The Iron Cage: Security Dilemma Dynamic Driving the India-Pakistan Conflict

Shamsul Azri Mohd Radzi, Faridah Jaafar

Abstract


This article discusses the enduring complexities of the India-Pakistan conflict and uses defensive realism to argue that the security dilemma is the main causal factor for over seventy years of unabated hostility between these two nuclear-armed South Asian states. The paper articulates this conflict and defends the defensive-realist security-dilemma mechanism with convincing arguments for endorsing this strategy. Applying Kenneth Waltz’s structural realist approach and Robert Jervis’s security dilemma analysis, this study shows how the India-Pakistan relationship encapsulates how anarchic international orders drive rational states pursuing security to create endless conflict regardless of regime, leadership, or diplomatic efforts. The study systematically analyzes five key cases from the 1947 Kashmir War to the 2019 Balakot Crisis based on realism’s fundamental principles: Statism, Survival, and Anarchy. It explains how protective intentions are misperceived as hostile acts in ambiguous situations, creating a never-ending chain reaction where both nations become trapped in
structural imperatives that transform rational thought into collective catastrophe. Using secondary sources including declassified documents, memoirs, and scholarly analysis, the study compares how fear, uncertainty, and action-reaction dynamics interact across different historical, technological, and geopolitical contexts. Findings show that ideological, identity, and domestic political factors are significant contextual influences on conflict types. However, the security dilemma provides the most succinct explanation for why wars recur, escalate, and prove difficult to end. This systemic disaster has persisted through partition violence, decades of war, nuclearization, terrorist provocations, and modern hybrid warfare, maintaining its fundamental structure of reciprocal insecurity while assimilating new technologies and transforming international systems. The author concludes that this theoretical framework offers important insights into dispute resolution strategies, emphasizing that approaches must operate within structural limitations to achieve stability, not merely solve immediate problems.


Keywords


Security Dilemma; India-Pakistan Conflict; Kashmir Dispute; Defensive Realism; Nuclear Deterrence

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JEBAT : Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies, 
Center for Research in History, Politics and International Affairs,
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 43600 UKM, Bangi Selangor, Malaysia.

eISSN: 2180-0251

ISSN: 0126-5644