Cognitive Disability and The Ethics of Care: Justifying Dependency as A Moral Claim in Relational Justice

CHRISTOPHER RYAN MABOLOC

Abstract


This study seeks to explain the importance of the ethics of care in making society just and equal. It attempts to respond to the exclusion of persons with disability. Using the interpretive method, this paper asks about society’s ethical obligations to persons with cognitive disability. It argues that the idea of cash enhancement is not enough. Caring for persons with mental impairment requires the deep type of commitment that can only be founded in unconditional love and care. That justice is relational means that the child with autism requires the full attention of parents and the support of the state. But there is a gap since human society is reluctant to embrace the fact that there are persons who are dependent for life. The aim of this investigation is to argue that dependency on the part of individuals with cognitive disability is a morally justifiable claim that is rooted in the value of love and care as critical elements in the relational dimension of justice

Keywords: Ethics of Care; Cognitive Disability; Dependency; Relational Justice; Autism


Full Text:

PDF

References


Anderson, E. (1999). What is the Point of Equality? Ethics 109: 287-337.

Brighouse, H. (2001). Can Justice as Fairness accommodate the Disabled? Social Theory and Practice 27 (4): 537-560.

Cohen, J. (2004). The Importance of Philosophy: Reflections on John Rawls. South African Journal of Philosophy 23 (2): 113-119.

Kittay, E. (1999). Love’s Labor. New York: Routledge.

Kittay, E. (2001). When Caring is Just and Justice is Caring: Justice and Mental Retardation. Public Culture 13 (3): 557-579.

Kymlicka, W. (2007). Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, M. (2006). Frontiers of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Putnam, D., Wasserman, D., Blustein, J. & Asch, A. (2019). Disability and Justice. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Rawls, J, (1999). A Theory of Justice. Revised edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Richardson, H. (2006). Rawlsian Social Contract Theory and the Severely Disabled. The Journal of Ethics 10 (4): 419-462.

Wong, S. (2007). The Moral Personhood of Individuals labeled ‘Mentally Retarded’: A Rawlsian Response to Nussbaum. Social Theory and Practice 33 (4): 579-594.


Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.


Contact:

Editor-in-Chief

MALIM Jurnal Pengajian Umum Asia Tenggara

Pusat Pengajian Citra Universiti

Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

43600 UK­M Bangi, Selangor Darul Ehsan

MALAYSIA

E-mail: jmalim@ukm.edu.my

© Copyright Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia