% posts from Surabaya and Sidoarjo, the area of the attack; 1% from East Java province other than Surabaya and Sidoarjo; and 6% from Indonesia other than East Java province). The scheduled comparison of responses between those with geo-location

Surabaya and those with other geo-locations was canceled due to the insignificant number of posts with geo-location.

Most statuses were accompanied by illustrations and/or links (69%) (see Chart 5).




Chart 5: With or without illustrations/ links

Among these illustrations/links, the biggest one was videos and pictures of the terror attack scene, including those depicted the gruesome conditions of the victims (32%). Five other largest groups of illustrations/links were about sympathy (15%), resilience (11%), stereotype, label, and opposition toward them (9%), call for unity (6%), and religious teachings (combination of Islamic teachings 4% and Christianity teachings 2%). Given the fact that some of the prominent figures (4%) also quoted religious teachings, the percentage of religious teachings among illustrations/links is bigger than 6% (see Chart 6).




Chart 6: Types of illustrations and links

Sympathy (46%) and slogans of resilience against any act of terrorism (17%) were the most prominent content of the posts under study (see Chart 7).




Chart 7: Main points of posts' contents

It might be biased since the hashtag used to mine the posts (#prayforsurabaya) falls under this category. However, the fact that the combinations of contents other than sympathy are also very large implies that users are not only sharing their sympathy. They were discussing and even debating other aspects under the said hashtag.

While most of the contents were sympathy and resilience slogans (46% and 17%, see Chart 7), there were also content about the stereotype, label and the opposition against them; accusation and anger; and social activism such as the appeal for online users not to spread the videos and pictures of terror victims. These posts triggered online discussion which helped the hashtag appear longer on Facebook.

Prominent Themes

All Facebook posts under this study show sympathy, while most Facebook users also widely shared the encouragement of resilience and call for unity. These three themes frame the terror attack as a moment to renew unity among Indonesians, strengthen the commitment to fight against terrorism and show support for those affected by the attack, denoting more agreement rather than discussion.

However, the fact that the church was the target of the attack and the attackers were Muslims made this terror attack inseparable from discussing religious matters and intergroup relations. Within this context, this research found four patterns of responses that created dialectic conversations, albeit indirectly, namely defending and promoting identity, anticipating backlash; putting terrorism on an urgent national policy-making agenda; and correcting ignorance.

A) *Defending and Promoting Identity*

In this category, some Facebook users tried to separate Islam (including Islamic teachings and Muslims) from the act of terrorism. In contrast, other users promoted Christianity's teaching of love, and an interpretation of Christianity teaching that being a Christian means one must be ready for the possibility of being persecuted as it is one of their features when living on earth. Facebook users who tried to separate Islam and Islamic teachings from the fact that the bombers were Muslim offered three arguments. First, Islam prohibits suicide (hence suicide bombings).

Islam mengharamkan bunuh diri!! Terrorist bukanlah Islam!! saya sebagai ummat Islam mengutuk keras pelaku Bom 3 gereja di Surabaya, semoga pelaku segera di tangkap dan di hukum seberat2nya.

English translation: Islam prohibits suicide!! Terrorists are not Islam!! As a Muslim, I strongly condemned the bombing perpetrators of 3 churches in Surabaya, may they be caught and punished as severely as possible. (Post No. 241)



Figure 1: Stating that suicide is not *jihad* (illustration on Post No. 244)

Second, Islam clearly outlined the ethics of war in which terrorism is not one of them.

Ga usah ngaku islam kalo ga tau adat perang rasululloh. Perang lo yahh..bukan suasana damai 😡😡😡 Ngaku islam tapi ga nyontoh baginda rosulYg mendapat wahyu langsung dr penguasa langit dan bumi? Sudah brp poin yg kamu langgar? Masih ngaku islam? Dan kamu juga yg selalu nuduh kami para muslim radikal GO TO HELL !!!!

English translation: Don't declare yourself as a Muslim if you don't know the Messenger's ethics of war. In the time of war, that is not applicable in the time of peace (angry emoticon). So, do you declare yourself as a Muslim without obeying the Messenger who've got revelation directly from the owner of the universe? How many points [of the Messenger's ethics of war] that you

violate? And for you too who always accuse Muslims as radical, GO TO HELL !!! (Post No. 73)



Figure 2: Showing Islam's ethic of war (illustration on Post No. 196)

Third, Islam as a religion of peace respects all living beings.

Kalau para terorist mengatasnamakan mereka dan perbuatannya adalah islam dan jihad. Mereka sebenarnya BODOH dan DICUCI OTAKNYA dan TIDAK MENUNJUKKAN ISLAM. Karena Islam dan muslim yang sebenarnya tidak akan tega meski hanya melukai seekor semut Karena dalam ajaran Islam yang sebenarnya:

*"pada setiap jiwa yang bernyawa pasti ada pahalanya" Sabda Rasulullah SAW
"Jika ada yang membunuh satu orang, maka itu sama halnya dengan membunuh seluruh umat manusia" (Al Qur'an, Al-Maidah: 32).*

English translation: If the terrorists regard themselves and their acts as islam and jihad, they actually STUPID and being BRAINWASHED and DID NOT SHOW THE TRUE ISLAM. The true Islam and Muslim will have no gut to kill the innocents, even to an ant, since the true teaching of Islam is:

"There are rewards [for doing good deeds to] every living being," said the Messenger PBUH "If someone kills a person equals to killing all human beings" (Al Qur'an, Al Maidah: 32). (Post No. 229)



Figure 3: Stating that Islam teaches tolerance, brotherhood, and peace (illustration on Post No. 75)

These responses basically want to disassociate the terrorism act and Islam (including Islamic teachings and Muslims) and clean Islam's tarnished image because of the terrorism act. On the other hand, some users regard persecution as the risk any Christian should bear in their life.

Penganiayaan adalah resiko pengikut Kristus

English translation: Persecution is the risk of the followers of Christ. (Post No. 80)




Figure 4: A verse on New Testament saying that a period of killing and exclusion will be endured by Christians (illustration on Post No. 75)

Other users showed the positive image of Christianity by stressing the love Christians should always share, including during a hard time.

TUHAN ampunilah Mereka dengan apa yang mereka perbuat Sebagai manusia Biasa Secara Manusiawi kita sedih kita marah benci dgn perbuatan yg menghilangkan Nyawa orang lain tak Berdosa tetapi Tuhan slalu Mengajarkan Kami untuk mengasihi sesama kami manusia Krn Tuhan memiliki Otoritas Didalam kehidupan kami yang Percaya akan Iman dalam Kristus.

English translation: God forgives them for what they have done. As a normal human being, we are sad and angry toward the act of killing other innocent humans, but God teaches us to share love with all humans. God has the authority on our life who have faith in Christ. (Post No. 110)



Figure 5: Shows some reasons which made a Facebook user proud to be Christian, one of them is the urge to spread the love even in hard times (illustration on Post No. 75)

These two types of responses from the possibly Muslim and Christian Facebook users put the two groups and identities, Islam-Muslims and Christianity-Christians, in stark positions. The first shows the need to defend their identity, while the second takes the opportunity to promote their identity.

Do Muslims need to defend themselves and offer a kind of clarification? They do, especially considering the accusation that is subtly and implicitly directed at them, such as:

Stay safe my fellow Surabayans. Just stay home, 'Netflix and chill' or cuddle with your loved ones. As you see, lack of cuddle could be one of the driving reason why people decide to commit violence. Inability to cuddle on earth, makes them wishing for 72 celestial beings to cuddle with. (Post No. 28, originally written in English)

Marrying 72 celestial beings in heaven is widely believed as the reward for good Muslims. Passing away while practising the proper *jihad* is believed as an automatic pathway to gaining this reward. Hence, the reference to "72 celestial beings" implicitly connects Islamic teaching to terrorist acts. The incorrect and simplistic understanding of *jihad*, its extremist view, and numerous socio-political problems led tiny portions of Muslims to engage in terror attacks. However, *jihad* (see Knapp, 2003) and the elaboration of other aspects of Islamic teachings are beyond the scope of this paper.

Here are three other similar implicit accusations connecting Islamic teaching with terrorist acts:

Ketika doktrinasi sudah melekat, tai kucing rasa coklat. everyone goes to heaven?

English Translation: When doctrines hold you so tight, cat's poo tastes chocolate*. Does everyone go to heaven? (Post No. 59)

*Note: This is an Indonesian proverb, usually used to describe someone's excessive love for something which makes him/her unable to objectively judge it.

Teroris, Surga Mana Yang Hendak Kamu Tuju?

English Translation: Terrorists, which paradise you are heading to? (Post No. 104)

Jika membunuh hanya untuk masuk surga, Maka itu ajaran sesat.

English Translation: The teaching which allows killing for the admission to paradise is deviant (Post No. 112)

A user puts his/her accusation more explicitly. S/he accused extreme views have been adopted and shared through the education system.

Banyak yg berteori bahwa pendidikan bisa mengalahkan terorisme. Saya yakin yg dimaksud bukan pendidikan formal di sekolah. Sebagaimana kita lihat hari ini banyak guru dan ustadz yang justru menunjukkan simpati pada tindakan terorisme. Mengirimkan anak2 kita kedalam bimbingan guru2 dan ustadz seperti ini malah berpotensi memasok bibit2 pelaku teror.
English translation: Many people argue that education can beat terrorism. I believe that education means there is no formal one in schools. We can see that nowadays, many teachers and ustadz (an Arabic word which also means teacher) show their sympathy for terror acts. Sending our children to be taught by them increases the potency to grow a new batch of terrorists. (Post No. 43)

B) *Anticipating Backlash*

Some Facebook posts show the fear of backlash against Muslim women wearing a burqa, as one of the perpetrators was wearing a burqa when she carried out the attack. The fact that Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country has not diminished this fear since wearing a burqa is also a minority among Indonesian Muslim women. One Facebook post even provocatively asked those with burqas to be drowned. Hence, some Facebook users tried to convince people that Muslim women wearing a burqa is not radicalized.

Pakaian boleh sama, bercadar. Namun aqidah kami berbeda. Tidak semua yg bercadar itu teroris. Tidak semua teroris itu bercadar.

English translation: Our attire might be the same, wearing a burqa. However, our faiths are different. Not all burqa wearers are terrorists. Not all terrorists are wearing a burqa. (Post No 114)



Figure 6: Shows two women wearing burqa with a caption saying that they are not terrorists as terrorism is not taught in Islam (illustration on Post No. 48)

Some posts exploit the fragile side of the burqa-wearing Muslim women to convince people that they are no different from other women.

Dikelilingi org bercadar, kenapa takut. My sist juga bercadar... Saya punya beberapa teman yang bercadar. Jangankan merakit bom, pasang tabung gas saja mereka takutnya setengah mati 🤔🤔

English translation: Don't be afraid when you are surrounded by burqa-wearing people. My sister is also wearing burqa...I have some burqa-wearing friends. They are acutely afraid just to attach the gas cylinder to its regulator, how will they be brave enough to assemble a bomb [?] [disbelieve emoticon]. (Post No. 228)

C) *Putting Terrorism as an Urgent National Policy-Making Agenda*

Some Facebook users used the terror attack as momentum to push the Indonesian government and lawmakers to take more severe actions in preventing terror attacks in the future. For them, it means the government must rectify the law draft on terrorism. The fact that some groups, including the human rights commission, urged the government and house of representatives to study the bill draft more closely to avoid loopholes (Agung, 2018; Damarjati, 2018; Erdianto, 2018; Jurnaliston, 2018; Purnamasari, 2018; Saputra, 2018), did not deter them from supporting the legislation of this bill draft as soon as possible. A sense of urgency to have a law that is hoped to better prepare the government in dealing with terrorism threats is seen as more important than reviewing the draft bill more closely to avoid human rights violations.

Saya kurang faham penyebab UU tentang Terorisme itu tidak selesai-selesai di DPR RI sampai pemerintah harus mengeluarkan perpu. Setahu saya juga, mayoritas anggota DPR RI berasal dari partai pendukung pemerintah. Jadi ya tinggal dikondisikan saja agar selesai itu UU. ... Lagipula pemerintah punya kekuasaan yang sangat kuat, kalau UU tentang terorisme itu tidak jadi, pakai perpu sebagai payung hukum sementara sambil menunggu UU. Masak harus menunggu kejadian penyerangan seperti di Surabaya lagi.

English translation: I don't really understand why the ratification of Law on Terrorism is not finished yet, forcing the government to issue Perppu (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law). What I know is that most lawmakers in the House of Representatives come from government-supporting political parties. Hence, it should be easy to ratify that law. ... Furthermore, the government has a very strong power that it can execute the Perppu while waiting for the ratification of the law. Do we need to wait for a similar act of terrorism just like the one in Surabaya [to have the law ratified?]. (Post No. 95)

Some Facebook users even support the idea to let the army tackles terrorism. Some groups regarded this idea as a dangerous manoeuvre to let the military intervene in civilian matters.

Sudah saat ny pemerintah menegaskan keberadaan ny akan stabilitas keamanan dan ketertiban umum, khusus ny menyangkut kebebasan dan kenyamanan beribadah. Kiranya wacana pembentukan satuan khusus anti teror dari TNI bukan sebatas menu penambahan anggaran di Senayan.

English translation: It is time for the government to ensure security and civil order stability, especially related to freedom and ease of worshipping. I do hope that the idea of creating a military's special anti-terrorism unit is not merely a pretext to increase the budget in Senayan (the headquarter of the House of Representatives). (Post No. 139)

D) *Correcting Ignorance*

Another relatively prominent theme apart from the identity-related conversation is correcting other users' attitudes. The correction was mainly aimed at two groups, those who think that the terror attacks were merely the government's act of diversion and those who circulate the pictures and videos of terror attack scenes, primarily those depicting victims in an unfortunate condition.

Employing the conspiracy theory, some people doubted the terror act as a genuine act triggered by a specific ideology and tended to believe that it was part of the government's effort to divert people's attention from its weaknesses and problems. Many Facebook users condemned other users who think this way.

Kalian yg punya teori konspirasi atau pengalihan isu, itu terserah kalian and your ignorance, tapi please tahan diri membuat status atau komentar dg teori konspirasi kalian untuk sejenak menunjukkan empati kepada para korban.

English translation: For you who hold the conspiracy theory or [regard this terror acts as] diversion, it's all up to you and your ignorance, but please don't make statuses or comments based on your conspiracy theory to show your empathy to the victims even for a while. (Post No. 42)

Other user shows his/her anger using Surabaya traditional utterance:

Hei... kalian yg bilang bom sbg pengalihan isu.... mrrinio tak amplas bathukmu

English translation: Hey you who said the bomb attacks as a diversion.... Come here, let me sand up your forehead. (Post No. 63)



Figure 7: A condemnation of those who considered terror attacks the government's deviation (illustration on Post No. 92)

Some online users turned to conspiracy theory and regarded the event as serious as a terror attack as a diversion that implies deep distrust toward the government. Some people always have a suspicion that the government is dishonest and will do anything to preserve their image.

Another group under criticism is those who circulated pictures and videos of terror scenes, especially those depicting the victims' gruesome condition.

Apapun alasannya. Tolong JANGAN menyebarkan gambar atau video apapun dari kejadian ledakan bom, terutama apabila ada gambar korban, ataupun pelaku dalam kondisi mengenaskan. Anda mungkin merasa itu empati. Sebagian merasa ngeri dan takut. Tapi diluar sana, ada kelompok yang merasakan hal yang berbeda.

English translation: Whatever your reason, please do not circulate pictures and videos about the bomb attack, especially the ones showing victims and perpetrators' grotesque conditions. You might want to show your empathy [by showing those pictures and videos], but there are people who are afraid just to watch it. And, somewhere out there, there are groups who have a different feeling about it. (Post No. 23)



Figure 8: The appeal not to share picture and video of terror attack victims (illustration on Post No. 92)

Thematic and Conceptual Analysis

This paper separates the themes among the Facebook post cluster and illustration cluster. While the themes and concepts within the first cluster are complete, the themes and concepts within the second cluster are not as complete as they should have been due to the limitation of Leximancer, which can only process written words and is unable to process pictures, audio, and video materials. When a researcher wants to analyze the content of an illustration, s/he needs to transcribe the content of the illustration into written words. In this research, the researcher re-typed the content of the pictures which contain written slogans and statements. However, I have only summarized the content of video illustrations/links. Transcription of these materials is considered too long. This is the weakness of this research.

Table 1: Themes and concepts within the post cluster

Themes	Concepts
<i>korban</i> (victims)	<i>Korban</i> (victims), <i>gereja</i> (church), <i>bersama</i> (together), <i>bom</i> (bomb)
Prayforsurabaya	Prayforsurabaya
<i>Kami</i> (we, does not include the ones we address to)	<i>Kami</i> (we, does not include the ones we address to), <i>meninggal</i> (died, passed away), <i>bisa</i> (able to), <i>dia</i> (she/he)
Surabaya	Surabaya
<i>Kita</i> (We, include the ones we address to)	<i>Kita</i> (We, include the ones we address to)
<i>Orang</i> (people)	<i>Orang</i> (people)
Islam	Islam




Figure 9: Thematic map of post cluster




Figure 10: Conceptual map of post cluster

Table 1 above shows the themes and concepts within the post cluster, which shows three points. First, Facebook users focused their attention on the hard facts of the event, which are the victims, the location of the bombing (church, Surabaya), means of the attack (bomb), and the condition of the victims (died). Second, Facebook users were split into two groups when perceiving the attack. One group see an attack as the attack on all Indonesians, and therefore they see themselves as *kita* (the Facebook post makers and the audience belong to one group). The other group sees the bombing as an attack on their respective groups. The presumably Christian Facebook users see the bombing as targeting them, while the presumably Muslim Facebook users see the bombing as discrediting them. Both groups perceived themselves as the victims of the terror attack. Therefore, the third largest theme was *kami*. *Kami* means ‘we’, albeit it does not include the ones we address. Therefore, *kami* means Facebook post makers and the audience do not belong to the same group. Third, the prominent position of Islam within the conversation. Islam was mentioned and discussed within the posts, regardless of the tone and direction of the posts.

Table 2: Themes and concepts within the illustration cluster

Themes	Concepts
Terorisme (Terrorism)	<i>Terorisme</i> (terrorism), <i>teroris</i> (terrorist), <i>aksi</i> (action)
Islam	Islam, Muslim, <i>agama</i> (religion), <i>membunuh</i> (to kill)
<i>Kami</i> (we, does not include the ones we address to)	<i>Kami</i> (we, does not include the ones we address to)




Figure 11: Thematic map of illustration cluster




Figure 12: Conceptual map of illustration cluster

Table 2 above exhibits the themes and concepts within the illustration cluster. Here, segregation was more apparent. Three themes within the illustration cluster were *terorisme* (terrorism), Islam, and *kami* (we, does not include the ones we address). These themes indicated that Facebook users were split when perceiving the bombing. The prominent position of *kami* signalled that the division among Facebook users was apparent. The division was related to the role of religion, especially Islam (or the absence of it), in nurturing terrorism and the position of each group relative to the attack.

When the themes and concepts of the posts and illustration clusters are put together, we can see that the conversation made through these Facebook statuses were mostly sympathy toward the victims of the terror attacks, condemnation toward the terrorists, and

the feeling of being the victim of the terror act. This feeling has two strands, the feeling of being targeted by the terrorists (presumably by Christian Facebook users), and being held responsible for the terror act because of sharing the same identity (presumably by Muslim Facebook users). Meanwhile, the discussion related to government policy and ways of deradicalization were very marginal.

Looking at both clusters' thematic and conceptual maps (picture 9, 10, 11, and 12 above), we missed two prominent findings that were apparent through content analysis: perspectives on the burqa and the appeal not to share pictures and videos of the terror victims. Again, it shows the specificity of Leximancer (which is also its limitation) that can only process written texts and is unable to analyze pictures, audio, and video materials.

Overall, the post cluster accommodated a general response toward the event. Hence the content was mainly more generic and less partisan. On the other hand, the illustration cluster showed a more partisan attitude toward the bombing. The illustration cluster reveals more about the stance, or at least, the stressing point of each Facebook user, hence it shows a more partisan tone than the post (status).

DISCUSSION

There were thematic intersections between the result of content analysis and Leximancer's thematic analysis. Both methods showed two different discursive activisms in responding to the terror attack. The first discursive activism put the terror attack on all Indonesians and humanity. Therefore, it garnered non-partisan responses such as sympathy, encouragement for resilience, and the call for unity. This type of activism is large in number and quite largely represented through hashtags such as #prayforsurabaya, #kamitidaktakut (we are not afraid), and #bersatulawanterorisme (united against terrorism). The second activism shows a more partisan tendency, albeit communicated mildly. The appearance of themes *kita* and *kami* highlighted this difference. Both Christians and Muslims regarded themselves as victims of terror attacks does not imply unity but discrepancy. Christians see themselves as direct victims and targets of the attack, while Muslims see themselves as victims of slander to the point that they fear backlash and feel the urge to provide evidence that distances Islam from terrorism.

Bonilla and Rosa (2015) found that groups "turning to digital activism at the highest rate" (p.8) are those who are misrepresented mainly in the media, given negative labels and discriminated against by the government or its apparatus. My investigation on Facebook posts #prayforsurabaya found that the ones who turn to online activism are those who fear to be perceived as misrepresented in the media, given the negative labels but not necessarily discriminated against by the government or its apparatus. This group, which is presumably Muslims, or specific groups within the Indonesian Muslim population to be more precise, has a long sentiment that they have always been put under suspicion. Some Muslim groups see themselves as marginalized and discriminated (viva.co.id, 2015; Husaini, 2015; Bachtiar, 2017; Kuwado, 2017; Sasongko, 2017; Wijaya, 2017). Their anxiety was represented through the sayings such as "*mayoritas rasa minoritas*" (being majority which felt like minority) or the impression of the Indonesian socio-political landscape that they labelled as "*tirani minoritas*" (tyranny of the minority). This group has minimal trust in mainstream media and hence turned to alternative media for their source of information. To complicate the trust issue, the government has also little trust in these media to the point that the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology in 2015, on the advice of Indonesia's National

Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) suspended several online media which majority of them were labelled as Islamic media or *media dakwah* (Islamic preaching media) (Panjimas, 2015a; Panjimas, 2015b; Kominfo.go.id, 2015). The suspension which was revoked in January 2017 (Kominfo.go.id, 2017) was based on a suspicion that they bred hate speech.

This situation paved the way for #prayforsurabaya to host counter-frames. Two clearest ones were about the relationship between Islamic teaching and terrorism, and the burqa as a marker or even identity of the terrorist. Many Facebook users are against these frames and try to offer new ones. Many users attached illustrations about the Islamic ethic of war which is very respectful and shared no resemblance to a terror attack (Shihab, 2018; Khaer, 2016).

Users who tried to counter the frames about the burqa as a marker for terrorists based their messages on the fact that wearing a burqa is only a matter of carrying out one's belief. Some users posted his/her testimony about his/her burqa-wearing friend, who is so delicate that she doesn't dare to connect the LPG tube to the regulator, let alone to hold a bomb. Other users made a social experiment asking people to hug a burqa-wearing woman if they were not afraid.

This research found that Facebook users engaged actively in corrective actions. Two attitudes received correction significantly: the act of circulating pictures and videos of terror victims and the perception that perceive the terror attack as merely the government's effort to divert people's attention from its weaknesses.

Lim (2017, as cited in Lu, 2019, p.877) said that "a firm position on political issues and the confidence to express political opinions are important antecedents for corrective political participation". It seems that most Facebook users believe that circulating the pictures and videos of terror victims are inappropriate. They believe that this is the majority opinion of people. They even went further by claiming that such actions can be categorized as helping terrorists gain their aim to spread fear.

Similarly, most Facebook users show firm belief that is questioning the nature of the terror attack, one of them saying that it was the government's effort to divert people's attention from criticizing it, is showing no empathy toward the victim of the bombing. The timing of the terror attack last year to presidential succession polarized the audience even further. Many Facebook users claimed that those holding the conspiracy theory wished to have a new president in the 2019 presidential election.

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BIODATA

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